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Abstract
The transition from hunting and gathering to farming at the end of the
Pleistocene was one of the most important events in human history, having
major impacts on human demography, evolution, health, culture, technol-
ogy, and social stratification. The reasons why some societies switched to
farming are still debated, with climate stabilisation and population pressure
as popular hypotheses. However, since these processes occurred so long ago,
investigating the transition can be difficult without the use of mathematical
models.
In this thesis I investigate the effect of various factors, including population
size, conservatism, property rights, environmental conditions, climate vari-
ability, and mobility, on the transition to farming using evolutionary models.
I do this by implementing an intensive parameter sensitivity analysis method
on an existing game theoretical model (Bowles and Choi, 2013) for the ori-
gins of agriculture, and also develop and explore my own agent-based models
of social and environmental interactions.
Using the Bowles and Choi model, I find that the key parameters for the
emergence of farming are group structuring, group size, conservatism, and
farming-friendly property rights. The analysis of this model also shows that
although advantageous, it is not essential for the emergence of farming for
farming productivity to be greater than foraging productivity. In the devel-
opment of my own model, I first consider mobility changes in a forager popu-
lation, and find that low depletion and high growth rates can lead to reduced
mobility, low fitness, and high population density. When I add subsistence
behaviours to the model I find that three behaviours can evolve in response
to different environmental conditions; mobile foraging, sedentary foraging,
and sedentary farming. I also find a relationship between reduced mobility,
the emergence of farming, decreased fitness and high population densities.
Additionally, my model predicts that population pressure was caused by, but
not causal of, the switch to farming. Importantly, these results concur with
the observed archaeological data and ethnographic record, and highlight the
value of using modelling to validate and/or challenge observed data.

Acknowledgements
Many thanks to my supervisors Mark Thomas, Stephen Shennan and Peter
Bentley, whose expert guidance, advice and encouragement made this work
possible. I would also like to express my gratitude to my examiners Joanna
Bryson and Mark Altaweel, for reading this dissertation and for their valuable
comments and suggestions.
Thanks to the MACE lab and CoMPLEX for invaluable conversations, inspi-
ration and support along the way. Particular gratitude to Adrian Timpson,
Yoan Diekmann, Catherine Walker, Lucy van Dorp, Anna Rudzinski, Kate
Brown, and Pascale Gerbault.
This thesis would not have been possible without the love and support of my
family and friends. Special thanks to my sister Sarah for keeping me up-to-
date on dog memes, to my mum Tina for the crystal energy, and to my dad
Pat for the years of bribes which have got me to this position. Thanks for the
distractions, care and outside perspectives along the way to Amy, Obb, Jez,
Rob, Louise, Jaspal, Ruth, Jackie, Liz, Sam, Lauren, Laurie, Paul, Philippa,
Louie, Federico, Thomas, Alan, Fintan, Mel, Lulu, Mark, Thom, Sally, and
Kabosu.

Contents
List of Figures 14
List of Tables 18
Glossary 20
1 Introduction 23
1.1 The Origins of Agriculture and the Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.1.1 The Origin of Agriculture in Southwest Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.1.2 Other Independent Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.1.3 The Consequences of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.2 The Spread of Agriculture into Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.3 Understanding the Origins of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.3.1 Climate Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.3.2 Demographic Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.3.3 Internal Changes and Social Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.3.4 Human Behavioural Ecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.4 Hunter-gatherer Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.4.1 Why Move? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.5 Thesis Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2 Modelling and Data 53
2.1 Evolutionary Theory and Human Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2 Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2.1 Evolutionary Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2.2 Evolutionary Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2.3 Agent-Based Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
9
CONTENTS
2.2.4 Building and Validating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2.5 Modelling and the Scientific Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Models for the Origins of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3.1 Forager Population Size and Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3.2 Models for the Switch to Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.4 Methodological Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.4.1 The FIO Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.4.2 Predicting When Outcomes Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.4.3 Measuring Convergence in Simulation Outcome Distributions . . 83
2.4.4 The Outcome Clustering Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.5.1 Ethnographic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.5.2 Archaeological Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.5.3 Climate Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3 Property Rights and Subsistence Strategy Changes 105
3.1 The Bowles and Choi Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.1.1 Model Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.1.2 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.2.1 Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.2.2 Parameter Randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.2.3 The Criteria for Ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.4.1 Structuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.4.2 Conservatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.4.3 Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.4.4 Ratio of the Productivity of Farming to Foraging . . . . . . . . . 123
3.4.5 Cost of Conflict and the Level of Conformity . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.4.6 Insensitive Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.4.7 Assumptions and Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
10
CONTENTS
4 The Forager Model 129
4.1 Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.1.1 Foraging Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.2 Agent Movement and Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.3 Family Fission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.3.1 Probability of Fission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.4 Mutation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.4.1 Selection and the Null Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.5 Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.5.1 Distance Between Two Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.5.2 Potential Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.5.3 Attractiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.5.4 Cost of Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.5.5 Site Size and the Maximum Number of Agents . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.6 Initialisation and Iterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5 Mobility Changes in a Forager Population 147
5.1 An Example of Model Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2 Preliminary Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2.1 Initial Conditions – Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2.2 Number of Iterations – Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2.3 Number of Sites – Experiment 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2.4 Minimum Foraging Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.2.5 Averaging – Experiment 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.2.6 Outcomes of Preliminary Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3 Parameter Sensitivity and Simulation Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.1 The Effects of All 8 Parameters – Experiment 5 . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.3.2 Fixing Certain Parameters – Experiments 6 and 7 . . . . . . . . 166
5.4 Temporal and Spatial Variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.4.1 Temporal Variability – Experiment 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.4.2 Spatial Variability – Experiment 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.5 Model Events Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.5.1 Dynamics Over Time – Experiment 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.5.2 Ordering Model Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
5.6.1 Parameter Sensitivity and Simulation Outcomes . . . . . . . . . 186
11
CONTENTS
5.6.2 Variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
5.6.3 Events Over Time and Their Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6 Mobility and Subsistence Strategy Changes in a Mixed Population 193
6.1 The Forager-Farmer Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.1.1 Effort Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.1.2 Foraging and Farming Fitness Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.1.3 Agent Yield and Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.1.4 Site Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.1.5 The Maximum Number of Agents at a Site . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.1.6 Initialisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6.1.7 Running the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.2 Parameters Sensitivity and Simulation Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.2.1 The Effect of All 12 Parameters – Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.2.2 Fixing Parameters – Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.3 Temporal and Spatial Variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
6.3.1 Temporal Variability – Experiment 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
6.3.2 Spatial Variability – Experiment 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
6.4 Model Events Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
6.4.1 Dynamics Over Time – Experiment 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
6.4.2 Ordering Model Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
6.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
6.5.1 Simulation Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
6.5.2 Parameter Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
6.5.3 Variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
6.5.4 Events Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
7 Conclusions 239
7.1 Thesis Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
7.1.1 Property Rights and Subsistence Strategy Changes . . . . . . . . 240
7.1.2 Mobility Changes in a Forager Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
7.1.3 Mobility and Subsistence Strategy Changes in a Mixed Population 242
7.2 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
7.3 Further Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
12
Appendix 249
A Data from Robert Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
B Corrections to Bowles and Choi’s Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
C Model Coding and Running Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
D Justifying Limit Assumptions in the Bowles and Choi Model . . . . . . . 256
E FIO Ranking Criteria in the Bowles and Choi Model . . . . . . . . . . . 258
F ODD Protocol for the Forager Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
F.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
F.2 Entities and State Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
F.3 Process Overview and Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
F.4 Design Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
F.5 Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
F.6 Input data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
F.7 Submodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
G Weighted Selection Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
H Details of the Forager Model Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
I Investigating Mutation Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
J When the Environment Becomes Stable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
K Preliminary Checks for the Forager-Farmer Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
K.1 Number of Iterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
K.2 Number of Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
K.3 Averaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
K.4 Outcomes of Preliminary Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
L Cluster Analysis Using the Forager-Farmer Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
M Details of the Forager-Farmer Model Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
N Research Article . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Bibliography 293
List of Figures
1.1 Proposed Independent Centers of Domestication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.2 Stages from Foraging to Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 Map of Southwest Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Early Cultivation Sites in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Maps of Mesoamerica and Eastern North America . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6 The Spread of Farming Across Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.7 Binford’s Model for Hunter-Gatherer Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.1 Von Neumann’s Self-Replicating Machine and Conway’s Game of Life . . 61
2.2 Agent-Based Models for Flocking and Puebloen Settlements . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Visualising Stochastic Multi-Parameter Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.4 The Fix-All-But-One Method in Stochastic Multi-Parameter Models . . 79
2.5 The FIO Method in Stochastic Multi-Parameter Models . . . . . . . . . 80
2.6 Predicting When Outcomes Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.7 Measuring Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.8 Outcome Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.9 Mobility by Region Type in Hunter-Gather Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.10 Residential Moves and Other Variables in Hunter-Gather Groups . . . . 89
2.11 Residential Mobility, Density and Primary Biomass in Hunter-Gather
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.12 Movement, Dependence on Fish and Effective Temperature in Hunter-
Gather Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.13 Group Size, Mortality and Fertility in Hunter-Gather Groups . . . . . . 92
2.14 Mortality and Fertility in Hunter-Gather Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.15 Wealth and Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.16 Effective Temperature and Primary Productivity for Hunter-Gather Groups 94
2.17 Archaeobotanical and Material Culture Dataset Sites . . . . . . . . . . . 96
14
2.18 Wild and Domestic Phenotypes Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.19 Material Culture and Ground Stone Artefacts Over Time . . . . . . . . 98
2.20 Population Density Data Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.21 Evidence for the Neolithic Demographic Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.22 Climate Variability Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.1 Cultural Updating Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.2 Replication of the Results from Bowles and Choi (2013) . . . . . . . . . 111
3.3 Bowles and Choi’s Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4 Number of Farmers in Ordered Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.5 Parameter Value Frequencies in Top Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.6 The Number of Farmers and Parameter Values in Top Simulations . . . 117
3.7 The Number of Farmers and Parameter Values in All Simulations . . . . 118
3.8 Parameter Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.9 Experimentation, Number of Groups and the Number of Farmers . . . . 120
3.10 Ratio of Farming to Foraging Productivity and the Number of Farmers . 121
3.11 Win Probability, Group Size and Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.1 Visualisation of the Forager Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2 Hexagonal Site Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.3 Depletion Term and the Number of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4 Foraging Quality Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.5 Wealth and Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.6 Mutation of Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.7 Site Distances, Potential Fitness and Attraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.8 Furthest Movement in the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.1 An Example of Model Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.2 Model Outcomes with Different Initial Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3 Model Outcomes Over 2000 Iterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4 Convergence of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.5 Region Size and Model Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.6 Final Mobility Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.7 Parameter Values in Simulations with no Agents Alive . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.8 Simulation Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.9 Parameter Values and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.10 Principal Components from Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.11 Pairs of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.12 Outcomes in Each Cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.13 Parameters in Each Cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5.14 Simulation Outcomes when Different Numbers of Parameters are Fixed . 167
5.15 Pairs of Outcomes when Parameters are Fixed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.16 Parameters and Outcomes when Four Parameters are Fixed . . . . . . . 171
5.17 Parameters and Outcomes when Six Parameters are Fixed . . . . . . . . 172
5.18 Pairwise Relationships Between Parameters in Clusters . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.19 The Effect of Temporal Variability on Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . 174
5.20 Simulation Outcomes with Environmental Variability . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.21 Temporal Variability and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
5.22 Different Types of Spatial Variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.23 Spatial Variability and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.24 Outcomes Over Time by Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5.25 Outcomes Over Time by Growth-Depletion Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.26 Outcomes in the first Iterations by Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.27 Measuring when Events Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
5.28 The Time Until Changes in Population Size and Mobility . . . . . . . . 184
6.1 Examples of Foraging Yield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.2 SimulationOutcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.3 Final Mean Effort and Mobility Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.4 Colour Coding Used to Represent Final Mean Strategies . . . . . . . . . 205
6.5 Parameters and Outcomes in Extremes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
6.6 Pairs of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
6.7 Simulation Outcomes when Only Environmental Parameters are Varied . 210
6.8 Final Mean Effort and Mobility Strategies when Only Environmental Pa-
rameters are Varied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
6.9 Pairs of Outcomes when Only Environmental Parameters are Varied . . 213
6.10 Pairs of Parameters when Only Environmental Parameters are Varied . 214
6.11 Parameters and Euclidean Distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
6.12 Parameters and Outcomes in Extremes when Only Environmental Pa-
rameters are Varied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
6.13 Parameter Pairs in Extremes when Only Environmental Parameters are
Varied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
6.14 Temporal Variability and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
6.15 Different Types of Spatial Variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
6.16 Spatial Variability and Strategy Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
6.17 Outcomes Over Time by Final Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
6.18 Pathways of Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
6.19 The Average Mobility to Effort Strategy Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
6.20 Pathways of Evolution by Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
6.21 Changes in the Numbers of Agents when Sedentary Farming Evolves . . 228
6.22 The Time Until Changes in Outcomes Occur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
List of Tables
1.1 Dates for Early Cultivation and Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.2 Dates for Archaeological Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.1 Payoffs in the Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Payoffs in the Hawk-Dove Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3 Existing Models for the Origins of Agriculture and Mobility . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Data Use Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.5 Ethnographic Mobility Data Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.6 Ethnographic Group Size, Mortality and Fertility Data Summaries . . . 92
2.7 Culture Categories in the Archaeological Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.8 Proportions of Juvenile Skeletons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.9 Estimates of How Many More People Farming Can Support . . . . . . . 100
3.1 Interaction Outcomes in the Bowles and Choi (2013) Model . . . . . . . 109
3.2 Model Parameters and the Ranges they are Varied in . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.3 Bowles and Choi’s (2013) Robustness Tests and Results . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4 Prior and Posterior Distribution Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.5 Correlations between Parameter Values and the Number of Farmers . . . 117
3.6 Correlations Between Parameter Pairs in the Top Simulations . . . . . . 120
4.1 Constants, Variables and Parameters in the Forager Model . . . . . . . . 145
5.1 Experiments Using the Forager Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2 Correlations Between Initial and Final Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3 Correlations Between Parameters and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.4 Correlations Between Parameters and Outcomes when Four Parameters
are Fixed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.5 Correlations Between Parameters and Outcomes when Six Parameters are
Fixed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
18
5.6 The Number of Simulations with Different Event Orders . . . . . . . . . 185
6.1 Experiments Using the Forager-Farmer Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.2 Constants, Variables and Parameters in the Forager-Farmer Model . . . 200
6.3 Correlations Between Parameters and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.4 Correlations Between Parameters and Outcomes when Only Environmen-
tal Parameters are Varied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
6.5 The Percentage of Simulations with Different Event Orders . . . . . . . 229
Glossary
Agriculture Farming dominates the activities and contributes the majority of the
diet of a group.
Broad Spectrum Revolution (BSR) Increases in the diet breadth of foragers
before the transition to agriculture.
Cultivation Intentionally preparing the soil for planting wild or domesticated
plants.
Cultural Evolution Applying evolutionary theory to cultural traits (instead of
genes) to understand cultural change (as opposed to genetic change).
Culture Information acquired via social transmission which is capable of affecting
individual behaviour.
Domestication Morphological or genetic changes in plant and animal species due
to selective breeding by humans.
Farming Cultivating domesticated plants and/or raising domesticated animals for
food.
Foraging Obtaining wild plants and/or wild animals for food, also referred to as
‘hunting and gathering’.
Human behavioural ecology (HBE) A framework in which to study diversity
in human behaviour in the context of adaptive solutions to the environment, i.e.
fitness-optimising behaviours being selected for.
Hunter-Gatherer A person who obtains most of their food by foraging.
Logistical Mobility The movement of smaller groups away from and back to
their base camp.
Neolithic demographic transition (NDT) The increase in fertility rates seen
during the transition to agricultural economies.
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Niche construction Environmental modification by organisms, which can in turn
change selection pressures.
Optimal Foraging Theory (OFT) A framework for understanding how animals
forage for food by minimising costs.
Residential Mobility The movement of an entire group to a different camp.
Sedentism Where a group at least partially remains at the same location year-
round.
Subsistence strategy The manner in which food is obtained by a group. This
could include foraging or farming, or a blend of both.

1Introduction
Summary
After around 190,000 years of anatomically modern humans living as hunter-gatherers,
societies began to make a transition to agricultural subsistence systems. These transi-
tions are thought to have occurred independently in several regions of the world between
11,500 and 3,500 years before present (yBP) (Bellwood et al., 2005). Farming has spread
to most of the world from these centres. This transition had major impacts on human de-
mography, evolution, diet, health, culture, technology, and social inequality (Diamond,
2002; Fuller, 2010; Lambert, 2009; Starling and Stock, 2007). It is generally agreed that
there are at least three separate regions around the world where agriculture originated
independently: southwest Asia, Mesoamerica, and China (Bellwood et al., 2005; Dia-
mond, 2002; Fuller, 2010). There is also growing evidence for additional independent
origins of domestication, which include the Eastern United States, the Andes, the Cen-
tral and South America tropics, New Guinea, West Africa, and southern and northern
India (Fuller, 2010). A range of different explanations for the development of agriculture
have been proposed, including those based on climate changes and population pressure.
Whereas the long-term advantages of farming are clear in that it is a strategy that
has generally led to increased carrying capacities and greater reproductive successes
(Bocquet-Appel, 2011b), the short-term fitness payoffs are less obvious, as Diamond
(2002, p. 700) observes:
The question ‘why farm?’ strikes most of us modern humans as silly. Of course
it is better to grow wheat and cows than to forage for roots and snails. But in
reality, that perspective is flawed by hindsight. Food production could not possibly
have arisen through a conscious decision, because the world’s first farmers had
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around them no model of farming to observe, hence they could not have known
that there was a goal of domestication to strive for, and could not have guessed
the consequences that domestication would bring for them. If they had actually
foreseen the consequences, they would surely have outlawed the first steps towards
domestication, because the archaeological and ethnographic record throughout the
world shows that the transition from hunting and gathering to farming eventually
resulted in more work, lower adult stature, worse nutritional condition and heavier
disease burdens.
Investigating the reasons behind the transition to agriculture is challenging because
modern ethnographic data may not be informative on ancient population dynamics, and
the material culture record is sparse and only weakly informative on social aspects of
the transition. Furthermore, the appearance of domestication traits in various species is
likely to postdate their initial cultivation or management, sometimes by a considerable
margin (Zeder, 2008). In this context, mathematical models can be helpful in exploring
the ecological and social conditions necessary for the transition to agriculture. There are
many examples of such models (e.g. Bowles and Choi (2013); Dow and Reed (2011); Dow
et al. (2009); Locay (1989); Marceau and Myers (2006); Reynolds (1986); Richerson et al.
(2001); Winterhalder and Goland (1993); Wirtz and Lemmen (2003)), which, together,
have explored most of the major hypotheses for the origins of agriculture.
However, many of the existing models are lacking important components, are anal-
ysed using ill defined parameter values, and/or do not include social-environment inter-
actions. Furthermore, the strong relationship between mobility, population density and
the origins of farming has only been specifically studied in very few models. Hence the
purpose of this thesis is to two-fold; the first is to implement a more thorough parameter
analysis method on an existing model for the origins of agriculture, and the second is to
build a mathematical model which specifically considers how mobility and population
density are interlinked with the origins of agriculture.
In this first chapter I will introduce the topic of the thesis – the origins of agriculture.
By reviewing archaeological evidence, I will build a picture of the factors leading up to
and surrounding the switch to agriculture, and the immediate implications, both locally
and globally. Since the transition to agriculture in SW Asia has received more attention
in the literature than in other parts of the world, my discussion will focus mostly on
this area, and then I will give a brief comparison to some of the origins in other parts
of the world. I will then briefly review the genetic evidence for the spread of farming
into Europe in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3 I will look at factors which may have been
important for the transition to agriculture, and discuss how human behavioural ecology
24
(HBE) can be a useful framework for understanding the transition. Since decreased
mobility is one of the key correlates of the switch to farming, in Section 1.4 I will discuss
hunter-gatherer mobility. I will finish this chapter with a discussion of the structure and
aims of the thesis.
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1.1. THE ORIGINS OF AGRICULTURE AND THE EFFECTS
1.1 The Origins of Agriculture and the Effects
Agriculture has been argued to have originated independently in at least three separate
regions: SW Asia, Mesoamerica and in China (Bar-Yosef, 1998; Brown et al., 2006).
Fuller (2010) also states that there is evidence for the independent domestication of var-
ious species in the Eastern U.S, the Andes, the Central and South America tropics, New
Guinea, West Africa, Japan, Tibet, and India. Figure 1.1 gives these proposed indepen-
dent origins and the crops which would have been cultivated and animals domesticated.
Eastern North 
America:
sunflower, sumpweed, 
pitseed, goosefoot, squash
Mesoamerica:
maize, beans, 
squash
North Peru/
Equador:
lima bean, sword
bean, squash
Andes: 
potato, oca, llama, 
quinoa, amaranth, 
guinea pig
Amazonia: 
manioc, peanut
Savanna:
cowpea, fonio, 
African rice, 
sorghum, cattle
West Sahel:
pearl millet
Fertile Crescent:
wheats, barley, sheep, 
goat, cattle, pig
India:
rice, mungbean, 
horsegram, browntop millet
Tibet:
buckwheat, yak
China: 
rice, proso and foxtail 
millets, soybean, pig
New Guinea:
banana, yams, taro
North Japan: 
barnyard millet,
burdock, soybean
Figure 1.1: Proposed independent centers of domestication, with the most widely
accepted regions shown in dark red. The crops cultivated at each centre are also given.
Adapted from (Fuller, 2010).
Archaeological evidence for agriculture can come from the presence of the morpho-
logical traits or genetic variants associated with domestication (Zeder et al., 2006), and
evidence for cultivation before domestication can be seen by the presence of weed seeds
which would have grown with the crops (Willcox et al., 2008) and also by crop-processing
by-products (Fuller et al., 2012). A summary of the changes in plant food procurement
from foraging to agriculture, and the associated types of archaeobotanical evidence
found, are shown in Figure 1.2. Using this evidence it can be seen that the timings
for early cultivation and the speed of development to a fully agricultural economy, are
quite different for each of the main regions for independent origins of agriculture – these
are given in Table 1.1.
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Increasing	labour	input	per	land	unit,	popula3on	density,	and	in	the	size,	density	
and	dura3on	of	se8lements.	
	
	
Wild	plant	
food	
procurement	
Wild	plant	food	
produc3on	
Cul3va3on	with	
systema3c	3llage	
Agriculture:	
cul3va3on	of	
domes3c	crops	
Gathering,	
burning,	
tending	
Replacement,	
plan3ng,	
harves3ng,	
storage	
Land	clearance,	
3llage	
Reliance	on	
cul3va3on,	
improved	harves3ng	
methods	
Foragers	using	
wild	
progenitors	
(oFen	
secondary	
resources)	
Management	of	
wild	progenitors	
(possibly	
dwindling),	range	
expansion	
Emergence	of	arable	
weed	ﬂora	
(assemblage	change);	
evolu3on	of	larger	
grains,	reduc3on	of	
dispersal	aids	
Rise	to	dominance	
and	ﬁxa3on	of	
domes3c-type	
dispersal	
Figure 1.2: Stages from foraging to agriculture (left to right) with the associated
expectations in the archaeobotanical evidence (bottom row). Adapted from Figure 1 in
Fuller (2007).
The transition to agriculture in SW Asia has been studied extensively for many
years, and therefore the literature is more detailed than for other parts of the world.
Because of this, in this section I will focus on building a picture of societal and climate
changes before and during the transition to agriculture in SW Asia. I will then give a
brief review of the transition in other parts of the world to illustrate how a worldwide
narrative for the transition does not hold. Since there is a notable amount of literature
for the transitions in China, Mesoamerica, and eastern North America (ENA), these will
be the areas I look at.
Definitions of terms relevant to this thesis are given in the glossary on page 20. I
use terms such as ‘the origins of agriculture’ and ‘the transition/switch to agriculture’
to refer to the period of time from when people first began to cultivate to when these
people fully adopted an agricultural economy, without having copied these behaviours
from existing farmers.
1.1.1 The Origin of Agriculture in Southwest Asia
The transition to agriculture from hunting and gathering is thought to have first begun
at the start of the early Holocene around 11,500 years before present (yBP) in SW Asia
(Zeder, 2011, this area is shown in Figure 1.3). But perhaps it is from the Late Upper
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Table 1.1: Approximate timings for the earliest cultivation evidence and the full adop-
tion of agriculture in the main regions of agricultural origins.
Region Early cultivation Agricultural economy Difference
fully adopted
SW Asia Rye: 11,500 BP 8000 BP 3500 years
(Zeder, 2011) (Zeder, 2011)
Southern China Rice: 10,000 BP 4300-5300 BP 4700-5700 years
- Yangtze River areas (Jiang et al., 2006) (Zhao, 2011)
Northern China Millet: 10,000 BP 7000-6000 BP 3000 - 4000 years
- Yellow River area (Lu et al., 2009) (Zhao, 2011)
Mesoamerica Maize: 8700 BP 3500-2900 BP 5200 - 5800 years
(Ranere et al., 2009) (Barker, 2006, p. 251)
Eastern North America Squash: 5000 BP 1300 BP 3700 years
(Smith, 2011) (Zeder and Smith, 2009)
Figure 1.3: SW Asia. The Levant in shown in red, the Fertile Crescent in pink and
the ‘core area’ of SW Asian plant domestication is within the dashed line.
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Table 1.2: Approximate dates for archaeological periods in SW Asia. Unless otherwise
stated dates are given in cal BP.
Archaeological/cultural period Start cal BP End cal BP Reference
Kebaran 21,250 17,575 Goring-Morris and
Belfer-Cohen (2011)
Early-Late Epi-Palaeolithic 24,000 11,600 Goring-Morris and
Belfer-Cohen (2011)
Natufian 14,900 11,750 Goring-Morris and
Belfer-Cohen (2011)
Khiamian 12,175 11,800 Goring-Morris and
Belfer-Cohen (2011)
Pre-Pottery Neolithic A (PPNA) 11,800 10,500 Conolly et al. (2011)
Early PPNB 10,500 10,300 Conolly et al. (2011)
Middle PPNB 10,300 9500 Conolly et al. (2011)
Late/Final PPNB 9500 8800 Conolly et al. (2011)
Pre-Pottery Neolithic C (PPNC) 8800 8400 Conolly et al. (2011)
Khirokitian 7000 cal BC 5500 cal BC Colledge et al. (2004)
and personal communi-
cation from Colledge
Early (Pottery) Neolithic (EN) 8400 7500 Conolly et al. (2011)
Palaeolithic/Early Epi-Palaeolithic that the very first processes leading to the transition
can be traced (Goring-Morris and Belfer-Cohen, 2011). Archaeological/cultural periods
mentioned in this section are shown in Table 1.2.
In the Upper Palaeolithic, hunter-gatherer groups in SW Asia were highly mobile
and mostly relied on small to medium sized ungulates. In the Epi-Palaeolithic there
is evidence for subsistence intensification, where more effort was spent getting more
nutrients from the environment (Munro, 2009). People started to include previously
ignored, low-ranked species into their diets – smaller mammals, birds, fish, tortoises,
crabs, small-grained grasses, ember wheat and barley (Flannery, 1969; Weiss et al.,
2004). This increase in the dietary breadth before the transition to agriculture is known
as the Broad Spectrum Revolution (BSR).
It has been proposed that during the early and middle Epi-Palaeolithic mobile-
band groups were made up of around 25 individuals, with around 250-500 needed for
sustainable mating networks (Goring-Morris and Belfer-Cohen, 2011). Due to the Last
Glacial Maximum populations would have been packed into refugia (such as Ohalo II
on the shore of the Sea of Galilee in Israel), and hence population densities increased.
The slight climate amelioration at the end of the Late Glacial Maximum (around
15,000 yBP) saw the emergence of less mobile foragers, the Early Natufian (Zeder and
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Smith, 2009). Bellwood et al. (2005) notes a large increase in settlement size and
Bocquet-Appel and Bar-Yosef (2008) infer an increase in population size, during the
transition from the Kebaran to the early Natufian. With the Natufian culture there is
also evidence for pit houses, stone structures, storage pits, symbolic behaviours, burial
grounds, jewellery, decorated items and technological innovations, such as sickles, in the
archaeological record (Belfer-Cohen and Goring-Morris, 2011; Boyd, 2006). Belfer-Cohen
and Goring-Morris (2011) suggest that these characteristics could only have occurred
because of social mechanisms to keep groups together; for example, emerging social and
community identities, territoriality and competition. Hunting and gathering was inten-
sified with the Natufians, and there is evidence for increased preparation and processing
of foods (Goring-Morris and Belfer-Cohen, 2011).
During the abrupt cold and dry period of the Younger Dryas (12,900 to 11,700 yBP)
(Broecker et al., 2010) societies in the Southern Levant appear to have become mobile
again, whilst societies in the Euphrates valley and the Zagros stayed semi-sedentary
(Zeder and Smith, 2009). The Younger Dryas was followed by a return to wet and
warmer conditions, with the expansion of woodland and parkland, in the Holocene (Bar-
Yosef, 1998). It is during this climate reversal that sedentism across the Fertile Crescent
became possible (due to these climate changes being advantageous for annual cereals)
and the first evidence of cultivation appeared (Zeder and Smith, 2009). Hence, the
transition from hunter-gathering to cultivation co-occurred with these late-Pleistocene
environmental changes (Moore and Hillman, 1992; Willcox et al., 2009), leading to many
theories (see subsection 1.3.1) that the Younger Dryas and/or climate amelioration in
the Holocene had a strong effect on the development of agriculture.
In the Pre-Pottery Neolithic A (PPNA), from around 11,600 yBP, there is evidence
for a large increase in population size, settlement size, social organisation, exchange
networks, reduced residential mobility, accumulation of surpluses and a hierarchy of site
sizes (Belfer-Cohen and Goring-Morris, 2011). Later, in the Pre-Pottery Neolithic B,
beginning at around 10,500 yBP, large permanent village societies emerge and there is
an increasing dependence on domesticated species (Bellwood et al., 2005; Goring-Morris
and Belfer-Cohen, 2011). By 9000 yBP farming is generally believed to have become
well-established (Conolly et al., 2011), and by around 8000 yBP it is suggested that
human populations all over the Fertile Crescent relied on an agricultural economy with
fully domesticated resources (Zeder, 2011). Therefore it took around 3500 years for the
transition from the initial cultivation of rye to an agricultural economy.
The eight crops which are associated with early agriculture in SW Asia – the ‘founder
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crops’ – are emmer wheat, einkorn wheat, barley, lentil, pea, flax, chickpea and bitter
vetch (Zohary, 1996). These species, along with sheep, goats, cattle and pigs (Zeder,
2008), are thought to have been initially domesticated in the Fertile Crescent, and the
wild ancestors of these are still found in this region today.
1.1.2 Other Independent Transitions
Sites with early rice remains
Sites with early millet remains
Yangtze River
Yellow River
Figure 1.4: Early millet (triangles) and rice (circles) cultivation sites in China along
the Yellow and Yangtze rivers respectively. Adapted from Zhao (2011).
Beginning with SW Asia, the first steps towards agriculture took place at least 1000
years apart in each of the three major centres for the origins of agriculture. Further-
more, the transition from some cultivation (beginning with plant cultivation) to a fully
agricultural economy took different amounts of time (see Table 1.1).
In northern China, foxtail and broomcorn millet were the initial crops, with millet
cultivation becoming established by 7500 yBP1 in the Yellow River basin (Fuller, 2010),
and by 7000 to 6000 yBP full millet farming-based subsistence had been adopted (Zhao,
2011). In the middle and lower Yangzte regions the cultivation of rice may have begun
as early as 10,000 yBP (Jiang et al., 2006), with domestication occurring around 6000
yBP2 (Fuller et al., 2007), rice cultivation becoming established by 7000 yBP3 (Fuller
et al., 2007), and full rice agriculture becoming established at around 6400 to 5300
yBP and 5200 to 4300 yBP in the middle and lower Yangtze River regions respectively
(Zhao, 2011) (see Figure 1.4 for these regions). Although, due to the large amount of
1 5500 BC in Fuller (2010) 2 4000 BC in Fuller et al. (2007) 3 5000 BC in Fuller et al. (2007)
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Mesoamerica
San Andrés
Xihuatoxtla Shelter
(a)
Riverton
Phillips Spring
(b)
Figure 1.5: Mesoamerica and eastern North America. (a) Mesoamerica and sites of
early cultivation. Adapted from Piperno (2011). (b) Eastern North America and sites
where the earliest evidence of domesticated plants are found. Adapted from Smith
(2011).
information exchange between the different regions in China, Cohen (2011) suggests that
it still needs to be assessed whether rice- and millet-based agricultural systems could
have arisen truely independently from one another. Hence the full transition occurred
over around 3000-4000 years in northern China, and around 4700-5700 years in the
Yangzte regions.
In Mesoamerica, the transition to mostly relying on farming from mostly foraging
took 5200-5800 years – longer than in other parts of the world (Barker, 2006). The
Mexican western lowlands have been suggested to be the site for the domestication of
maize (Barker, 2006), and the earliest record for the cultivation of maize dates to 8700
yBP from Xihuatoxtla Shelter in the Central Balsas River Valley (Ranere et al., 2009)
(see Figure 1.5a). Domesticated avocado and some squash species have been found in
sites which date to 9000-7000 yBP4, and at sites dating from the Coxcatlan phase (5000-
4300 BC) there is evidence of domesticated beans, gourds, some other squash species
and chilli (Barker, 2006). It is not until the Ajalpan phase from 3500-2900 yBP5 that
there is evidence for sedentary village life based on farming (Barker, 2006).
In eastern North America (ENA) (see Figure 1.5b) the earliest evidence for culti-
vation is of pepo squash in Illinois, dating from 5025 calibrated calendar (cal) years
BP (Smith, 2011). Squash, sunflower, marsh elder, and two species of chenopod were
first brought under domestication from about 5000 to 3400 years ago (Smith, 2006). By
3800 yBP there is evidence of a crop complex composed of these five species (Smith and
4 7000-5000 BC in Barker (2006) 5 1500-900 BC in Barker (2006)
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Yarnell, 2009), but perhaps only by 700 AD is there evidence for a fully agricultural
economy (Zeder and Smith, 2009). Thus the ENA transition was the latest and took
around 3700 years.
By at least the Early Neolithic (around 9000 yBP), there is evidence for sedentary
village life, with storage, ritual, and burials, in the low altitude regions of China – along
the yellow river in northern China, and the Middle and Lower Yangtze (Cohen, 2011).
Likewise, in ENA the first evidence for early cultivation and domestication are seen in
small and more sedentary settlements in resource-rich river valley environments (Smith,
2011), with little evidence for social hierarchy (Zeder and Smith, 2009). Thus in SW
Asia, China and ENA agriculture started and developed in sedentary settlements near
to river valleys. In contrast, in Mesoamerica many of the sites where agriculture started
were smaller, seasonally occupied and mostly in rock shelters near seasonal streams
(Piperno, 2011).
As in SW Asia, populations in China and ENA were found to have increased before
domestication began (Cohen, 2011; Weitzel and Codding, 2016), although Smith and
Yarnell (2009) suggest an absence of carrying-capacity challenges at one of the ENA
sites (Riverton). In Mesoamerica there is evidence that population sizes were small
before farming began (Ranere et al., 2009), although this is not contradictory to there
being carrying-capacity challenges.
In SW Asia climate changes associated with the end of the Pleistocene were corre-
lated with the timings of various changes in behaviour (e.g. changes in mobility and
cultivation). During the Pleistocene-to-Holocene transition (around 12,800 to 11,600
yBP) in China there were localised environmental changes, with changes in monsoon
cycle intensities in the north, and more stable, warmer, wetter and resource-abundant
in the south (Cohen, 2011). In northern China these changes promoted people to retreat
to more favourable sites where they established less mobile and larger communities, and
eventually began to cultivate (Bar-Yosef, 2011). In southern China hunting and gather-
ing persisted for much longer and the impact of climate change is less clear. At the end
of the Pleistocene in the Americas (around 11,400 yBP) the climate became significantly
wetter and warmer with a shift from savanna-like vegetation to tropical forest (Piperno,
2011). However, here there was still a significant delay before early cultivation attempts
occurred. Likewise, early cultivation in ENA occurred much later than the beginning
of the Holocene, but here it is suggested that later climate changes may have played a
part in changes to human behaviour. Zeder and Smith (2009) suggested that a change
in climate 7,000 to 6,500 years ago in eastern North America (ENA) promoted the de-
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velopment of river valley regimes and their enriched floodplains. It was then in these
environments where societies became more sedentary and first began to cultivate crops
(Smith, 2011). Thus, end of Pleistocene climate changes were most clearly correlated
with changes in behaviour in SW Asia and northern China, but less so with southern
China, the Americas and ENA.
1.1.3 The Consequences of Agriculture
There are a number of lasting lifestyle changes which occurred before, during and after
the transition to agriculture (a few of which are mentioned in the preceding paragraphs).
Many of these are interlinked and feedback onto one another, and it is often not clear
whether they are causal of, or caused by a switch to farming. In this section I will
discuss these changes, their connectivity to one another and implications.
The Broad Spectrum Revolution
Before agriculture was fully adopted there is evidence for a change in subsistence systems
– from one based on low-cost resources (e.g. large, slow mammals), to a more labour-
intensive system with increased diversity. As mentioned in the previous section this
increase in diet breadth is referred to as the broad spectrum revolution (Flannery, 1969).
Sedentism
A key shift during the transition to agriculture was the switch from communities being
highly mobile to more sedentary, which in some places occurred before farming began
and in others after (Diamond, 2002). However, as I will discuss in Section 1.4, decreased
mobility is not always linked with farming, and can also be present in foraging societies.
In the archaeological record sedentism can be seen by the presence of certain items.
If a site is occupied year round then there might be evidence of a species from each
of the four seasons, e.g. seeds from fruits that are only edible in one season, for each
of the seasons. Also, certain commensal species (e.g. mice) thrive around humans, so
evidence of their presence can indicate that settlements were lived in for large amounts
of time. Other evidence for sedentism includes investment in building large structures,
and increases in burials (since all deaths would occur in a similar location) and storage
(Dow and Reed, 2015).
Sedentism is linked with several of the other lifestyle changes, which will be discussed
in turn in the next paragraphs.
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Population Growth, Health, and Quality of Life
An increase in fertility rate leading to higher rates of population growth is seen during
the transition to agriculture; this is referred to as the Neolithic demographic transition
(NDT) and can be measured by increases in the proportions of juvenile skeletons in
cemeteries Bocquet-Appel (2011a). Explanations for this could be that sedentary life
allowed for shorter birth intervals, as reduced mobility allows for increased energy for
reproduction (Page et al., 2016), or that in more mobile societies having more than one
young child would be difficult to carry (Lee, 1979); and another explanation is that there
was an increase in fertility due to high calorie foods (Bocquet-Appel, 2011b).
Despite increased fertility rates, there is evidence for a health decline (seen by a
decrease of human stature) during the agricultural transition (Cohen, 2009; Lambert,
2009). This could be explained by the negative effects of sedentism and large com-
munities (and hence crowding), for example increased infection, disease and parasites
(Cohen, 2009). Bowles (2011) also estimates that the productivity, in terms of caloric
returns per amount of labour, of the first farmers is less than it is for foragers in the
early Holocene. Furthermore, the amount of work effort may have increased during the
transition to agriculture (Haviland, 1996).
Property Rights and Storage
During the transition to agriculture there is evidence for an increase in storage facilities
(Bogaard et al., 2009), beginning with communal storage areas and then indoor private
storage rooms (Flannery, 2002). Since mobile groups have to move all their belongings
with them (a costly process), staying in one place makes storage easier. The accumu-
lation of food reserves reduces risk in times when food is scarce, which further reduces
the need for mobility (Testart et al., 1982).
As Winterhalder and Kennett (2009) point out, storage raises issues associated with
private property ownership such as defence and the respect of other people’s property.
Risk reduction for hunter-gatherers may come in the form of sharing, but for sedentary
foragers or farmers it may be a better strategy to establish private property and its
associated rights (Shennan, 2011).
Social Inequality and Wealth Transmission
Social inequality also became more pronounced during the transition to agriculture
(Bowles et al., 2010), with foraging societies perhaps having enforced egalitarianism
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(Boehm et al., 1993) – although there is still some evidence for social inequality in for-
aging societies (e.g. Vanhaeren and d’Errico (2005); Wengrow and Graeber (2015)).
Social inequality can be seen in the archaeological record by the presence or absence
of grave goods, indicators of storage and nutrition, ceremonial objects and the size and
location of dwellings (Bowles et al., 2010). Shennan (2011) estimates a Gini coefficient 6
of 0.4 in pastoralist societies, 0.51 for agriculturalists and 0.19 for hunter-gatherers. As
Winterhalder and Kennett (2006, p. 2) remark:
Agriculture is the precursor, arguably the necessary precursor, for the development
of widespread social stratification, state-level societies, market economies, and in-
dustrial production (Diamond 1997; Zeder 1991). Social theory (e.g., Trigger 1998)
maintains that present-day notions of property, equality and inequality, human re-
lationships to nature, etc., are shaped, at least in part, by the social organization,
technology, or food surpluses entailed in our dependence on agriculture.
Bowles et al. (2010) argue that key to the emergence and persistence of social in-
equality is how wealth is transmitted inter-generationally. For foraging societies it is
thought that the transmission of material wealth (e.g. land, livestock) is less important
than the transmission of embodied wealth (e.g. nutritional investment) or relational
wealth (e.g. social contacts) through generations, and this is perhaps because of the
effect mobility has on wealth accumulation (Smith et al., 2010). Hence, perhaps it was
only when people began to farm, became more sedentary and stored private property,
that material wealth accumulated and social inequality was able to emerge. In fact,
Olsson and Hibbs Jr (2005) find that current wealth distribution is strongly correlated
with the location and timings of agricultural origins.
The transition from small egalitarian to larger despotic groups could have occurred
voluntarily (rather than by force) when there were surplus resources leading to demo-
graphic expansion, and also when there were high dispersal costs (Powers and Lehmann,
2014). These conditions are likely to have been met during the Neolithic transition.
6 Where a Gini coefficient of 0 indicates complete equality and a value of 1 indicates complete inequality.
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1.2 The Spread of Agriculture into Europe
Although this thesis is concerned with the independent origins of agriculture, the spread
of agriculture from these origins is also widely studied. Thus for completeness I will
discuss the spread of farming from SW Asia into Europe and the contribution the study
of genetics has made.
There is evidence for the initial spread of agriculture from SW Asia into Cyprus from
around 10,600 years ago (Vigne et al., 2012), then through the Balkans, Central Europe
and the West Mediterranean (Olivieri et al., 2013) before finally reaching the British
Isles at around 6000 yBP7 (Stevens and Fuller, 2012). Figure 1.6a shows the earliest
dates of archaeological evidence for the Neolithic package of crops and animals across
Europe.
Although the routes of spread can be estimated, the mechanisms of the Neolithic
transition across Europe is still debated in archaeology, anthropology, and human pop-
ulation genetics, with arguments mostly divided between two contrasting views. Some
researchers support the idea that agriculture was introduced into hunter-gatherer com-
munities by the movements of people, where indigenous groups were replaced by or
reproduced with the new farming populations. The other argument suggests indigenous
hunter-gatherer groups imitated agricultural techniques by a process of cultural trans-
mission from contact with agropastoral communities. These two extreme processes are
termed ‘demic diffusion’ and ‘cultural diffusion’ respectively.
If the cultural diffusion model is correct it might be expected that there would be
very little genetic footprint from SW Asia in modern Europeans, and hence the current
genetic pool should mainly be derived from indigenous European hunter-gatherers. Al-
ternatively, if the demic diffusion model is correct it may be expected that SW Asian
Neolithic ancestry would be more pronounced in early farmer and modern European
populations (Haak et al., 2010). However, other processes (such as the degree of ad-
mixture and other demographic events) during the expansion make this expectation
tentative (Rasteiro and Chikhi, 2013).
Hence, to investigate which of the models for the Neolithic transition in Europe is
most likely, genetic data can prove extremely useful. Much of the work done on this
aims to find out how much of a genetic contribution early SW Asian Neolithic farmers
made to modern Europeans.
Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza predicted that if the demic diffusion model was cor-
7 4000 cal BC in Stevens and Fuller (2012)
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rect there would be genetic gradients from the mixing of Neolithic and Mesolithic pop-
ulations, with the more extreme gene frequencies closest to SW Asia (Ammerman and
Cavalli-Sforza, 1973). Menozzi et al. (1978) demonstrated such a cline by using principal
component analysis (PCA). The first principal component of variation in modern Eu-
ropean allele frequencies from 38 independent alleles (blood groups, the tissue antigen
HLA system and some enzymes) from ten loci accounted for 27% of the total variation
and was used to generate a synthetic gene map (Figure 1.6b shows their results). How-
ever, such PCA patterns could arise through other demographic processes (Novembre
and Stephens, 2008).
Hence, while this early genetic work was widely interpreted as fitting with the demic
diffusion model of a Neolithic wave of advance from SW Asia, where modern Europeans
were influenced genetically by SW Asian populations, it did not in itself demonstrate
demic diffusion of farmers. However, since then molecular genetic approaches have
revealed contrasting and contradictory results concerning the Neolithic contribution to
the gene pool of modern Europeans (Haak et al., 2010).
The distribution of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) or Y-chromosome haplotype fre-
quencies has been used to infer the movement of females or males respectively. Work on
this by Semino et al. (2000) is shown in Figure 1.6c.
The predicted Neolithic genetic contribution to modern Europeans has been seen
to vary, from some authors suggesting very little (Haak et al., 2005), others suggesting
around 20% (Richards et al., 2000; Semino et al., 2000) or 50% (Chikhi et al., 2002), to
others suggesting a majority (Balaresque et al., 2010; Sampietro et al., 2007). Authors
have sometimes interpreted little genetic contribution as supporting a cultural diffusion
model of the Neolithic transition and a large contribution as supporting the demic dif-
fusion model. However, Haak et al. (2010) and Brandt et al. (2013) suggest that there
was a major demographic event after the early Neolithic, which would mean that this
interpretation would be problematic. Furthermore, clines in genetic frequency could
also arise from the first peopling of Europe or re-colonisation after the LGM, admix-
ture between groups with allele frequencies which were initially different (Barbujani and
Bertorelle, 2001), natural selection (Fix, 1996), range expansion or genetic drift (Pinhasi
et al., 2012). Lazaridis et al. (2014) find that contemporary Europeans do in part derive
from European farmers who were mainly from SW Asia, but there are also at least two
other ancestral populations.
Studies using ancient DNA have suggested a regional difference in how farming was
spread; with some evidence for cultural diffusion in Central Europe (Haak et al., 2005)
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and demic diffusion in the Mediterranean (Sampietro et al., 2007). Ancient DNA work
has also shown a genetic affinity between modern SW Asian and early Neolithic samples
in both Central Europe and in the Mediterranean (Brandt et al., 2013; Gamba et al.,
2012; Haak et al., 2010), and also between modern southern Europeans and an early Ne-
olithic Scandinavian farmer (Skoglund et al., 2012). This work suggests that pioneering
farmers travelled from SW Asia to all over Europe, and Hofmanová et al. (2016) suggest
that this dispersal would have been from the Aegean.
Ancient DNA studies have also shown a large genetic difference between hunter-
gatherers and early Neolithic populations in Central Europe (Bramanti et al., 2009;
Brandt et al., 2013; Haak et al., 2010, 2015) and Northern Europe (Skoglund et al.,
2012), which again further supports an idea of early farmers as immigrants rather than
local hunter-gatherers adopting a new culture. Taken together, recent ancient DNA
studies favour the demic diffusion of farming into and across Europe by migrating farm-
ers originated in western Anatolia, but that there was a later partial resurgence of
hunter-gatherer ancestry as farmers and hunter-gatherers mixed in the middle and Late
Neolithic.
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(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1.6: (a) The spread of farming across Europe based on archaeological evidence
(figures give the approximate earliest dates in years BC). Taken from Burger and Thomas
(2011). (b) Different intensities of the first principal component of the gene frequencies
from 38 independent alleles from ten loci. Taken from Menozzi et al. (1978). (c) The
relative frequencies of 6 pools of Y-chromosome haplotypes which account for 95% of the
samples (colours), the remaining 5% are grouped together and shown in white. Taken
from Semino et al. (2000).
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1.3 Understanding the Origins of Agriculture
Archaeological work can give us a good picture of where and when agriculture first
developed, and genetics can help us understand how it spread, but fully understanding
how and why it began is challenging. This requires us to not only consider archaeological
and palaeoclimatic evidence, but also human behaviour.
In this section I will discuss how certain pressures and changes could have lead to
the origins of agriculture both directly and indirectly. I will then introduce human be-
havioural ecology (HBE), and discuss how this can be used as a framework to understand
the switch in subsistence strategy.
1.3.1 Climate Stress
The right climate conditions for agriculture are obviously necessary for its development,
but the role that climate conditions are suggested to play varies from some authors
implying that it is a direct cause, to others suggesting it is indirect and acted as a
trigger for a series of events, including demographic pressure, leading to agriculture.
One of the first direct climate-based theories is that of the ‘Oasis hypothesis’ by
Childe (1926). This is based on the idea that due to the Holocene’s warmer climate
areas became arid and thus forced humans and animals to settle by lakes and rivers, and
it was this close proximity with animals that could have prompted their domestication
(Bar-Yosef, 1998). However since domestication actually started during a wet climate
phase this theory is contested (Bellwood et al., 2005). Wright (1977) also argued that
the climate change of the Holocene played a major part for the origin of agriculture. His
hypothesis was that pre-adapted wild cereal grains immigrated into the Fertile Crescent
from dry-summer Mediterranean climates, which spurred their selection for domestica-
tion.
Moore and Hillman’s (1992) excavation of the site of Abu Hureyra found changes
in the archaeobotanical material coinciding with the Younger Dryas – the reduction
of certain species and increasing abundance of others. From these results the authors
suggested that the severe climate changes of the Younger Dryas acted as a catalyst for
the development of agriculture in SW Asia, where these stresses forced people to start
cultivating certain species. Alternatively, these archaeobotanical changes could also be
because of the broadening of plant foods in the diet (Colledge and Conolly, 2010).
Although agriculture began at the beginning of the Holocene in SW Asia, this was
not the case worldwide, and thus many direct-cause climate theories can be disregarded
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somewhat (Bellwood et al., 2005; Cohen, 1977). Perhaps more robust are the models
which support the idea of climate change as the cause of subsistence experimentation
and other lifestyle changes, eventually leading to agriculture.
McCorriston and Hole (1991) suggest that in the Southern Levant seasonal resource
shortages due to the instability of the late Pleistocene meant that people developed stor-
age. Storage encouraged sedentism, which in turn meant people depleted local resources
quickly, and therefore the use of subsistence strategies which would lead to domestica-
tion became advantageous. However, another (perhaps more likely) solution to seasonal
resource shortages could be increased mobility (see Section 1.4).
Whether climate change was a direct or an indirect cause of agriculture, the right
climate conditions were a necessary backdrop. As Zeder and Smith (2009, p. 683) notes:
(...) climate change alternatively helped push and pull societies along the pathway
to domestication and agriculture, providing both opportunities and challenges that
people across the broad arc of the Fertile Crescent responded to in a variety of
ways, depending on their local cultural and environmental settings – forming a rich
mosaic of alternative adaptive solutions.
More specifically, Richerson, Boyd and Bettinger (2001) argue that agriculture was
both impossible during the Last Glacial, and compulsory in the Holocene. They hypoth-
esise that due to the high-frequency of climate fluctuations, lower levels of atmospheric
CO2 and the fact that the cultural evolution of agricultural subsistence systems is a
slow process, agricultural evolution could not have occurred in the Last Glacial. In the
Holocene, however, they (and also Diamond, 2002) hypothesise that the increasingly sta-
ble climate allowed for plant-rich subsistence intensification and groups with the most
efficient use of the land out-competed others, which in some cases would lead to the
evolution of agriculture.
1.3.2 Demographic Stress
The effects of population pressure have also been suggested as a driver for the origins
of agriculture. This idea generally supposes that a stress on the resource availability
for a population promotes subsistence intensification, eventually leading to a change in
the subsistence system (Cohen, 1977). The idea of population pressure has often been
assumed to mean a high population density, but Cohen (2009) has also suggested that
declining resources and political pressure could also be causes for population pressure,
and relief from these could be sought in an expansion of food choices or to work harder,
which could have been the precursors to agriculture.
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Binford (1968) and Flannery (1969) proposed that due to the late Pleistocene rise in
sea level, people living in some coastal areas would have a comfortable sedentary lifestyle
based on a subsistence of migratory birds and fish. However, these areas would soon
reach high population densities and people would then migrate into suboptimal habitats
(e.g. the gravel desert parts of SW Asia) where the carrying capacity of the area would
be reached most quickly.
Richerson, Boyd and Bettinger (2001) develop a model to show that the maximum
carrying capacity should have been reached, worldwide, much earlier than 11,600 yBP,
and thus argue that the population pressure argument does not explain why agriculture
began. Furthermore, they assert that if agricultural innovation was a quick process the
population pressure argument would mean that populations in the Pleistocene would be
switching between agriculture and hunter-gathering regularly due to the variable climate
creating subsistence crises repeatedly. Flannery (1973) also notes that a population
pressure model based on population density does not hold globally as in Mesoamerica
population densities were very low when agriculture first developed. Furthermore, Zeder
and Smith (2009) note that the specific regions of the Fertile Crescent where initial
domestication began have little evidence for population pressure.
1.3.3 Internal Changes and Social Forces
The hypotheses discussed so far are mostly based on external forces, but there are
also some theories for how changes within and between people could have lead to the
development of agriculture.
Rindos (1984) proposed an evolutionary model for the development of agriculture,
based on the idea of a long period of mutualism between plants and humans starting
with the chance domestication of wild plants. However, Redding (1988) suggests that
this theory misses the point somewhat, and the selective pressures that maintained this
mutualism still need to be identified.
Braidwood (1960) proposed the idea of ‘cultural readiness’, where agriculture de-
veloped due to human communities reaching high levels of cultural differentiation and
specialisation. In this theory people were simply so in tune with their habitat that
they started domesticating the plants and animals which they knew so well. Braidwood
suggested that this cultural level was reached first in the Fertile Crescent, and later in
Central America, southeastern Asia and China, and spread from these centres to the
rest of the world by cultural diffusion. Richerson, Boyd and Bettinger (2001), however,
suggest that Braidwood’s hypothesis has the wrong time scale, and agriculture should
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have developed much earlier if it was only reliant on cultural ‘settling in’.
In a similar type of argument, Cauvin (2000) suggests that the shift to agriculture
was driven by a change in the way of thinking about nature – from feeling part of it, to
feeling in control of it.
However, some of these hypotheses rely on an idea of early farmers being somehow
more cognitively sophisticated than their predecessors, which is difficult to support and
underestimates hunter-gatherers. The Jomon culture of Japan serves as a counter argu-
ment to these theories, since the Jomon were culturally complex, semi-sedentary, lived
in large settlements and had storage, but did not have an independent transition to
agriculture (Bleed and Matsui, 2010).
Bender (1978) called for social forces resulting from the demands of the evolution of
social relations to be considered in explanations for the origins. For these explanations
it may be predicted that agricultural development would correlate with the emergence of
socio-economic complexity – which could be measured by the archaeological evidence of
sedentism, hierarchies, storage, prestige items and exchange (Winterhalder and Kennett,
2006).
Social stresses, such as competition between individuals or groups, could promote
farming as a way to create rewards, for example to support larger population size or
strength (Bellwood et al., 2005). Hayden’s (1990) competitive feasting theory follows
a similar argument, but in this case the reward is the ability to create surpluses. This
theory is based on the idea that technological innovations – such as mass fishing and
gathering, processing and storage technologies – during the Mesolithic made the pro-
duction of resource surpluses possible. With surpluses comes the ability for people or
groups to hold feasts, which could create debt, control, competition, rivalry and social
inequality amongst populations (Hayden, 1996, 2009). Hence, there were socio-economic
benefits to have enough surpluses to hold a successful feast and Hayden suggests that
these created a continuously increasing demand on food production, which eventually
would lead to agriculture. Furthermore, Hayden claims that the competitive feasting
model can explain why the first domesticates are not as expected, e.g. chilli peppers and
dogs instead of wheat and goats – they may have been prestige items. However, Winter-
halder and Kennett (2006) argue that the competitive feasting theory does not explain
why agriculture would emerge roughly simultaneously (unlike behavioural modernity
Powell et al., 2009) in different regions, and is also at odds with the fact that in some
parts of the world domestication occurred before the right conditions for surpluses to
accumulate arose.
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Zeder and Smith (2009) support Rindos’s (1984) mutualism theory, but rather than a
random mutation of behaviour leading to chance domestication, they prefer the concept
of niche construction. In this, humans consciously tried to reach certain social and
economic goals within particular environmental and social conditions, leading to a change
in the subsistence system.
1.3.4 Human Behavioural Ecology
Human Behavioural Ecology (HBE) can be used to understand why foragers changed
their behaviours (e.g. becoming sedentary, moving to suboptimal environments, or in-
creasing the breadth of species foraged for) in response to some of the pressures noted
in the preceding paragraphs. HBE frameworks use evolutionary theory to explain the
process of behaviour change, rather than just explain the causes for it.
In much the same way as the changing frequencies of genes through natural selection,
evolutionary theory can be used to understand behaviour change and diversity. By also
bringing in elements from economics, such as game-theory and optimisation, behaviours
can be understood in terms of their cost effectiveness or efficiency. In this sense, HBE is a
framework in which to see behaviour change and diversity as an adaptation to ecological
variables.
HBE was initially developed in the 1970s to understand how hunter-gatherers move
around a region whilst foraging – a key outcomes of which was optimal foraging theory
(OFT; Wilmsen, 1973). OFT states that the most efficient (usually in terms of energy)
foraging pattern will be selected for, and in this context different human and nonhuman
foraging behaviours have been studied. An important factor in this is the law of di-
minishing returns (e.g. because of resource depletion), and hence the foraging organism
needs to decide the optimal time to leave a resource patch (described as the marginal
value theorem; Charnov, 1976).
HBE based explanations for the switch to farming discuss the idea that economic
efficiency can be used to understand the switch to agriculture – by calculating relative
costs and benefits of foraging and farming.
The diet breadth model is a possible explanation in the HBE framework for the broad
spectrum revolution (see Section 1.1.3). This predicts that if high ranking resources be-
come limited (perhaps due to climate changes), it becomes more efficient to incorporate
lower ranking resources into the diet rather than to continue to search for rare prey.
Lower ranking resources may be more plentiful, but require more effort or culturally
transmitted skills in harvesting and processing (e.g. seeds and tubers; Winterhalder and
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Goland, 1993). This change leads to a broader diet where foragers have an overall lower
energy cost to searching for food (Gremillion and Piperno, 2009). Additional to a broad
diet being more efficient, some of the new foods that entered the diets may have also
been more sustainable (e.g. some had high reproductive rates; Stiner, 2001). In terms
of the transition to agriculture, the diet breadth model shows how certain foods (e.g.
cereals) may have entered diets, and after some time of exploitation and management,
become the first domesticates (Gremillion and Piperno, 2009).
1.3.5 Summary
The large time-lag between the beginning of the Holocene and early cultivation in some
parts of the world mitigates against the direct-cause climate hypotheses for the origins
of agriculture. There is some possible counter evidence for the demographic pressure
argument (e.g. Mesoamerica), and also many hunter-gatherers exhibited complex social
behaviour and technological knowledge well before agriculture began. Thus, there is no
clear explanation for the origins of agriculture.
The climatic effects of the Pleistocene-Holocene transition clearly had effects on how
people lived, whether this was by promoting more or less movement, changing the types
and breadth of foods foraged, or perhaps storing more food as a risk aversion strat-
egy. These changes would prompt even more transformations and perhaps exert more
pressures (for example decreased mobility could lead to demographic pressure). Hunter-
gatherers may then have had the ability (perhaps cognitively or via the introduction of
a new suitable species for exploitation) and/or the pressure for a more reliable way of
procuring resources, to start to cultivate. Hence, from a starting point of environmental
changes people would have had to reassess the efficiency of how they lived, which could
lead to an agricultural economy. The events along this path would have been different
within and between different regions of the world.
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1.4 Hunter-gatherer Mobility
Since becoming sedentary is inextricably linked with the origins of agriculture (as dis-
cussed in Section 1.1.3), in this section I will describe hunter-gatherer mobility and
reasons for variation in it. Much of this discussion is within the HBE framework. I will
give summaries of ethnographic data on hunter-gatherer mobility in Section 2.5.1.
One of the obvious reasons for hunter-gatherer mobility is the search for resources
(Grove, 2009), or better ones (Anderies and Hegmon, 2011), and since foraging areas can
quickly become depleted, hunter-gatherers are generally quite mobile. However, there
are some ecologies (for example along coastlines) where resources are more abundant,
predictable and less easily depleted, and in these hunter-gatherers can have reduced
mobility (Hamilton et al., 2016; Kelly, 2013).
A classic model for hunter-gatherer residential mobility is Binford’s (1982) ‘complete
radius leapfrog pattern’; this is shown in Figure 1.7. This model assumes bands need
to move to a new base which is twice the distance of the foraging radius in order to
not forage in an already depleted area. Additions to this simple model include the
circumstances which affect how big the foraging radius is (and therefore how big the
move distance is) (Grove, 2009).
Figure 1.7: A diagram of Binford’s ‘complete radius leapfrog pattern’. Taken from
Grove (2009) (fig. 1) interpretation of fig. 2 from Binford (1982).
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1.4.1 Why Move?
It is generally accepted that foragers move because they have depleted, or considerably
reduced, the resources in the foraging radius around their residential base. And it can be
seen that high mobility is indeed correlated with a smaller population density, less food
availability (from high primary biomass), less dependence on fish or a higher effective
temperature (this will be illustrated using ethnographic data in Section 2.5.1 when I
look at data from Kelly (2013)).
A decrease in mobility can be predicted in the optimal foraging theory (OFT) frame-
work when there are high population sizes. Under these conditions food density can
be relatively low due to depletion, and thus the net return of an individual moving
to another low quality resource patch can be less than that of staying put (Bettinger
and Baumhoff, 1982). On the other hand when population sizes are low Bettinger and
Baumhoff (1982) predict foragers should move frequently amongst patches, which allows
for other fitness enhancing behaviours such as mating. More movement also means that
foragers may visit a larger breadth of site types, and thus increase dietary breadth. OFT
can be useful when considering the reasons behind hunter-gatherer mobility decisions,
but there are of course other factors influencing movement.
There are considerable costs to movement – for example energy, planning, predations
and other risks, opportunity loss, and time (Hamilton et al., 2016) – so it might make
sense that in particularly rich environments there is less benefit to mobility and thus it
is reduced. However, there are also cultural reasons for movement, as Kelly (1992, p.
48) notes
People also respond to religious, kinship, trade, artistic, and personal obligations
(...) People move to gain access to firewood or raw materials for tools, or because
insects have become intolerable (...) people seek spouses, allies, or shamans, or move
in response to sorcery, death, and political forces (...) in order to visit friends, to
see what is happening elsewhere, or to relieve boredom.
Similarly, mobility helps establish and maintain social networks which can reduce risks
when resource availability is low (Whallon, 2006). There is also the argument that
keeping mobile allows hunter-gatherers to maintain the knowledge of resources in a
region and thus prepare for the possibility of unfavourable circumstances (Binford, 1983;
Migliano et al., 2017).
Kelly (2013, p. 107) states that “sedentism is a product of local abundance in a
context of regional scarcity”. Therefore, for homogeneous environments depletion will
always play a part, and movement (even if infrequent) always has some benefits. Kelly
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argues that the only reason not to move would be if there was nowhere for groups to move
to, which could be the case for high regional population densities. For heterogeneous
environments, on the other hand, movement has fewer benefits and sedentism may be
more likely. Kelly also suggests that since the presence of sedentary groups in a region
removes possible resource areas from mobile groups, this might create a domino effect
of switching to sedentism.
Other explanations for mobile foragers becoming sedentary are given by Price and
Brown’s (1985) ‘pull’ and ‘push’ hypothesis – where resource abundance encouraged less
mobility (pull), or resource scarcity led to more time harvesting and processing and
therefore less time spent moving (push).
Thus for reduced mobility to occur the resources in the local environment will prob-
ably be abundant and reliable, but not necessarily high ranking.
In SW Asia and in China there were increases in population size and sedentism
before agriculture. In contrast agriculture is thought to have begun before sedentism in
the Neotropics where sites were seasonally occupied. Furthermore, sedentary foraging
was not followed by an independent transition to farming in Japan (Bleed and Matsui,
2010) and the northwest coast of North America (Dow and Reed, 2015). There are also
agriculturalists/horticulturalists who are mobile, for example the Rarámuri in northern
Mexico (Hard and Merrill, 1992). And Kelly (1992) argues that there is evidence that
reduced mobility and agriculture were not linked (or only in a minor way) in the Gulf
Coast of Florida, the Levant, the American Midwest, and coastal/highland Peru.
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1.5 Thesis Summary
In this chapter I have summarised how the transition to agriculture has had profound
implications on how we live now, and that it is well studied archaeologically. I have
also shown how genetics can help us understand how farming spread geographically.
However, I have also discussed how, despite many theories, there is no global consensus
on why and how agriculture began. I discussed how applying evolutionary theory in the
form of human behavioural ecology (HBE) provides a useful framework for exploring why
late Pleistocene forager groups changed their behaviours. I also examined why hunter-
gatherer mobility can vary, and how a HBE framework can also be used to understand
this variation.
Modelling can be used to test hypotheses and build theories about past events. Thus,
to understand the origins of agriculture better – the goal of this thesis – in the next 6
chapters I implement and analyse several evolutionary models.
In Chapter 2 I explain how evolutionary theory can be applied to human behaviour,
discuss game theory, agent-based modelling and how modelling can be used in theory
building. I then review some of the existing mathematical models for the origins of
agriculture and related concepts, and discuss the motivation for developing a new model.
I also introduce some of the methodological contributions I have developed, including a
statistical method for parameter analysis – fitting to idealised outcomes (FIO). I finally
discuss and analyse the ethnographic, archaeological and climate data I have to inform
my development of my model.
In Chapter 3 I present my work on replicating and analysing a mathematical model
for the origins of agriculture and property rights by Bowles and Choi (2013). This work
serves as an example of applying the FIO method and noting the extra insight it offers.
I describe the model, the methodology of applying the FIO method, and the results
found. The work for this chapter is published (Gallagher et al., 2015).
In Chapter 4 I describe an agent-based model I developed to study foragers and
their mobility decisions in a region. This model considers the feedback between people
and their environment, and includes the mutation of strategies, population growth and
resource depletion processes. The analysis and results of running this model are discussed
in Chapter 5.
An extension of this model is given in Chapter 6, along with the analysis and results
found. These extensions allow agents in the model to forage or farm, and hence I
can investigate the relationship between subsistence, mobility and population size. In
both Chapters 5 and 6 I investigate the impact of environmental conditions, interactions
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within the model, temporal and spatial variation, and the order of events, amongst other
things.
Finally, in Chapter 7 I give the conclusions of this thesis and discuss further work.
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2Modelling and Data
“There’s no sense in being precise when you don’t even know what you’re talking
about”
– John von Neumann
Summary
In the previous chapter I illustrated some of the many factors, interdependencies and
discrepancies associated with the origins of agriculture. Because of these, producing a
clear picture of the causes for and the processes involved in the transition is difficult. I
also discussed how human behavioural ecology (HBE) can be a useful framework with
which to understand the behaviour changes associated with the origins.
Models can help to sharpen intuitions, reveal unexpected behaviours and test hy-
potheses, and are especially valuable when trying to understand past events where real
time experiments are not possible. Modelling is also a useful tool to fill in gaps when
data is unavailable, which is often the case in archaeology. However, modelling is also
reliant on data for informing assumptions and testing. Therefore when building a model
it is important to understand the limits to the data you have available, and model
accordingly.
I will begin this chapter by discussing how evolutionary theory can be applied to
human behaviour in general. Concepts discussed in this section will be referred to
later in this thesis. In Section 2.2 I will then discuss modelling both in general and as
applied to social behaviour, giving particular emphasis to agent-based modelling and
evolutionary game theory. In Section 2.3 I will review some of the existing models
concerned with the transition to agriculture and associated processes.
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I will then discuss in Section 2.4 some of the methods I developed in this thesis,
including a parameter sensitivity analysis (fitting to idealised outcomes, FIO) that I go
on to apply to the models in Chapters 3 and 6. Next, in Section 2.5 I will discuss and
analyse the ethnographic, archaeological and climate data I have available, which I go
on to use in the development of my own models in Chapters 5 and 6. I will conclude
this chapter in Section 2.6.
2.1 Evolutionary Theory and Human Behaviour
In the 1960s Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection started to become more
frequently applied to study human behaviour; for example the work on kin and group
selection and reciprocal altruism (Hamilton, 1964a,b; Maynard Smith, 1964; Price et al.,
1970; Trivers, 1971). Using genetic evolution to understand the social behaviour (sociobi-
ology) of animals, for example pack hunting and mating patterns, was first popularised in
1975 when E.O. Wilson published Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. This book sparked
much controversy since in its extreme (genetic determinism) sociobiology ignores the
cultural explanations for behaviour. Thus its application to human behaviour has the
potential to fuel racist and other prejudiced viewpoints.
Memetics on the other hand, is almost the opposite. In memetics human behaviour
is studied in terms of cultural units (referred to by Dawkins (1976) as memes) which
may spread in a population without human choice. Hence in the nature-nurture debate
on human behaviour, it could be thought that sociobiology can help to understand the
nature elements and memetics can be used for the nurture elements. However, human
behaviour is much less discretised than this and, quoting Laland and Brown (2011, p.
12), “a complete understand of human behaviour will result only from us studying human
beings as animals developing in a rich social environment and immersed in complex
cultural traditions”.
In the wake of human sociobiology shortcomings, the fields of human behavioural
ecology, evolutionary psychology, cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution, all
attempt to integrate cultural elements into the evolutionary theory of human behaviour.
For an extensive discussion of these see Laland and Brown (2011).
Human behavioural ecology (HBE) applies evolutionary theory to human behaviour
whilst considering the environmental context – this was discussed in more detail in
Section 1.3.4. HBE is a framework to think about human behaviour with, and hypotheses
developed through HBE can be tested by looking at how humans really behave. HBE
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however assumes that humans have the ability (whether consciously or not) to optimise
their behaviour, which in many circumstances may not hold. It also assumes that
the behaviour observed is already optimal, rather than still actively changing to its
optimum (Boyd et al., 2011). HBE also often ignores constraints on adaptation, such as
developmental constraints and trade-offs.
Rather than thinking of the behaviour as the evolving entity (as HBE does), evo-
lutionary psychologists look at the psychology which leads to behavioural decisions as
the evolving entity (Symons, 1989). Evolutionary psychologists suggest there is a lag
between our current environment and the environment we were psychologically adapted
for (which is taken as the Pleistocene), and as such evolutionary psychology can be used
to look at the adaptive problems of our ancestors (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987). However,
the Pleistocene may have been too unstable to allow for very specific cognitive adapta-
tions (Brown and Richerson, 2014), so evolutionary psychology alone may not account
for the behavioural flexibility necessary for the cultural complexity humans have (Boyd
et al., 2011).
By borrowing methods and concepts from biological evolution, and as in memet-
ics thinking of culture in the same way as genes, cultural evolution can be used to
understand how human behaviour changes at the individual and population level. Cul-
tural evolution also uses mathematical modelling, rather than storytelling (a common
criticism of memetics, HBE and evolutionary psychology; Laland and Brown, 2011) to
understand human behaviour. Cultural evolution looks at how behaviour variants can
change in frequency; this includes the ability of behaviours to be transmitted (analogous
to inheritance), copied (analogous to horizontal gene transfer), changed via innovation
(analogous to mutation), combined in new ways (analogous to genetic recombination),
and changed randomly (analogous to genetic drift). Because of differential fitness of
behaviours in a population, some behaviours may become selected for and increase in
frequency. In cultural evolution models, how the behaviours are copied is an impor-
tant consideration (Boyd et al., 2011). A criticism of cultural evolutionary approaches
is whether or not human behaviour should be modelled in the same way as biological
evolution, or whether there are other mechanisms at work.
Cultural and genetic evolution can interact – culturally selected behaviours can affect
the gene pool, and natural selection can affect the frequencies of cultural traits. In gene-
culture coevolution theory human behaviour is studied in terms of these interactions and
feedback. Human behaviour can also shape the environment in which we live, which can
in turn affect selective pressures – this is referred to as niche construction. For example,
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as dairying culture expanded after the domestication of animals so later did the ability to
digest lactose in adult life (a trait determined genetically), which in some environments
would have been an huge advantage over those who could not (Gerbault et al., 2011; Itan
et al., 2009). If a demic diffusion model of the spread of farming is true (as discussed
in Section 1.2), then the frequency of the ability to digest lactose in modern day people
should be correlated with the spread of farming.
Thus the application of evolutionary theory to understanding human behaviour can
be done in different ways. I will discuss modelling and game theory in more detail in the
next section as these are important in the application of HBE frameworks and cultural
evolution.
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2.2 Modelling
There are many types of mathematical and computational model. Very broadly models
can be stochastic where there are random elements to the model or deterministic where
there is no random elements. Having random elements in the model means that each time
the model is evaluated the results will be different even if the same parameters are used.
Models can also be either mechanistic where the system’s behaviour is modelled with
an understanding of the workings of its individual parts, or empirical where extensive
observed data and measurements are used to model the system. Models can also be
dynamic, where model observations change with time, or static, which are at equilibrium;
some model discrete states, and others look at continuous changes; explicit models are
when you know the input parameters and are calculating the outcomes, and implicit
models where you know the outcomes of the modelled process and are finding the inputs.
Depending on the information you have about what you are modelling, and the type
of questions you want to ask, different model frameworks will be appropriate. These
frameworks include statistical models, equation-based models, system dynamics, and
simulation approaches such as discrete event simulation and agent-based models.
In this section I will discuss frameworks which are useful in modelling social be-
haviour. These include evolutionary game theory, evolutionary algorithms and agent-
based modelling. I will also discuss some general concerns around parameter choice and
analysis, and how modelling fits within the scientific method.
2.2.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
A framework in which to model social behaviour can be in the context of games. Game
theory was conceived in 1928 by John von Neumann (Neumann, 1928). It generally
involves a single or multiple round contest in which all players have a choice of strategies
to play. According to certain rules, each combination of possible players’ strategies in
a contest have different payoffs. It is of interest to find the scenarios in which certain
strategies maximise payoffs and is often used to understand economic, political, social
and biological strategic behaviour.
The popular example of the use of game theory is the Prisoner’s dilemma. This has
been used to study the cooperation/defection decisions in a game between two players.
Although easily adapted to many different scenarios, the original set-up to this game
looks at a situation in which two people are arrested on little evidence, isolated from one
another and then given the opportunity to betray the other prisoner. There are three
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Table 2.1: Payoff for player 1 when interacting with player 2 in the Prisoners Dilemma
game
Player 2 – Silent Player 2 – Betrays
Player 1 – Silent 1 year 3 years
Player 1 – Betrays Goes free 2 years
options that can occur depending on whether the prisoners betray each other (defect)
or remain silent (cooperate):
1. Both prisoners betray each other – they both receive a 2 year sentence
2. One prisoner betrays the other, and one remains silent – the betrayed prisoner
receives a 3 year sentence, and the other goes free
3. Both prisoners remain silent – they both receive a 1 year sentence
These payoff combinations are summarised in Table 2.1. Therefore, at an individual
level defection can mean going free, but overall mutual cooperation is better than mutual
defection, and herein lies the dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma can be adapted in
many ways; it can be discretely or continuously iterative, include a memory for past
interactions (peace war game), or include stochastic and spatial elements.
In part developed by the evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith,
1972; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) evolutionary game theory (EGT) looks at the
strategies of players as evolving entities. Players in evolutionary games can replicate
and pass on their strategies. A player’s payoff is thought of as its fitness, and fitter play-
ers are more likely to replicate. Therefore, as in natural selection, fitness maximising
strategies will persist in the population.
Whilst in classic game theory successful strategies are the ones that maximise indi-
vidual payoff, in evolutionary games the most successful strategies are the ones which
can persist in the presence of other competing strategies. Hence in evolutionary games
the frequencies of the strategies in the population affect their success.
EGT was developed originally to study intraspecific conflicts between two individ-
uals which have different behaviour types. Maynard Smith (1973) studied this using a
game where there were five different possible behaviour types – dove (although in May-
nard Smith and Price (1973) this type is described as ‘mouse’), hawk, bully, retaliator,
prober-retaliator. In the game with only two of these behaviour types (the hawk-dove
game) there is a contest between two players (which are either a hawk or a dove) over a
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Table 2.2: Payoff for player 1 when interacting with player 2 in the Hawk-Dove game
Player 2 – Hawk Player 2 – Dove
Player 1 – Hawk V/2 – C/2 V
Player 1 – Dove 0 V/2
resource of value V and if a fight ensues the loser pays a cost, C. The outcomes for each
type of pair are:
1. Hawk meets Dove – Hawk takes all the resource (V), Dove receives nothing (0)
2. Hawk meets Hawk – a fight occurs, each win the resource with a probability of
1/2, the loser pays the cost
3. Dove meets Dove – both share the resource
The payoff combinations are summarised in Table 2.2. The game also includes the
proportions of hawks and doves in the population, and hence the payoffs are multiplied
by the probabilities of encountering a hawk or a dove. The game is also generational,
so at the end of every round of contests (games) there can be replication and death of
contestants, and hence the next generation can have different proportions of strategies,
which can in turn affect how successful certain strategies are. The strategy which will
still remain dominant even with invasion from other strategies (if initially rare) is referred
to as the evolutionary stable strategy.
An additional behaviour type to the hawk-dove game is the ‘bourgeois’ (Maynard Smith,
1986). This behaviour type acts differently depending on who is the owner of the re-
source being fought over and who is the intruder. A bourgeois plays hawk if it is the
owner of the resource, and plays dove if it is the intruder. In this way, a bourgeois
behaviour respects ownership.
2.2.2 Evolutionary Algorithms
Cultural evolutionary models of social behaviour can be made in which individuals
interact (socially and with their environment, perhaps according to a game) and evolve.
These models fit into the broader category of evolutionary algorithm. Evolutionary
algorithms, inspired by natural selection, consist of a population of individuals which
have some fitness measure. The most fit individuals are more likely to reproduce, where
mutation and recombination can occur during reproduction, and individuals with the
lowest fitnesses can die.
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In these models it is possible that certain strategies will be selected for and un-
predicted and possibly complex behaviour of the system can emerge without having
been specifically programmed into the model. In this way we can study which circum-
stance give rise to the ‘natural’ evolution of certain strategies/behaviours in various
environments. Agent-based modelling can be a good model option since these models
are focussed on individuals who ‘live’ according to rules.
2.2.3 Agent-Based Models
Agent-based models (ABMs) are a type of simulation model where the behaviour of a
system is determined by the activities of autonomous individuals (or agents). Agents
can interact, move, adapt and learn according to predefined, but often simple, rules.
Through this approach complex behaviour of the system can emerge.
Macal and North (2010, p. 152) state that the three main elements in a typical
agent-based model are:
1. “A set of agents, their attributes and behaviours.
2. A set of agent relationships and methods of interaction: An underlying topology
of connectedness defines how and with whom agents interact.
3. The agents’ environment: Agents interact with their environment in addition to
other agents.”
Agent-based models emerged from work on cellular automata (CA), the first of which
was created by John von Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam in the 1940s. Their idea was
to try to build a self-replicating machine (a machine that can autonomously reproduce
itself) and the solution was a complicated set of rules on a grid (Figure 2.1a). In 1970
John Conway simplified this idea in his Game of Life (1970). This game involves a grid
of cells in which every cell interacts with its eight neighbouring cells according to four
basic rules which decide whether the cell will live or die, see Figure 2.1b. These basic
rules create many different emergent and complex patterns including one which copies
itself in the process of destroying itself.
In the 1970s one of the first agent-based models was developed. This model was
developed by Schelling and was used to study segregation (Schelling, 1971). In this model
agents make decisions and interact with one another in an environment – contrasting
with CA models where it is only the environment that is considered. In Schelling’s model
two types of agents can move around a grid, where an agent will move its location if
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: (a) A version of von Neumann’s design for a self-replicating machine
(Szangolies, 2015). (b) Examples of 5 different configurations over 3 moves in Conway’s
Game of Life (Gardner, 1970).
it has a majority of immediate neighbours of the other agent type. After a number of
these moves the emergence of segregation of the two agent types can be seen.
After these initial developments and increasingly powerful computational power,
agent-based models have become a popular tool in ecology, the social sciences, the
life sciences and economics. Research using ABMs has included land-use (Brown et al.,
2005), the flocking behaviour of birds (Reynolds (1987), see Figure 2.2a), predator-prey
relationships between killer whales and other marine mammals (Mock and Testa, 2007),
bumble bee behaviour (Hogeweg and Hesper, 1983), how culture changes and spreads
(Axelrod, 1997a), the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod, 1997b), sharing information
(Čače and Bryson, 2007), crowd behaviour during emergency evacuation (Pan et al.,
2007), the adaptive immune system (Folcik et al., 2007), the spread of cancer (Preziosi,
2003), agricultural economics (Berger, 2001), and the simulation of whole artificial so-
cieties in the Sugarscape model of Epstein and Axtell (1996).
In archaeology, ABMs have been used to study the societal collapse of the Anasazi
(Dean et al., 2000), and, for the Puebloan people who came afterwards, changes in their
settlement types (Kohler et al., 2000), their disappearance (Kohler et al. (2005), see
Figure 2.2b), and their food-sharing networks (Crabtree, 2015). Amongst many other
things, ABMs have also been used to study social dynamics and structure (Chliaoutakis
and Chalkiadakis, 2016), settlement patterns (Crema, 2014), patterning in surface ar-
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.2: (a) Simulating flocking behaviour in the Boids program (Reynolds, 1987).
(b) Comparing real and simulated data from a model of Puebloen settlements (Kohler
et al., 2005).
chaeological features (Davies et al., 2016), battlefield archaeological sites (Campillo et al.,
2012), dependencies between population dynamics and Holocene monsoon precipitation
patterns (Balbo et al., 2014), the Mayan social-ecological system (Heckbert, 2013), Ro-
man Empire ceramic tableware trade (Brughmans and Poblome, 2016), and the cultural
transmission of Great Basin projectile point technology (Mesoudi and O’Brien, 2008).
When agents interact with one another they may do so according to a game, and
the strategies the agents have may be evolvable. Thus agent-based modelling, game
theory and cultural evolution can fit well together when studying behavioural change.
Furthermore, how and why behaviours change – Tinbergen’s (1963) ‘proximate’ and
‘ultimate’ – can be studied by modelling at such an individual level.
2.2.4 Building and Validating Models
Building a model involves knowledge and assumptions about the system being modelled.
Models are abstractions of reality, and therefore they do not have to contain every single
factor to do with the system. Because of this, decisions on which important components
to include in the model, and those which do not need to be included, need to be made.
These decisions can be based on which dynamics you are particularly interested in,
which aspects of the system you have information about (based on data), and subjective
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decisions about which factors are important.
Depending on the type of model, input parameter values can be found empirically,
estimated, or (in the case of implicit models) predicted based on known outcomes of the
system.
After building a model and running it, the model needs to be evaluated to check that
it is providing a realistic estimate of the system – this is model validation. This can be
done by checking that some aspects of the model fit to observed data. It is important
that the same data is not used to both inform the design of the model and the test
the fit of the model. Sensitivity analysis should also be used to investigate how input
parameters affect the outcomes of the model. If there is uncertainty in the value for
the input parameters then this analysis will give some idea of the degree to which this
impacts the results from the model.
A commonly used type of parameter sensitivity analysis is investigating the effect of
varying one parameter whilst keeping all the others at their default values (I will refer
to this type of parameter sensitivity analysis as ‘fix-all-but-one’). In Section 2.4.1 I will
illustrate the merits and problems with this approach.
2.2.5 Modelling and the Scientific Method
The scientific method is a process of “systematic observation and experimentation, induc-
tive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories”
(Andersen and Hepburn, 2016). In this way hypotheses can be continuously improved
by refinement or rejection.
A model is a scientific theory about how the real-life system behaves, and hypothesis
testing is equivalent to model validation (Bryson et al., 2007). Hence, every time we
validate a model we can learn something new about how the real-life system might work,
and then refine hypotheses about this system accordingly. Thus, in the next version of
modelling a particular system we may have even more robust ideas about parameter
values or relationships within the model.
In terms of understanding the past, the modelling process helps us to make predic-
tions about what may or may not have happened – something which may not be possible
by solely looking at the archaeological record.
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2.3 Models for the Origins of Agriculture
In this section I will discuss some of the existing models which can be used to understand
some of the key processes involved in the transition to agriculture. These models are
reviewed since they both provided me with inspiration for the development of my own
model and also illustrate the contribution modelling can make in understanding the
transition to agriculture. This is not an exhaustive review of the models associated with
the transition to farming, but rather the ones I felt were most relevant and interesting
in my search of the literature.
Since changes in mobility are associated with the transition to farming, but could
have occurred before the transition, first I will look at some models which investigate
mobility out of the context of agriculture. The models by Anderies and Hegmon (2011),
Freeman and Anderies (2012) and Dow and Reed (2015) all consider the movement
decisions of individuals in an environment with variation in resource quality. The first
two of these look at how the resource qualities can change directly because of population
density, and the last, due to weather. Dow and Reed (2015) also include the effect of
population growth and technological knowledge. Additionally, the model presented by
Hamilton et al. (2016) considers mobility decisions in different ecosystems in the context
of metabolic rates.
I then consider the existing models concerned specifically with the switch to agricul-
ture. The majority of these models test hypotheses (including some of those mentioned
in Section 1.3) for the transition to agriculture – including the effects of mobility and
population pressure (Locay, 1989); environmental change and technological knowledge
(Wirtz and Lemmen, 2003); technological knowledge and cooperation (Marceau and
Myers, 2006); technological knowledge and population pressure (Baker, 2008); climate
change and population pressure (Dow et al., 2009); and technological knowledge and
climate change (Dow and Reed, 2011). More broadly the model by Freeman, Peeples
and Anderies (2015) investigates the stable strategies for farming when domestication
has occurred. I will finally briefly mention the model by Bowles and Choi (2013) which
looks at the relationship between property rights, climate change and the transition to
agriculture, this model will be described in much more detail in Chapter 3.
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2.3.1 Forager Population Size and Mobility
Anderies and Hegmon (2011)
The model presented by Anderies and Hegmon (2011) was motivated by the Mimbres
archaeological region in southwest New Mexico. This region had two main areas, one
which was richer (more resources and a higher regeneration rate) but was more degraded,
and one which was less rich and less degraded. The authors modelled a landscape with
two areas with variation in their resource qualities to try to understand the relationship
between migration and spatial variation in resource quality.
Their model has 14 parameters, including ones to do with resource regeneration rate,
harvestability, cultural attractors and migration. They model people migrating between
the two areas and harvesting a density-dependent renewable resource, and also model
the case where there is no migration. Their model shows that differences in regeneration
rates and harvestability can cause the situation observed in the Mimbres region; where
at equilibrium the area with slower regeneration is less degraded than the area with a
higher regeneration rate. Migration reduces welfare losses for the population overall,
but has little impact on the heterogeneity of degradation.
Freeman and Anderies (2012)
Freeman and Anderies (2012) built a model to look at the dynamics between foraging
decisions, resources and social relationships.
Their model is built on ideas from two previous static human population-resource
models: the traveler-processor model by Bettinger and Baumhoff (1982) and the packing
model by Binford (2001). The former assumes that when there are low forager population
densities foragers should maximise their energy return by minimising the time spent in
one patch and frequently move between patches. In contrast, when there are high forager
population densities foragers should maximise their time harvesting from one patch. The
latter model assumes that groups of hunter-gatherers primarily exploit their landscape
by moving between its different foraging locations. However, once the landscape is
‘packed’ – when all the foraging locations are occupied by a group – groups will then
fight or cooperate with one another to use the resources in each other’s territories.
The mathematical model by Freeman and Anderies (2012) includes 12 parameters
and the two dynamic variables: resource abundance, x(t), at time t and foraging effort,
e(t). Foraging effort is based on the harvest and consumption time of foragers within a
habitat, and is measured in work hours per day. x(t) is measured as biomass per unit
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area. Resource abundance changes according to
dx
dt
= G(x)−H(x, e), (2.1)
where G(x) is resource growth and H(x, e) is resource depletion by harvesting. G(x)
follows the logistic growth equation, G(x) = rx(1− xk ), where r is the maximum growth
rate of the resource and k is the carrying capacity within a habitat. H(x, e) = ph(x, e),
where p is the population density (number of groups/unit area) and h(x, e) is the harvest
for one forager group.
Several different resource patches make up a foraging habitat, and resources cannot
move between habitats (hence they are seen as plant resources). Forager groups move
from habitat to habitat, evaluate whether or not to start to forage in that habitat, and
if so, then determine when to stop foraging there. Private ownership of resources by for-
agers is not considered in this model, hence all resources are open-access. Furthermore,
the time spent foraging takes away time from other activities such as the maintenance
of social relationships, and hence foragers want to minimise their time foraging.
The model was analysed using bifurcation and stability analysis using different pa-
rameter values. It was found that if a resource base’s growth rate decreases or the
density of foragers increases in a particular habitat, then resource harvesting by the
foraging group in this habitat will intensify. However, Freeman and Anderies found
that this adaptation can lead to a vulnerable system and foragers face a risk. It was
suggested that to increase the system’s stability foragers may start to enforce ownership
rules, become hyperaggressive and expand territory, decrease fertility or increase mor-
tality, and/or invest labour to increase the habitat’s productivity, perhaps by cultivating
domesticated plants.
Dow and Reed (2015)
The model developed by Dow and Reed (2015) involves climate change, population
growth and technological knowledge, and aims to investigate the switch from mobile to
sedentary foraging.
Dow and Reed (2015) model a region divided into many production sites, where each
site can be occupied by several agents. Production sites can have abundant or scarce
food resources, and these can change randomly both spatially and temporally. Agents
have one unit of time for labour, and this can be spent on two food collection meth-
ods – hunting (which is a mobile activity) and gathering (which is involves stationary
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methods). Food output at a site is
Y = θ[f(Lf ) + kg(Lg)] (2.2)
where Lf and Lg are the labour inputs for hunting and gathering of all the agents at this
site respectively. f and g are hunting and gathering production functions respectively,
k is the productivity of gathering. θ is the weather at this site. There are no costs to
movement between sites.
Dow and Reed (2015) find that when the region’s weather is generally bad and has a
high variance, hunting only is used and sites are abandoned every time the local weather
at the site changes from good to bad. When the region’s weather is better and has
less variance they find that agents can stay at the same site even if the local weather
changes from good to bad. They propose three reasons for this, one is that if there is less
variation in productivity from good to bad sites, agents are more likely to stay at bad
sites. Another reason they give is that better weather can lead to population growth and
therefore sedentism. Their final reason is that population growth promoted by better
weather can lead to technological innovation, which in turn creates sedentism. They
explain that the final reason is non-reversible, so even if the climate then deteriorates
sedentism can still persist.
Hamilton et al. (2016)
Hamilton et al. (2016) look at the predictability of hunter-gatherer residential mobility.
Since mobility is driven by the need for energy, they use metabolic rates to predict the
scale of mobility and the respiration of the entire ecosystem (as a function of temperature
and precipitation) to predict variation in mobility across different ecosystems.
A territory of size A is divided into the home ranges, H0, of the N individuals of
size M living there. A home range is the area used by an individual to meet their
metabolic needs (B) given the energy availability, R, of the local environment, and
therefore H0 = B/R.
Using data from Binford (2001) and Hein et al. (2012) Hamilton and colleagues
(2016) find the average relationship between average distance per move and area per
individual, temperature and also precipitation.
They conclude that their model shows an exponential increase in average move dis-
tance with decreasing temperature and precipitation. Since biodiversity increases with
temperature, they suggest their results show mobility decreases with increases in biodi-
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versity. They also note that the average distance per move is only minorly influenced
by population size, and so they predict any population density factors affecting mobility
would be because of limits to the size of the area, rather than the number of people.
Thus they predict switches to sedentism in hunter-gatherers would be primarily caused
by changes to the subsistence ecology.
2.3.2 Models for the Switch to Agriculture
Locay (1989)
An early model for the switch to agriculture was one looking at the effect of sedentism
and population pressure by Locay (1989).
Locay’s model includes families (two adults and children) living in a uniform and
natural environment, and producing food for themselves. Agents live two generations,
one as children and one as adults. At the end of childhood, agents can marry other
adults and form new families. The number of children that survive until adulthood is
proportional to the amount of food the family has. Furthermore, families have varying
degrees of nomadism, and the amount of food required for a child to survive to adulthood
increases with the degree of nomadism in the family.
Families can get food by either hunting and gathering, or by agriculture (or both).
Two assumptions are made at this point, one is that hunting and gathering is more
“intensive in land relative to labor” than agriculture; and the other is that high degrees of
nomadism are detrimental to farming output. Thus Locay’s output of hunter-gathering,
XH , and of agriculture, XA, for a family are taken as
XH = θHg(τH , aH), and XA = θAh(N)f(τA, aA), (2.3)
where τi and ai are the amount of labour/time and land the family has available for
hunter-gathering (i = H) or for agriculture (i = A); g and f are functions increasing with
τi and ai; θH and θA are how productive the activity is; and h is a function decreasing
with N , the degree of nomadism. Locay also assumes that the total time available for
subsistence activities, τ(N, a) (where τH + τA ≤ τ(N, a)), increases with the amount of
nomadism (based on the idea that a sedentary family would need to frequently waste
time walking to their foraging or farming site), but at a decreasing rate (i.e. τ ′ > 0, but
τ ′′ < 0).
Locay finds that a household with much more labour available than land will find
hunter-gathering unattractive; if there is little labour available relative to land, hunting
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and gathering will be attractive; and if the labour available and land are closer to
being equal then a family will engage in both subsistence activities. Furthermore, Locay
shows that the relative gains of agriculture in comparison to hunting and gathering are
increased with sedentism.
Locay also tests the hypothesis of population pressure on the switch to agriculture.
By allowing families to have an increasing amount of land available (i.e. there is no set
constraint) until all the land in the region becomes utilised (and then there will be a
land constraint) Locay creates population pressure within the model. He finds that a
population pressure increase lowers each family’s available land, which both increases
the attractiveness of agriculture relative to hunter-gathering and lowers the advantage of
nomadism. Thus a population pressure increase could cause a switch to agriculture, both
directly and indirectly via a switch to sedentism (which would increase the advantage
of agriculture).
Wirtz and Lemmen (2003)
A deterministic model by Wirtz and Lemmen (2003) looked at the dynamics between
human changes (culture, economy and migration) and environmental changes on a global
scale. Their goal was to test if these human changes are adaptations to their environ-
ment.
The model consists of four variables, the ratio of established agricultural economies to
non-agricultural, population density, the farming effort ratio, and technology efficiency
index. Data on the regional distribution of different vegetation classes (e.g. grassland,
tundra, hot desert) at 5000 yBP is used in the model. The net primary productivity
(NPP) for each of these classes is also found as a measure of their temperature limitation
index (where warmer climates have values close to 0, and colder climates have values
close to 1, representing the constraint of cold temperatures on vegetative growth). They
split the world into 197 regions, and categorise these regions as belonging to one of the
vegetation classes.
The model is implemented with evolution equations explaining how each of the vari-
ables change with time in each of the world regions. Findings suggest that the transition
to agriculture would have occurred without climate fluctuation, albeit not as early. Wirtz
and Lemmen also infer from their model that a slow process of technological innovation
and competition was a driving force for the transition to agriculture, rather than popu-
lation pressure.
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Marceau and Myers (2006)
The effect of technological knowledge and cooperation on the switch to agriculture are
studied in a model by Marceau and Myers (2006). Individuals in their model each have
a time which they use for leisure, food production, and security effort. Individuals can
form cooperative bands, which are either comprised of all foragers or all farmers, and
within a band all work (labour and security) and food is shared equally.
For farmers, the only gain in forming a band is to share security costs. Farming
output is given as φf , where φ is the amount of agricultural technological knowledge, and
f is a function of the time spent farming and the amount of land farmed by an individual.
The foraging stock available for foraging bands changes according to the logistic growth
equation – and it is assumed that the amount of land used in farming reduces the carrying
capacity of the foraging stock. The amount of foraged food harvested is a function of
total band effort, amount of stock, and the degree of foraging technology.
They start their model with a solely foraging economy, and thus assume that initially
there is no agricultural technological knowledge (i.e. φ = 0). When considering a
population of only foragers and low levels of technology, Marceau and Myers find that
the best strategy for all individuals is to form a single cooperative band, which helps
avoid over-exploitation. However, as technology (both of foraging and farming) increases
this single band breaks up into many bands, causing an increase in work and over-
exploitation of the environment, which eventually can lead to a switch to agriculture.
Thus, they show that technological progression could have damaged the integrity of
cooperative bands, and thus lead to the transition.
Baker (2008)
A model by Baker (2008) looks at the effects of technological capability and population
density on the transition to agriculture. The model assumes these are “symbiotically
related”, and that agriculture requires more technological knowledge then hunting and
gathering.
Baker’s model includes n individuals allocating their time to hunting and gathering
(τH) or to farming (τF ) on an amount of land (Z), where τH + τF = 1. Land and
labour is needed for agriculture, and the land not used in agriculture is used by agents
for hunting and gathering. The amount of land needed for agriculture by one agent, z,
is proportional to the amount of time spent on agriculture, thus z = ψτF . However, if
land becomes scarce due to lots of agriculture (i.e. if Z < ψnτ¯F ), then it will be shared
equally amongst the agents. Agents can also have children, the number of which is
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determined by the amount of food the agent produces, hence the population dynamics of
their model are determined by the production economy of the population. Technological
capability is included into the model in the function for hunter-gatherer and agricultural
productivities, along with population density, resource base availability and the amount
of time engaged in agriculture.
Results showed that among agricultural societies, larger amounts of technological
sophistication result in higher population densities, and vice versa. However, for hunter-
gatherer societies population density is unaltered by technology level, and ‘technological
spillovers’ from centers of civilization are important for the transition to agriculture.
Dow et al. (2009)
Dow et al. (2009) argue that the transition to agriculture and the associated population
changes were the result of climate changes. In particular, the Younger Dryas’s climate
reversal effects on local site heterogeneity and the ability for migration between these
sites, is seen as the key force. They create an analytic model with region-specific climate
variation (which is based on the average temperature and precipitation), and within-
region differences in site ‘quality’, which is fixed for each location, to test this idea.
A geographical region in their model contains many production sites where foraging
and cultivation can take place. People move in between these sites freely, with no distinc-
tion between nomadic or sedentary people. The productivity of foraging and farming are
functions of climate, site quality, and foraging or cultivation labour respectively. In each
period of their model, adults decide (based on the climate and site qualities) whether to
move site or not. Next, labour is split between foraging and farming at each site food
is obtained and the products of foraging or farming are all shared equally between this
site’s population. Finally, the adults are replaced by their offspring, where the number
of children for each adult increases with the overall productivity of the site.
It was found that the population density at high quality sites increased, and in the
short-run cultivation became more favourable at these sites. Focusing on southwest Asia,
their model predicts population growth between 15-13,000 yBP, and then the climate
shock of the Younger Dryas caused people to move to ‘good’ sites where local populations
increased, which made cultivation more attractive than hunting and gathering, and thus
the transition to agriculture began.
Dow and Reed (2011)
Dow and Reed (2011) model the evolution of food production technological knowledge,
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and how climate shocks can effect this. Technological knowledge is made up of tech-
niques for acquiring, processing and storing different food resources. The amount of
food produced from resource r is taken as argr(kr)fr(nr). Where the resource is in
abundance ar, is harvested with technique kr (which is comprised on many skills) and
labour nr. Adults will know a subset of the full technological knowledge set, and some
of this subset can be passed on (with some mutation) to their offspring’s knowledge.
Dow and Reed ask “what environmental conditions are most conducive to technical
progress?” and find that climate shocks (such as the Younger Dryas) induced techno-
logical experimentation. The authors hypothesise that this innovation could then have
led to agriculture.
Freeman et al. (2015)
The human behavioural ecology framework model proposed by Freeman, Peeples and
Anderies (2015) looks at the relationship between foraging, farming and resource pro-
ductivity; their model links foraging theory and niche construction. They ask in what
circumstances do people become farmers – or not – once domesticated plants have be-
come available.
Their model involves the reproduction and growth of a forest, and the amount of
time households spend foraging and/or farming. The households forage for the seeds
produced by trees and/or farm a domesticated plant, and these affect their fitness. If
households farm then this affects the production of seeds (through tree clearance). They
assume seed harvest has diminishing returns, since the more a household collects the
further they have to travel to get more, and farming produces constant returns.
Seed density, s, changes with time, t, according to
ds
dt
= rsp− dss−Nhs, (2.4)
and tree density, p, changes according to
dp
dt
= rps(1− p
Kp
)−Nc, (2.5)
where rs is the intrinsic production of seeds, ds is the depletion rate of seeds by plants
and decay, N is the density of households, hs is the per capita harvest of seeds, rps
is the intrinsic growth of trees, Kp is the tree growth limiting effects by intraspecific
competition and c is the land cleared of trees because of farming. Their model has a
total of 12 parameters.
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Their model has several stable states when households try to allocate their effort
optimally. One of these states is productive and the other is impoverished; because of
this the households run the risk of flipping from the productive to the impoverished.
They find that in the short term farming can be optimal, but this can be sensitive to
population density increases or decreases in wild resource productivity and hence in the
longer run farming can be risky.
Bowles and Choi (2013)
In an agent-based game-theoretical model by Bowles and Choi (2013) the relationship
between the advent of farming and farming-friendly property rights was studied. Their
model was calibrated with a measure of climate volatility and their simulations showed
the coevolution of farming and farming-friendly property rights at approximately the
same time as may be expected from the archaeological record.
I replicate and analyse this model in Chapter 3, and thus I will fully describe it there.
2.3.3 Summary
These models predict the importance of various factors on the transition to agriculture.
The work of Wirtz and Lemmen (2003), Dow and Reed (2011) and Marceau and Myers
(2006) suggests that technological innovation could have been an important factor for
the transition – via the decline in cooperation in the case of Marceau and Myer’s model.
Locay (1989) and Dow et al. (2009) suggest that population pressure could have caused
the transition to agriculture, perhaps via sedentism in the case of Locay’s model. On
the other hand, Wirtz and Lemmen (2003) suggest that population pressure was not
a key factor for the transition. Declining cooperation and the emergence of property
rights are shown to be important for the switch in the model by Bowles and Choi (2013).
Climate change is also seen to play a part in the transition for the models in Dow et al.
(2009), Dow and Reed (2011) and Bowles and Choi (2013), however, the model by Wirtz
and Lemmen (2003) predicts that the transition would still have occurred (albeit later)
without climate fluctuations.
These models all highlight how modelling can be a critical tool for understanding why
behaviours and practices might change. Even though there are contradictions in some
results and differences in what processes and parameters people choose are important
to include or exclude in their models, these models provide a way to test hypotheses.
Inspired by several of these models – notably those by Freeman and Anderies (2012),
Locay (1989), Bowles and Choi (2013) – I create a new evolutionary model for the origins
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of farming. This model includes certain factors which I think are critical to understand-
ing why subsistence behaviour changed (based the literature reviewed in Chapter 1),
but to my knowledge have not been included together in a model before. These factors
are subsistence and mobility decision making, population size variation, resource quality
variation, and a dynamic human-environmental interaction.
As in Anderies and Hegmon (2011), Freeman and Anderies (2012) and Dow and
Reed (2015) in my model I look at movement decisions in an environment with resource
variability. However, unlike these, I also include the possibility that people can farm.
The models I have looked at do not include both farming and mobility, apart from Lo-
cay’s (1989), but in this there is a uniform environment. In my model the environment
responds to the human population as in Freeman and Anderies (2012), and environmen-
tal quality is not solely determined by climate data as it is in Wirtz and Lemmen (2003)
and Bowles and Choi (2013). Furthermore, there is no explicit link between mobility
and subsistence strategies as there is in Locay (1989) – the optimal behaviours in my
model are able to evolve. A full comparison of the models reviewed in this section and
the factors I include in my model is shown in Table 2.3.
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2.4 Methodological Contributions
In this section I will describe the analysis methods I have developed. In Section 2.4.1
I will describe the fitting to idealised outcomes (FIO) approach; in Section 2.4.2 I will
describe an algorithm for predicting when model outcomes change; in Section 2.4.3 I
will describe a method of measuring convergence in simulation outcome distributions;
and in Section 2.4.4 I will describe a method to infer parameter-outcome associations
and simulation outcome types (the Outcome Clustering method). These methods are
particularly useful for stochastic models where every run of the model can yield different
outcomes, and/or in models where exact parameter values are unknown and therefore
the parameter space needs to be explored.
2.4.1 The FIO Approach
As mentioned in Section 2.2.4 the fix-all-but-one approach is commonly used in the
parameter sensitivity analysis of models. I will illustrate this approach using a basic
model for population growth. I will also use this model to introduce the fitting to
idealised outcomes (FIO) approach, which tests parameter sensitivity amongst other
things.
Population growth can be modelled according to the exponential growth equation
nt = nt−1(1 + r) = n0(1 + r)t, (2.6)
where nt is the population size at t years, r is the maximum per capita growth rate and
n0 is the initial population size.
If the purpose of this model was to find the population size after 10 years (n10) but
there were no exact values for n0 and r, I could vary both n0 and r and find n10 for
every combination. This can be seen in the top left panel of Figure 2.3, where r is varied
in the x-axis and n0 is varied in the y-axis. Thus in this simple two parameter model
the sensitivity of the parameters and parameter interactions can be explored relatively
easily.
If I then add more complexity to this model and allowed there to be a death rate,
the model becomes slightly more difficult to analyse. For this I model the population
growth as
nt = nt−1(1 + r − d) = n0(1 + r − d)t, (2.7)
where d is the death rate of the population. I can still visualise how these parameters
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Figure 2.3: Population size after 10 years, n10 (colour – see key) when looking at
different combinations of the four parameters.
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affect the population size after 10 years in 2D, but now one of the parameters cannot be
varied continuously, and thus the parameter interactions are less easily examined. This
is shown in the top row of Figure 2.3, where I have investigated the effect of changing d.
I now add a fourth parameter to the model, m, which stochastically models migra-
tion. I pick the number of people migrating into the population every year from an
uniform distribution between 0 and m, hence
M ∼ U([ 0,m] )
nt = nt−1(1 + r − d) +M,
(2.8)
The top 2 rows of Figure 2.3 show how we can vary all four parameters and visualise the
outcome, but now two of the parameters cannot be varied continuously and parameter
interactions become even more complicated to analyse. Since the addition of migration
means that there is now a stochastic element, each run of the model will now have
slightly different outcomes – this can be seen by comparing the middle and bottom rows
of Figure 2.3 where the parameters were kept the same.
Thus with increasing model complexity (and in this example there are only 4 param-
eters) the effects parameters have on the outcomes of a model can become progressively
more difficult to analyse. Varying one parameter at a time to explore parameter sensi-
tivity also relies on having a default value to set the other parameters to, but there is
not always the data available to find this value. However, if there is data which suggests
that only a small range of values are realistic (but there is no exact value known) then
complexity will be reduced.
If we assume (perhaps by some intuition from data) that the default values for each
of these parameters are r = 0.55, n0 = 10, d = 0.45 and m = 501, we can see how
varying each parameter in turn affects the number of agents after 10 years. This is
shown in Figure 2.4. Using this approach I can get an idea of how each parameter
affects the outcomes, however since the model has stochastic elements to it the results
will be different each time.
This method provides a one-dimensional view of the parameter complexities, since it
has possibly relied on ill defined default values and has not accounted for the variation
in these results every time the models are run. Unfortunately this is the method often
used to study the effects of model parameters. However, another method can provide
a more detailed view. This method will be referred to as ‘fitting to idealised outcomes’
(FIO), and it is very similar to approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) (Beaumont,
1 These values are entirely made up for illustrative purposes.
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Figure 2.4: Population size after 10 years (n10) when varying each of the four param-
eters in turn and keeping the others at their default values. Default values are shown in
red.
2010).
FIO has three steps:
1. Many simulations of the model are run with random combinations of parameters
– this allows trends between the parameters and the outcomes to be seen, as well
as studying parameter interdependencies and sensitivity.
2. An idealised outcome is decided on. This is informed by observed data.
3. Simulations which give the most ideal outcome are then separated out. The pa-
rameter value combinations which were used in these are interpreted as being most
likely to cause the ideal outcome.
This process differs from in ABC in step 3. In ABC summary statistic(s) from
observed data are compared to the same summary statistic(s) from the modelled data,
rather than a simple comparison of basic outcomes. Thus in ABC the comparison of
the simulation and observed data is much more robust, and thus ABC can be used to
infer parameters and validate complex models. However, to do this ABC relies on having
detailed observed data which is not always possible. Thus, I propose that when observed
data is not rich enough to allow ABC, but either some general outcome is known or is of
interest, FIO is a good method for studying parameter sensitivity and model behaviour
with much more detail than the fix-all-but-one approach allows.
Using the FIO method in my population growth model I can look at the relationship
between parameter values and the population size after 10 years. I run the model 100,000
times with different parameter values (step 1). From this it can be seen which parameter
values cause certain values of n10 in 100,000 simulations of the model; these relationships
are shown in Figure 2.5a.
79
2.4. METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l lll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
r
n
10
0.5 0.7 0.90
e+
00
4e
+0
6
8e
+0
6
ρ = 0.48
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l l
l
lll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll ll
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
n0
n
10
0 4000 80000
e+
00
4e
+0
6
8e
+0
6
ρ = 0.36
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l llll l
l l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll ll l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
d
n
10
0.0 0.2 0.40
e+
00
4e
+0
6
8e
+0
6
ρ = −0.48
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
ll
l
l l
ll
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l l
ll
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll l
l l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
m
n
10
0 20 60 1000
e+
00
4e
+0
6
8e
+0
6
ρ = 0
(a)
r
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.5 0.7 0.9
0
10
00
30
00
50
00
n0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 4000 8000
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
d
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.0 0.2 0.4
0
10
00
30
00
50
00
m
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 20 60 100
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
(b)
Figure 2.5: Results from applying the FIO method. (a) The relationship between
parameters and the population size after 10 years (n10) in 100,000 simulations. Pearson’s
product moment correlation coefficient, ρ, between the parameter value and population
size after 10 years is shown in red. (b) The frequencies of parameter values in the 1% of
simulations closest to having n10 = 400, 000.
If my observed data suggests that the actual population size after 10 years is 400,000,
I then look for the simulations which are closest to this (the ‘top simulations’). n10 =
400, 000 is therefore my idealised outcome (step 2). The parameter value distributions
in these top simulations are shown in Figure 2.5b (step 3). In ABC these would be the
posterior distributions.
Hence, my interpretation from this analysis could be that in the range I looked at
the upper limit on the number of people migrating in, m, makes little difference to
the overall population size after 10 years. High values for the growth rate and initial
population size, and low death rates, cause higher population sizes over time. I can
also estimate which parameter values might be likely to cause the observed outcome by
looking at the modes of the histograms in Figure 2.5b.
There is much more analysis and statistical tests which can be done on the data
collected from implementing the FIO method. These will be explored in context when
I use the FIO method in my model analysis in Chapters 3 and 6.
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2.4.2 Predicting When Outcomes Change
In an evolutionary model there may be an outcome (for example cooperative behaviour
or population size) of the model which changes over time. There may be a period of
time when this outcome changes by random drift, and then there may be a selection
pressure which means that the outcome evolves towards a particular value.
If there are multiple outcomes changing in this way, it is often of interest to be able to
quantify the point at which when they change in order to be able to estimate the order in
which events happened (for example does the evolution of cooperation happen before an
increase in population size or after?). In some cases predicting which outcome changes
first could be done by simply looking at a plot of the changes over time. However,
being able to quantify this rather than a prediction by eye is useful when evaluating this
consistently for many simulations. I have developed an algorithm to predict when this
point of change occurs.
The way I quantify the point of change is by fitting a linear model (line of best fit) to
the outcome values in the first 100 time points (or any other block size) and comparing
the gradient of this slope to that of the next block of 100 points (e.g. compare an
outcome for time points 1 to 100, and 101 to 200). I then perform a two-tailed Student’s
t-test on these two sets of fitted data points, where my null hypothesis is that the slope
of the first block is equal to that of the second block. With a p-value threshold of 0.01
I reject or accept the null hypothesis. I then calculate the point of change as the first
time point of the second block when the null hypothesis was rejected, i.e. the slopes
were significantly different. Examples of the point of change predicted by my algorithm
in two outcomes are shown in Figure 2.6, it can be seen from these that Outcome 1 is
always predicted to change before Outcome 2.
I can choose different block sizes, but there is a trade off since if the block size is too
small it is very sensitive to the random oscillations which occur often, but if it is too big
then the resolution of results will be low. By simply looking at a sample of the points
of change predictions using different block sizes by eye, I can find a block size that gives
the best results.
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Figure 2.6: Examples of predicting the point at which two outcomes (‘Outcome 1’ and
‘Outcome 2’) start to change significantly (red and blue circles respectively). Lines of
best fit for each 100-point window of results are also plotted.
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Figure 2.7: An example of measuring the point at which distributions become similar.
(a) Violin plots of 100,000 values at each iteration (data was made up for illustrative
purposes). (b) The p-values from a two-tailed Student’s t-test on value distributions
from two consecutive iterations. e.g. I perform a t-test on the values at iteration 1 and
2 and plot the p-value.
2.4.3 Measuring Convergence in Simulation Outcome Distributions
As well as finding the point at which an outcome starts to change more significantly than
it does by drift (as I looked at in Section 2.4.2), it is also of interest to see when (and if)
the changes in the outcome value have stabilised. In terms of simulation modelling this
point is useful to know since it may be the case that running the simulation for longer
will not result in any differences in results, but will take up time and processing power.
However, caution must be taken since some systems may stabilise but then they might
begin to change again.
If many simulations of the model are run over many iterations then there will be
a distribution of outcome values for each iteration. These are shown using made up
data in Figure 2.7a. From this plot it can be seen that the outcome value distributions
become quite similar after iteration 13. I can measure convergence more quantitively by
performing a two-tailed Student’s t-test between the outcome distributions at consec-
utive pairs of iterations (e.g. comparing the distributions at iteration 1 and 2). If the
p-value of these tests is big then I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution
means are equal. I plot the p-values for each consecutive outcome distribution in Figure
2.7b. Indeed, the p-values become large (> 0.01) after iteration 13; indicating that the
distribution means are likely to be converging at this point.
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2.4.4 The Outcome Clustering Method
In the FIO example in Section 2.4.1 the outcome of the model was population size,
and I found that a combination of specific parameter values made it most likely for a
particular idealised outcome to occur. There may also be other outcomes of a model
and it may be of interest to see if there are any relationships between different outcome
values. For example, outcomes of high population size and high gross domestic product
(GDP) may co-occur in the model.
When there are multiple outcomes of the model a simple correlation coefficient could
be found to see relationships. However, correlation coefficients would not pick up on any
granularity in the specific outcome values which may co-occur together, especially if the
relationships are not strictly linear. I propose another method where outcomes are
clustered to find any relationships between them. I will refer to this method as the
Outcome Clustering (OC) method.
For this method many simulations of the model are run, and outcomes are recorded.
I then use the function ‘Mclust’ in the R library ‘mclust’ (Fraley and Raftery, 2002;
Fraley et al., 2012; R Core Team, 2013) to find clusters of simulations on the basis
of their outcomes. After identifying these simulation clusters the distributions of the
parameter values in each cluster can be found.
To illustrate this method I have made up the parameter and outcome values (where
there are two parameters and three outcomes) of 3000 simulations. Figure 2.8a shows
scatter plots of each simulation outcome pair and Figure 2.8b shows the frequency dis-
tributions for each outcome. From these figures there are clear clusters in the outcomes,
and indeed the clustering algorithm in R identified three clusters. Using the cluster clas-
sifications found I can look at both the relative densities of outcomes and parameters
in each of the three clusters (Figure 2.8c and 2.8d respectively). In this example these
figures show how certain parameter ranges are associated with quite distinct outcome
types.
The data I made up for this example had very clear and distinct outcome clusters,
however this might not always be the case. Thus, this method systematically identifies
differences in simulation outcomes and whether certain parameter values are associated
with outcome types.
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Figure 2.8: An example of using the outcome clustering method to infer parameter-
outcome associations and simulation outcome types using made up data. (a) Scatter
plots of each pair of the three outcomes. (b) The frequencies of the three simulation
outcome values. (c) The relative densities of the three simulation outcome values in each
of the three clusters identified. (d) The relative densities of the two parameter values in
each of the three clusters identified.
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Table 2.4: A summary of how I use the data reviewed in this section. When the data
is used for parameter fitting I have included the parameter symbols – see Tables 3.2 and
6.2.
Data Source Use Type Value
Kelly’s (2013) hunter-
gatherer mobility data
Model validation There is an exponentially decreasing
relationship between reduced mobil-
ity and larger population density
Kelly’s (2013) hunter-
gatherer mobility data
Model validation There is less mobility in areas where
there is more to eat
Kelly’s (2013) hunter-
gatherer population
density data
Parameter fitting The maximum number of agents
which can be supported at a site,
nmax
Mace’s (1996) Gabbra
wealth and fertility data
Parameter fitting There is a logarithmic relationship
between wealth and fertility, p(f)
Kelly’s (2013) hunter-
gatherer fertility and
mortality
Parameter fitting The upper fission probability, pmax
Archaeobotanical data Model validation The timings of when agriculture be-
came adopted in SW Asia
Bocquet-Appel’s
(2011b) population
density data
Parameter fitting How many more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers, φ
NGRIP climate data Parameter fitting The disadvantage of farming due to
temperature volatility, θ
2.5 Data
The first step in building a model is to consider what data is available. Thus in this
section I will review and analyse the ethnographic, archaeological and climate data I use
to inform my model decisions, fit parameter values, and validate the model. Reference
back to the data in this section will be made when I describe my model in Chapter 4
and Section 6.1.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.4 data is used fit model parameters and to validate the
model, but the same data should not be used for both. An overview of which data is
used for these purposes is given in Table 2.4.
I did not collect any of the data presented in this section, however the data cleaning,
merging and analysis is my own contribution. This is with the exception of the Gabbra
household wealth-fertility relationship by Mace (1996) which is simply reviewed.
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2.5.1 Ethnographic Data
A large dataset of information about hunter-gatherers from all over the world is pro-
vided by Kelly (2013). This data includes details of hunter-gatherer mobility behaviour,
population density, group sizes, fertility and mortality rates, and the environments in
which the groups live. In this section I will discuss this data along with the relationship
between fertility and wealth given by Mace (1996). I include some details of the data
cleaning I had to do, and give the datasets used, in Appendix A.
Mobility
A summary of part of the dataset on hunter-gatherer mobility (Table 4-1 in Kelly, 2013,
p.80–84) is given in Table 2.5. The variables included in this data are the number of
residential moves per year, the average distance moved each time, the total distance
moved and area used in a year, and the average number of days a logistic move takes.
Also included in this Table is a measure of food availability (primary biomass) and
population density. After cleaning this dataset (details to which are given in Appendix
A) there were 87 hunter-gatherer groups included, although there are not always values
available for each variable. How these variables vary in different region types (e.g. Arctic,
Temperate forests) is shown in Figure 2.9. It can be seen that these values vary widely,
where some of the variation can be explained by region type.
The relationship between how often hunter-gatherer movement occurs (residential
moves per year) and other factors is shown in Figure 2.10. For these the biggest cor-
relation is with the total distance moved per year. Kelly’s dataset also shows that the
number of residential moves per year exponentially decays with increasing population
density – shown in Figure 2.11a. Furthermore, Kelly finds as primary biomass increases
so do the number of residential moves – shown in Figure 2.11b. Primary biomass is
defined as “an environment’s total amount of standing plant matter” (Kelly, 2013, p.
85), where high primary biomass means the plants invest more in structural parts of the
plants, and less in seeds/nuts/tubers etc. Therefore there can be less for foragers to eat
in areas of high primary biomass.
Dependence on aquatic resources and residential mobility are negatively correlated
(Kelly, 2013, p. 92) – see Figure 2.12a. A further trend is that generally hunter-gatherers
in higher effective temperatures tend to be more nomadic, but also those from the lowest
(the arctic) are highly mobile (Binford, 1980), see Figure 2.12b.
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Figure 2.9: Box plot summaries of Kelly’s hunter-gatherer mobility data separated into
region type, sample size shown underneath. Data from Kelly (2013, p.80–84) (Table 4-1).
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Figure 2.10: Relationships between the number of residential moves per year and
other hunter-gatherer mobility variables recorded in Kelly (2013, p.80–84) (Table 4-1).
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient, ρ, is given in red in each plot.
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Figure 2.11: Hunter-gatherer residential mobility, density and primary biomass. (a)
Number of residential moves per year against the population density (persons per 100
km2) for 31 forager groups. Point style denotes whether the groups live in relatively
colder or warmer climates (colder climates are from the area categories ‘Arctic’, ‘Sub-
arctic/cold forests’, ‘Temperate forests’, ‘North American Northwest Coast’, with the
other area categories defined as warmer climates). Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient
for all the data points is ρ = −0.33, with a p-value of 0.071; for just the colder climate
foragers ρ = −0.56, with a p-value of 0.039; and for just the warmer climate foragers
ρ = −0.31, with a p-value of 0.22. (b) The number of residential moves per year against
the primary biomass for the 26 tropical and subtropical forager groups. Reproduced from
Kelly (2013, p.88) (Figure 4-4). Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient for all the data
points is ρ = 0.37, with a p-value of 0.066; for just the tropical foragers ρ = 0.51, with a
p-value of 0.043; and for just the subtropical foragers ρ = −0.12, with a p-value of 0.73.
The data used to make these plots is from both Kelly (2013) and private correspondence
with Robert Kelly.
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Table 2.5: Summaries of the cleaned data collected by Kelly (2013) on the mobility,
primary biomass (Table 4-1, pg. 80–84) and population density (Table 7-3, pg. 178–184)
of hunter-gatherers, given in Appendix A.
Number
of
groups
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Residential moves per year 52 16.5 0 75 18.7
Average distance (km) 35 17 2.1 69.5 17
Total distance (km) 43 262.6 7 1600 283.0
Total area (km2) 65 2646.8 8.0 61880.0 8241.6
Logistic mobility (days) 21 15.3 1 48 13.1
Primary Biomass (kg/m2) 85 17.9 0 57.3 14.9
Population density
(persons/100km2)
70 34.2 0.4 266.5 47.1
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Figure 2.12: Movement, dependence on fish and effective temperature. (a) Annual
residual moves and the dependence on fish for several hunter-gatherer groups, data from
Kelly (2013, p.92) Table 4-3. (b) Settlement-patterns and effective temperate range.
Bars show the six different ET ranges, split into the proportion of each of four types of
settlement-pattern. Data from Binford (1980) Table 2.
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Table 2.6: Summaries of the cleaned data collected by Kelly (2013) on the group sizes
(Table 7-2, pg. 171), mortality (Table 7-7, pg. 201) and fertility (Table 7-5, pg. 195–
196) of hunter-gatherers, given in Appendix A. Mortality here is the percentage of people
under 1 or 15 years who die, and total fertility rate is the number of children that would
be born per woman if they survive through childbearing years.
Number
of
groups
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Group Size 34 143.0 13.5 1500.0 288.6
Group Size (Nomadic) 19 29.1 13.5 61.0 12.7
Group Size (Sedentary) 15 287.2 33.0 1500.0 395.3
Mortality (%) <1yr 16 20.8 8.0 37.0 9.3
Mortality (%) <15yr 27 35.3 6.0 61.0 15.0
Birth Interval (months) 15 5.6 2.3 37.6 8.9
Total Fertility Rate 52 5.7 2.6 8.5 1.4
Group Size, Fertility, Mortality and Wealth
Kelly (2013) also gives data on group sizes (Table 7-2, pg. 171), fertility (Table 7-5,
pg. 195–196) and mortality (Table 7-7, pg. 201) of various hunter-gatherer groups, this
data is shown in Appendix A. This data is summarised in Table 2.6 and in Figure 2.13.
Figure 2.14 shows the pairwise relationships between the mortality rates of infants and
adolescences, and between the birth interval and the fertility rate.
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Figure 2.13: Box plot summaries of Kelly’s hunter-gatherer group size, mortality and
fertility data, from Kelly (2013) (Tables 7-2, 7-5, and 7-7). The number of groups in
each sample is given in brackets.
In a study by Mace (1996) the relationship between wealth and fertility in the Gabbra
nomadic pastoralists is investigated. The number of camels is used as a proxy for
wealth and 848 households are included in the study. Mace found that the equations
for the best fit regression curves are −0.714 + 0.516 log(no.camels + 1) and −0.292 +
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Figure 2.14: Scatter plots of Kelly’s mortality and fertility data. (a) The relation-
ship between mortalities of children under 1 year old and those under 15 years old in
14 hunter-gatherer groups (Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient, ρ = 0.74, p-value =
0.003). (b) The relationship between birth interval and total fertility rate in 11 hunter-
gatherer groups (ρ = 0.43, p-value = 0.18). From Kelly (2013) (Tables 7-5 and 7-7).
0.198 log(no.camels+1) respectively for men and women’s residual fertility (Mace, 1996).
This result is reproduced in Figure 2.15.
Primary Productivity and Effective Temperature
Kelly (2013) also provides data on the environment of hunter-gatherer groups (in Table
3-1, pg. 41–43, data which is mostly taken from Murdock, 1967). There is a strong
positive correlation between the primary productivity and effective temperature of the
126 hunter-gatherer groups, see Figure 2.16a. Furthermore the dataset also gives the
percentage of food derived from three different activities, I have plotted these in Figure
2.16b.
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Figure 2.15: The relationship between wealth and fertility. The best fit regression
curves of data on the number of camels in the household (a measure of wealth) and the
residual fertility of ever-married male head of household (solid line) and ever-married
females (dashed line), from a study by Mace (1996) on 848 Gabbra households. Repro-
duced from Mace (1996, pg. 77).
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Figure 2.16: (a) The relationship between effective temperature and primary produc-
tivity in 126 hunter-gatherer groups (some group names are given). Pearson’s product
moment correlation coefficient, ρ = 0.75, where the p-value is 0.00. (b) Percentage of
food derived from hunting, gathering and fishing separately in the 126 hunter-gatherer
groups, ordered by effective temperature. Data from Table 3-1 of Kelly (2013, pg. 41–
43).
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2.5.2 Archaeological Data
I also have archaeological data available to me2. These datasets provide me with a
proxy to estimate the rate of the transition to agriculture (through changes in the wild-
to-domestic ratio) and sedentism (through the appearance of ground stone tools), and
population density.
Archaeobotanical Data
I obtained a dataset from the Institute of Archaeology at UCL of the published records
of archaeobotanical samples from SW Asia; discussion of an early form of this dataset
has been published in Colledge et al. (2004). The dataset includes 911 seed/grain or
chaff samples from cereals and pulses, with the culture they date from, whether they are
from the wild, domestic or ‘wild/domestic’ phenotypes and their ubiquity score. The
ubiquity score is the percentage of this sample type in the total samples found. The
sites these samples came from can be seen in Figure 2.17a. The culture category ‘PPNB’
(Pre-Pottery Neolithic B) in this dataset is used when there is no specific designation
for early (E), middle (M), late (L) or final (F); since this category is vague I have left
out the 45 ‘PPNB’ data entries from the analysis in this section.
Figure 2.18a shows the proportion of wild, domestic and ‘wild/domestic’ phenotypes
in each culture ordered by approximate dates (see Tables 1.2 and 2.7). I also looked at
the domestic-to-wild phenotype ratios over time in Figure 2.18b (right). Since the exact
year for certain categories (e.g. ‘EMPPNB’) are not given I have grouped ‘EMPPNB’,
‘MPPNB’ and ‘MLPPNB’, and ‘LPPNB’, ‘LPPNB, PN’, ‘L/FPPNB’ and ‘FPPNB’.
Since the ‘wild/domestic’ phenotype is ambiguous, I have included the three different
options for calculating the domestic-to-wild ratio.
From this data it can be seen that the proportion of domestic phenotypes increases
over time. However the data is of a low resolution, so we can only say something about
the overall trend of increase – which is roughly exponential.
2 Please correspond with Stephen Shennan for potential access to these datasets – s.shennan@ucl.ac.uk.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.17: Sites in SW Asia where the archaeobotanical dataset (left) and material
culture dataset (right) come from.
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Figure 2.18: Number of wild and domestic phenotypes over time. (a) The propor-
tion of wild, wild/domestic and domestic phenotypes for each culture. (b) The three
calculations of the domestic to wild ratios for different dates. ‘d’: domestic; ‘wd’: wild/-
domestic; ‘w’: wild. The data points for ‘EMPPNB’, ‘MPPNB’ and ‘MLPPNB’ have
been grouped, as have ‘LPPNB’, ‘LLPNB, PN’, ‘L/FPPNB’ and ‘FPPNB’, and a mid
point in the period range has been plotted.
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Table 2.7: Number of samples and date estimates from each culture category.
Culture classification Number of samples Mid-point cal BP estimate
Kebaran 5 19,413
Natufian 15 13,325
Khiamian, PPNA 10 11,988
PPNA 84 11,150
PPNA, EMPPNB 7 Vague culture classification
PPNB 45 Vague culture classification
EPPNB 60 10,400
EMPPNB 34 10,000
MPPNB 123 10,000
MLPPNB 150 10,000
LPPNB 123 9150
LPPNB, PN 21 9150
L/FPPNB 72 9150
FPPNB 77 9150
PPNC 27 8600
Khirokitian 58 8250
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Figure 2.19: How many of the different types of material culture (a; out of 12) or
ground stone (b; out of 20) classifications each site had (points).
Material Culture
I also obtained an archaeological dataset which includes details of the material culture
findings at 782 sites in SW Asia (for locations see Figure 2.17b) from the Institute
of Archaeology at UCL. The dataset has presence/absence scores of various material
objects (e.g. art, clay objects, ochre), but also burials/human remains and hearths.
It also includes the number of different types of ground stone artefacts (e.g. grinding
slabs, mortars). Having a large number of material culture types could be a proxy for
sedentism, since the accumulation of items becomes possible when mobility is reduced
(see Section 1.1.3).
The original data had 132 different classifications for the site’s culture, however some
of these were vague (e.g. ‘Mixed Early/Late Epipalaeolithic and Neolithic’) and/or only
had one or two data entries for each classification. I reclassified the data into 14 different
groups and did not include the vague data points. Figure 2.19a shows how many of the
different types of material culture (out of 12 types) each of the 782 sites had present,
where each site is grouped by the culture it belongs to. Similarly, Figure 2.19b shows
how many of the different ground stone types (out of 20 types) each site had present.
These plots show an increase and then a decline in the number of types of artefact.
Since the dataset only provides me with presence/absence scores for the material
objects, and often very vague number of ground stone tool types (e.g. entries which
say ‘>1’ or ‘many’), unfortunately I can only accurately infer how the range of types of
these items increases over time.
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Population Density
Through personal correspondence with Jean-Pierre Bocquet-Appel I obtained the dataset
he analysed in Bocquet-Appel (2011b). This dataset includes the numbers of skeletons
in different age ranges and the proportion of juvenile skeletons (5 to 19 years old), P5_19,
in 222 Northern Hemisphere cemeteries. The dataset also includes the difference in time
between the advent of farming (dt) in each of the cemetery locations. The data has been
used (Bocquet-Appel, 2011a,b) to illustrate the Neolithic demographic transition.
Bocquet-Appel (2011b) excludes cemeteries with low sample sizes, leaving 135 ceme-
teries – 32 from before farming and 103 after. This dataset includes skeletons with
dt ∈ [−7085, 3200] and the samples dated from 14,560 cal BP to 350 cal BP. Figure
2.20 shows the sites where this data is from, and Figure 2.21 shows how the number of
skeletons and the proportion of juvenile skeletons increases after farming began.
Figure 2.20: Cemetery locations in the dataset from Bocquet-Appel (2011b).
Table 2.8 shows the minimum, mean and maximum proportions of 5 to 19 year
old skeletons before and after the advent of farming. The increase shown represents
the increase in birth rate (and therefore fertility), but not mortality (Bocquet-Appel,
2011a). Thus, using this data I can find how many more people farming can support
than foraging, Φ = P5_19,after/P5_19,before. The maximum for this is Φmax = 4.2 and
the average is Φmean = 1.17.
I looked at these ratios in data with dt ∈ [−y, y] with y = [ 500, 1000, 1500, 2000,
2500, 3000, 3500, 8000] , and the results are robust to changing the period of time around
dt = 0 to include. All these ratios are shown in Table 2.9.
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Figure 2.21: Representation of the data from Bocquet-Appel (2011b). (a) The number
of skeletons from different age ranges and (b) the proportion of 9 to 15 year old skeletons
before and after the advent of farming.
Table 2.8: The minimum, mean and maximum proportion of 5 to 19 year old skeletons
before and after the advent of farming in the data from Bocquet-Appel (2011b).
Minimum Mean Maximum
Before the advent of farming 0.1 0.18 0.31
After the advent of farming 0.08 0.21 0.41
Table 2.9: Estimates of how many more people farming can support in comparison
to foraging. Maximum and mean values for the ratios of 5 to 19 year old skeletons
proportions before and after the advent of farming are found (P5_19,after/P5_19,before).
Data from Bocquet-Appel (2011b).
dt period Φmax Φmean
[−500, 500] 4.00 1.38
[−1000, 1000] 4.00 1.26
[−1500, 1500] 4.00 1.22
[−2000, 2000] 4.00 1.13
[−2500, 2500] 4.00 1.15
[−3000, 3000] 4.00 1.14
[−3500, 3500] 4.00 1.13
All 4.20 1.17
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2.5.3 Climate Data
A high resolution paleoclimatic proxy is available in the form of the North Greenland Ice
Core Project (NGRIP) (Andersen et al., 2006; Rasmussen et al., 2006; Svensson et al.,
2006; Vinther et al., 2006). This data shows the ratio of stable isotopes oxygen-18 (18O)
and oxygen-16 (16O), δ18O, over the last 41,760 years (with a 20 year resolution) which
can be used as a proxy for the temperature of ancient oceans. Figure 2.22 shows the
values for δ18O over time. This data shows how in the last 10,000 years the temperature
has become more stable.
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Figure 2.22: δ18O over time from the NGRIP database (Andersen et al., 2006; Ras-
mussen et al., 2006; Svensson et al., 2006; Vinther et al., 2006).
Using this data as a proxy for temperature is very general. Thus incorporating
climate data into a model of a region (for example SW Asia) would require more specific
terrestrial climate data than this (for example the eastern Mediterranean continental
paleoclimate determined from cave speleothems by Bar-Matthews et al., 1997). However,
the NGRIP data shows general trends and by looking at the difference in δ18O from
decade to decade (or another resolution) a measure of climate stability can be found.
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2.6 Conclusion
In the previous chapter I discussed how climate changes at the end of the Pleistocene
were associated with changes in the way people lived. I showed how although it was not
always through the same mechanisms or with the same timings, agriculture developed
alongside becoming less mobile and increases in population size. In Section 2.3 I showed
how modelling has been used to try to better understand the origins of agriculture,
and in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 I showed how evolutionary theory, game theory and agent-
based modelling can be used to study behaviour. In Section 2.4 I discussed some of the
methods I developed in this thesis, and in Section 2.5 I reviewed and analysed the data
I have available to develop my own model of the origins of agriculture.
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I will describe my evolutionary agent-based model which can
be used to study the relationship between mobility and population size on the switch to
agriculture. In this model, mobility and subsistence decisions are adaptable behaviours,
where selection pressures are influenced by a dynamic and interacting population and
environment.
Agent-based models have drawbacks; for example, if there are many parameters
then checking parameter sensitivity can be complicated and computationally intensive,
agent-based models can be very sensitive to initial conditions (and sometimes these are
unknown), and in general, agent-based models can produce complex behaviour which
can be complicated to analyse and understand. However, I think that my methodological
contributions in this thesis can help significantly with these problems. Furthermore, the
use of an agent-based evolutionary algorithm framework for what I want to model is
appropriate for two reasons:
1. What I am modelling is inherently individual-based behaviours (mobility and sub-
sistence strategies), and how these change over time.
2. The data I have available allows me to make predictions about individual dynam-
ics (e.g. how fertility can be predicted from fitness), but not global (e.g. how
population size changes over time).
Although my data can be used to inform on some of the parameter values in my
model, I do not have the data necessary to build a very specific model of the growth of
resources at rates expected throughout the Pleistocene-Holocene transition3, or to make
3 The NGRIP δ18O dataset can be used as a proxy for temperature during this period, and hence
should be correlated with plant growth. However, converting this to an actual value for plant growth
rate in the model would involve several assumptions about which unit and scale the value should be in.
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quantitative estimates of how farmers/foragers affect their environment. Because of this
I chose changes in resource quality to be modelled by simple growth equations which
include effects from the foraging/farming efforts of individuals (in a similar way as in
Freeman and Anderies (2012) – Equation 2.1).
I will describe and analyse the first version of this model, where only mobility and
population size in a foraging population is investigated, in Chapters 4 and 5. This
model is referred to as the Forager Model, and warrants a whole chapter of results for at
least two reasons: why there might be variation in the mobility of hunter-gathers is still
interesting (I dedicated Section 1.4 to this question), and it allows me to understand
the workings of the model before adding the extra complexities of subsistence strategy
variation.
Before I discuss the development and results of my own model, I will first describe
my analysis of the model developed by Bowles and Choi (2013). This is an evolutionary
game-theoretical model which looks at the coevolution of farming and farming-friendly
property rights, and provided inspiration for the future development of my own model.
This chapter is also a case-study of how the FIO method can provide fuller explorations
of mathematical and computational models, and how my application of it has revealed
new insights into how farming may have developed.
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3Property Rights and Subsistence
Strategy Changes
The work in this chapter has been published in:
Gallagher, E. M., Shennan, S. J., and Thomas, M. G. (2015). “Transition to farming
more likely for small, conservative groups with property rights, but increased productiv-
ity is not essential”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(46):14218–
14223.
I quote passages verbatim from this publication and its supplementary material, and
all figures have been reprinted with permission. This publication is attached in Appendix
N.
Summary
In Chapter 2 I discussed how mathematical models can be used to test theories and ex-
plore new hypotheses concerning the origins of agriculture. I examined how evolutionary
theory, game theory and agent-based modelling can all be useful in modelling human
behaviour. I also saw how models which base their results on ill-defined default param-
eter values and use a vary-all-but-one method of parameter sensitivity analysis do not
provide a complete view of how the model works, are weak in interpretative power and
can overlook many interactions between parameters. I proposed the fitting to idealised
outcomes (FIO) method in Section 2.4.1 as an alternative method of model exploration
and parameter sensitivity analysis.
Bowles and Choi (2013) developed a game-theoretical model for the coevolution of
farming and farming-friendly property rights, which replicates the timings for the emer-
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gence of these events seen in the archaeological record. Their model was calibrated using
the NGRIP climate data (described in Section 2.5.3). Bowles and Choi vary parameters
one-by-one to test the robustness of their model, but give little to no indication of where
they find the values used in the default parameter set.
In this chapter I replicate the model of Bowles and Choi (2013) and use the FIO
method to find complexities and interactions of the model previously unidentified. As
I will discuss in Section 7.3 the property rights aspect of Bowles and Choi’s model is
something I would like to include in a further model at a future date. This chapter
also provides an example of implementing the FIO method and by doing so reveals new
insights into the origins of agriculture.
In Section 3.1 I will describe the model in full and discuss the results of Bowles and
Choi’s parameter sensitivity analysis. I will discuss details of my replication of their
model and my decisions for certain aspects of the FIO approach in Section 3.2. The
results will be given in Section 3.3 and implications given in Section 3.4. Finally I will
conclude my findings in Section 3.5.
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3.1 The Bowles and Choi Model
It has been argued that during the transition to agriculture, the institution of private
property emerged (Bogaard et al., 2009; Earle, 2000; North and Thomas, 1977). This
idea led Bowles and Choi (2013) to hypothesise that the advent of farming was impos-
sible without farming-friendly property rights, and vice versa. Furthermore, they posit
that farming was not suddenly invented and then adopted because it was a “better way
to make a living” (Bowles and Choi, 2013) but, instead, that it was only due to particu-
lar rare (and perhaps coincidental) environmental and social conditions that it became
established. To study these hypotheses, an agent-based model was developed (hence-
forth referred to as the Bowles and Choi model), calibrated with a proxy of climate
volatility from the North Greenland Ice Core Project (NGRIP) (Andersen et al., 2006;
Rasmussen et al., 2006; Svensson et al., 2006; Vinther et al., 2006) – see Section 2.5.3
for details on this. Their simulations show that farming and farming-friendly property
rights can coevolve with approximately the same timings and magnitude as indicated in
the archaeological record.
3.1.1 Model Details
The Bowles and Choi model (2013) is based on 600 agents (the hypothesised size of a late
Pleistocene ethnolinguistic unit), separated into groups of 20 (the size of forager bands
or small villages). Agents have two types of strategies: they can be farmers or foragers
(their ‘technology strategy’), and they can have a ‘behavioral’ strategy, whereby they
can be a sharer, a bourgeois, or a civic (explained later). The model can be split into
five sections: within-group interactions, between-group interactions, cultural updating,
behavioural experimentation, and migration. All simulations start with a population of
civic foragers, representing what may be expected in the late Pleistocene on the basis of
generalizations from hunter-gatherer ethnographies (Kaplan et al., 2005).
First, agents obtain their payoffs by foraging or farming. The productivity of forag-
ing, Vh, is normalized to 1, and the productivity of farming is
Va = (r − θ)z − z, (3.1)
where r is the productivity of the farmer’s investment, z is the amount of farming
investment, and θ is the disadvantage of farming due to temperature volatility. θ is found
by transforming the original NGRIP ice core data to find a value for each 20-y period;
details can be found in Bowles and Choi’s supporting information (Bowles and Choi,
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2013, SI pg. 17–18). Hence, the value for the productivity of farming changes every 20 y,
and iterations of the model are now pegged to specific years. Next, two agents from the
same group are randomly paired, and games are played over the distribution of each of
the agents’ products. The outcomes of these games can increase or decrease the agents’
payoffs based on which strategies they both have (see Table 3.1). Key components
of this model are the farming-friendly property rights of the bourgeois agents and the
‘sharing-enforcer’ role played by the civics. A bourgeois agent will never share its own
product, it will never contend for a farmed product (the contestability of farming, µa,
is 0), and it will always try to steal a foraged product (the contestability of foraging,
µh, is 1). This behaviour is not tolerated by civics, which try to punish the bourgeois
individual. Hence, there will be contests between civic foragers and bourgeois agents.
The civic wins with a probability, f , increasing with the number of civics in the group:
f =
((1− α− β)n+ 0.5n− ν)γ
((1− α− β)n+ 0.5n− ν)γ + (n− (1− α− β)n− 0.5n+ ν)γ , (3.2)
where n is the size of the group, ν and γ are the centre value and exponent respectively
of the winning function – these are set to ν = 8 and γ = 5 without discussion, and α
and β are the proportions of sharers and bourgeois within the group. If the civic wins
the product is shared equally between all of the civics in the group, and the bourgeois
pays the conflict cost, C. Alternatively, the conflict cost is divided between all of the
civics in the group. Thus, these within-group conflicts will not occur if the population
consists of either entirely civic or sharer foragers (i.e., the Pleistocene state) or entirely
bourgeois farmers (i.e., the Holocene state). Sharers never participate in contests, either
sharing or conceding their product depending on whom they interact with.
With a probability of κ, all of the groups are randomly paired and between group
contests can occur. The probability a contest occurs between groups i and j is
d =
|pii − pij |
pii + pij
(3.3)
where pii and pij are the average payoffs of group i and j respectively. The group with
the higher average payoff wins with a probability of 0.5 + 0.5d. Therefore contests are
less likely between equally matched groups, and the group with the higher average payoff
is more likely to win. Each of the agents in the winning group then gains τ payoff units
each, and agents from the losing team lose τ payoff units each.
Next, agents are assigned a cultural model for both strategies. Cultural models
are generally chosen from within the same group, with the exception of the loser of a
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Table 3.1: Interactions in the Bowles and Choi (2013) model. Outcomes of a game
over the row player’s product, when the row player is a forager (red) or a farmer (blue).
Outcomes that are independent of the row player’s technology strategy are shown in
black.
Bourgeois Sharer Civic
Bourgeois
forager
Column player will take all
row’s product with probability 0.5 Row player keepsall of their product
Civics will take
all of row’s product
with probability fBourgeois
farmer
Row player keeps all of their
product
Sharer
forager
Column player will take all of
row’s product Row’s product willbe shared equally
Row’s product will
be shared equally
Sharer
farmer
Row’s product will be shared
equally
Civic
forager
Column player will take all of
row’s product with probability (1-f),
otherwise row player’s product will
be shared equally with all the civics
in the group
Row’s product will
be shared equally
Row’s product will
be shared equally
Civic
farmer
Row’s product will be shared
equally
between-group interaction, where cultural models are chosen from the winning group.
Cultural models are more likely to be from the predominant type of strategy, with
the probability that a sharer, bourgeois, or civic is chosen as the cultural model as,
respectively, αη/y, βη/y, or (1− α− β)η/y, where
y = αη + βη + (1− α− β)η (3.4)
and η is a measure of conformist biased cultural transmission. Figure 3.1 shows how
these probabilities can change with η. An agent will copy their cultural model’s strategy
if it has a higher payoff.
The last stages in the model are behavioural experimentation, where agents will
randomly change their strategies with probability , and migration, where agents migrate
from their group with probability m and are randomly assigned to another group.
Bowles and Choi (2013) ran 1,000 simulations of their model over 2,075 iterations
(41,500 y) and recorded the percentage of simulations at each iteration that had more
than 50% bourgeois farmers. Their results (see Figure 3.2) show a small increase in
the number of bourgeois farmers around 15,000-13,000 yBP; this small increase is noted
to coincide with short-lived experiments in sedentism and storage seen in the Natufian
109
3.1. THE BOWLES AND CHOI MODEL
Figure 3.1: How the probability of a cultural model being chosen with a trait of x
changes with the fraction of that trait in the population, under different values for η. A
reproduction of Figure S3 from Bowles and Choi (2013, SI pg. 11).
culture. After around 11,000 yBP, there is a steady increase in the number of majority
bourgeois farmer simulations, fitting with evidence that independent origins occurred
after this point in all of the well-studied regions. For any given year, there are always
less than 31 of the 1,000 simulations with a bourgeois farmer majority.
The parameters and default values in Bowles and Choi’s model are given in Table
3.2.
3.1.2 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
Bowles and Choi (2013) test the robustness of their model by varying parameters one-by-
one, and show that varying parameters through plausible values gives the same outcome
as the result with the default parameters, although with changeable magnitudes (Bowles
and Choi, 2013, SI pg. 19–23). Figure 3.3 shows their robustness check for the migration
rate, where the interpretation would be that increasing the migration rate increases the
amount of bourgeois farmer majority simulations. A summary of all Bowles and Choi’s
robustness checks is shown in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: Range (light green), interquartile range (middle green), and median (dark
green) of the percentage of metapopulations (1,000 simulations) with a majority of
bourgeois farmers at each time point when running my interpretation of the model
1,000 times. Bowles and Choi’s published result (2013) is reproduced in black.
Table 3.2: Model parameters, their default value used in the Bowles and Choi model,
and the range of values sampled from in my FIO analysis if applicable.
Parameter Symbol Default value Range/values
Number of groups g 30 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 20, 30,50, 60, 100, 150, 300
Migration rate m 0.2 m ∈ R|0 ≤ m ≤ 1
Behavioural experimentation  0.25  ∈ R|0 ≤  ≤ 1
Cost of losing a conflict C 1.5 C ∈ R|0 ≤ C ≤ 10
Hunter-gatherer product Vh 1 Vh ∈ R|0 ≤ Vh ≤ 10
Contestability of a hunter-gathered prod-
uct
µh 1 µh ∈ R|0 ≤ µh ≤ 1
Contestability of a farmed product µa 0 µa ∈ R|0 ≤ µa ≤ 1
Resource transfer amount τ 3 τ ∈ R|0 ≤ τ ≤ 10
Probability of a between-group conflict κ 1 κ ∈ R|0 ≤ κ ≤ 1
Farming investment z 2 z ∈ R|0 ≤ z ≤ 19.21
Level of conformism η 2 η ∈ R|0 ≤ η ≤ 5
Farming product Va Va = (r − θ)z − z Not varied
Productivity of the farmers investment r 1.5 Not varied
Disadvantage of farming due to tempera-
ture volatility
θ θ = (0.45− w)/5 Not varied
Temperature variability w Transformed from
raw NGRIP values
Not varied
Centre value of the winning function ν 8 Not varied
Exponent of the winning function γ 5 Not varied
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Figure 3.3: An example of one of Bowles and Choi’s robustness checks for the migration
rate. Taken from Bowles and Choi (2013, SI pg. 21)
Table 3.3: Parameters varied by Bowles and Choi (2013), and the values used. The
default values are shown in bold. The result of whether the amount of bourgeois farmer
majority simulations increases or decreases when these variations are applied is also
noted.
Parameter Variations Result
The productivity of the farmers investment, r 1.4, 1.5, 1.53, 1.57* Increase**
Migration rate, m 0.18, 0.2, 0.22, 0.25 Increase
Cost of losing a conflict, C 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 Increase
Contestability of a hunter-gathered product, µh 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1 Decrease
Contestability of a farmed product, µa 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 Decrease
Resource transfer amount, τ 1, 2, 3 Decrease
Probability of a between-group conflict, κ 0.33, 0.5, 1 Decrease
Behavioural experimentation,  0.24, 0.25, 0.26 Increase
* r is varied to 1.57 in the Holocene, but kept as 1.5 in the Pleistocene for this change.
** Increase when r is varied through 1.4, 1.5 and 1.53.
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3.2 Methods
Using the FIO method, I expanded on the analysis by Bowles and Choi by running the
model 1.2 × 107 times with randomly chosen (within defined limits) combinations of
parameters (see Table 3.2), selecting the simulations closest to idealized outcomes (the
‘top’ simulations), and then exploring the patterns and interactions of the parameter
values in these top simulations.
In this section I will give details of these processes and the model replication.
3.2.1 Replication
Following some corrections to the published account of the Bowles and Choi model
(given in Appendix B) and using some of their code for the within-group interactions, I
essentially replicated their published results using the default parameter values. Coding
and running information is given in Appendix C.
To look at the variability in my results, I ran the model 106 times with the default
parameters (given in Table 3.2) and then separated these simulations into 1,000 sets of
1,000 simulations. The range of the number of majority bourgeois farmer simulations at
each year for all of these 1,000 simulation sets can be seen in Figure 3.2, along with the
published results of Bowles and Choi (which mostly fall into my range). I observed a
similar trend to theirs, where the presence or absence of a majority of bourgeois farmers
occurs at the same times, and a steady increase in bourgeois farmers also occurs from
around 11,000 yBP to the present day. However, because there is no analysis of the
variability between different runs of the model in the study by Bowles and Choi (2013),
it is not possible to determine whether my results fall into the range of their results.
3.2.2 Parameter Randomization
I varied the following parameters from the Bowles and Choi model (2013): g, Vh, z, µh,
µa, C, κ, τ , η, , and m. Because the productivity of farming, Va, changes with both r
and z, I elected to vary only z. I kept the overall number of agents in the population
at 600, the hypothesised size for an ethnolinguistic group in the late Pleistocene in the
study by Bowles and Choi (2013). There are 12 possible values for the number of groups,
g, since g needs to be even, divide 600, and result in even-sized groups. The parameters
that concern the addition or subtraction from payoffs (C, Vh, and τ) were given a range
from 0 to 10 (justified in Appendix D). I made the assumption that the maximum value
for Vh is the same as for Va, because there will be an upper limit to how much a person
113
3.2. METHODS
can benefit from food production. The productivity of farming will be at its maximum
when the disadvantage of farming due to temperature volatility (θ) is minimized. Hence,
by rearranging the Equation 3.1 for Va,
max(z) =
max(Va)
r − θmin − 1 =
10
1.5 + 0.0206− 1 = 19.21. (3.5)
The function that defines the probability of a trait being selected for a cultural model
converges when η is increased (see Figure 3.1); hence, I only varied η between 0 (no
conformity) and 5. The other parameters are probabilities, which I varied through the
whole range from 0 to 1. The parameters, their default values, and their range of values
varied are shown in Table 3.2.
3.2.3 The Criteria for Ranking
Archaeological evidence indicates that farming in SW Asia had become established by
the Late/Final Pre-Pottery Neolithic (9,500 to 8,800 yBP) (e.g., Conolly et al., 2011),
hence I ranked the simulations based on the number of farmers they have at 9,000 yBP,
where the highest would be classified as the idealized outcome. I show in Appendix E
that this number stays roughly the same from 9000 to 0 yBP and that the results would
be similar even if I used the number of bourgeois farmers at 9000 yBP.
I ran simulations with parameter sets that were randomly chosen from the ranges
discussed above. These simulations were then ranked on how close they were to the
idealized outcome. Then the next step was to identify trends in the parameter values of
the top simulations and correlations between closeness-of-fit rank order and parameter
value.
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Table 3.4: Statistics from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and a Chi-squared
test between the prior (all 1.2× 107 simulations) and posterior (top 1% of simulations)
distributions for each parameter. Only the tests for τ were not significant (p-value
≥ 0.05).
g m  C Vh µh µa τ κ Va η
D 0.559 0.028 0.781 0.054 0.421 0.008 0.337 0.005 0.031 0.280 0.088
χ2 159439 489 511448 1833 116176 101 68993 26 613 49264 7453
3.3 Results
Of the 1.2 × 107 simulations run, only ∼13% have a majority (> 300) of farmers at
9,000 yBP, and only ∼1% of simulations have over 500 farmers (see Figure 3.4). In
Figure 3.5 I show the relative frequencies of parameter values when considering the top
1%, 0.5%, and 0.1% of simulations. From this, a simulation’s placement in the top 1%
of simulations is very sensitive to g, , Vh, µa, and Va; moderately sensitive to C and
η; and relatively insensitive to m, µh, τ , and κ (statistics are provided in Table 3.4).
Correlation coefficients between the number of farmers and parameter values are shown
in Table 3.5. These trends can be clearly seen for the top 1% of simulations in Figure
3.6, and for all of the simulations in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.4: The number of farmers in the 9, 000 yBP iteration of each of the 1.2× 107
simulations. In rank order from the largest (best) to the smallest (worst) number of
farmers. The top 1% of simulations are to the left the dashed line.
Parameter interactions, as indicated by correlations between pairs of parameters in
the top 1%, 0.5%, and 0.1% of simulations, are shown in Figure 3.8 (coefficients are given
in Table 3.6). The largest of these correlations were between g and  (ρ = −0.402), Vh
and Va (ρ = 0.376), and  and η (ρ = 0.359). The relationship between behavioural
experimentation () and the number farmers for different numbers of groups (g) is shown
in Figure 3.9. Here, I see that increasing the amount of behavioural experimentation
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Figure 3.5: Relative frequency plots of parameter values for different top slices of the
1.2 × 107 simulations (top 1% in yellow, top 0.5% in green, and top 0.1% in blue).
The vertical dashed lines show the default values chosen by Bowles and Choi (2013).
Statistical differences between the distribution of the top 1% of simulations and a uniform
distribution for each of the parameters are given in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.5: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, ρ, between parameter values and
the number of farmers in different top slices of the 1.2× 107 simulations. ns – the tests
which were not significant (p-value ≥ 0.05).
Simulation
fraction
g m  C Vh µh µa τ κ Va η
All 0.31 -0.01 0.72 0.01 -0.20 0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.00 0.13 -0.11
Top 10% 0.27 -0.01 -0.73 -0.06 -0.26 -0.02 -0.23 0.00ns 0.03 0.19 0.06
Top 1% 0.14 -0.02 -0.74 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.11
Top 0.5% 0.11 0.00ns -0.73 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.00ns -0.01ns 0.01 -0.11
Top 0.1% 0.05 0.03 -0.65 -0.02ns -0.02ns -0.03 -0.01ns 0.02ns 0.00ns -0.00ns -0.09
Figure 3.6: The number of farmers and each parameter value for the top 1% (all
points), top 0.5% (red, blue and green points), top 0.1% (red and blue points) and top
0.05% (red points) of simulations.
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Figure 3.7: The number of farmers and each parameter value for all 1.2× 107 simula-
tions (each point represents one simulation). Correlation coefficients between parameter
values and the number of farmers are given in Table 3.5.
118
3.3. RESULTS
() can increase the amount of farming, but the highest numbers of farmers are mostly
found in simulations where g is large and behavioural experimentation is low. For the
productivities of foraging and farming (Vh and Va, respectively), I found that in the
top 1% of simulations, farming is almost always more productive than foraging (i.e.,
Va/Vh ≥ 1, for 98.1% of these simulations). However, in all simulations (Figure 3.10)
there are some (3.66%) with a majority (> 300) of farmers when Vh > Va holds. The
relationship between behavioural experimentation () and the level of conformism (η)
in the top 1% of simulations is shown in Figure 3.8. It is only for smaller values of η
(< 2) that there is a relationship between lowering  and there being a greater number
of farmers. I saw little change in the effect of  while increasing η greater than around
2.
Figure 3.8: Eight significantly (p-value < 0.05) correlated pairs of parameters in the
top 1% of the 1.2× 107 simulations. These plots are broken down into all of the top 1%
simulations (green, blue and black points), top 0.5% (blue and black points), and top
0.1% (black points). For ease of interpretation, a small amount of width has been added
to the y coordinates of the first three panels, and points plotted randomly within these
widths. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, ρ, is give in the titles.
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Table 3.6: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between all pairs of parameters in
the top 1% of the 1.2×107 simulations. ns – the tests which were not significant (p-value
≥ 0.05).
m  C Vh µh µa τ κ Va η
g 0.107 -0.402 -0.033 0.063 0.008 0.132 0.006 0.061 0.035 0.044
m 0.021 0.015 0.025 -0.006ns -0.031 0.003ns -0.004ns -0.012 -0.034
 0.009 -0.056 0.007 -0.157 0.012 0.030 0.001ns 0.359
C 0.031 -0.002ns -0.148 -0.005ns -0.003ns 0.006 -0.020
Vh 0.023 -0.139 -0.002ns -0.002ns 0.376 -0.015
µh 0.004ns 0.004ns 0.021 -0.013ns -0.021
µa 0.008 0.053 0.063 0.001ns
τ -0.005ns 0.001 0.002ns
κ 0.005 -0.011
Va 0.012
Figure 3.9: Relationship between behavioural experimentation () and the number
of farmers for simulations with different numbers of groups (g), using all 1.2 × 107
simulations (each point represents one simulation).
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Figure 3.10: Ratio of farming productivity to foraging productivity (Va/Vh) and the
number of farmers in all 1.2×107 simulations; a log10(Va/Vh) scale is used. The vertical
red line shows when the ratio is 1 (i.e., Va = Vh), and the horizontal red line shows the
boundary between majority farming and majority foraging simulations. Hence, there
are some simulations with a majority of farmers when Va < Vh (top left quadrant).
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3.4 Discussion
My analysis has highlighted that the parameters g, , Vh, µa, and Va (or z) are the most
influential parameters on the number of farmers at 9,000 yBP in the model. Therefore,
I suggest that group structuring, behavioural experimentation, property rights, and the
ratio of farming productivity to foraging are most important for the emergence of farming
using this model. I will explain these in more detail in this section.
3.4.1 Structuring
This work has highlighted the relationship between the number of groups (g) and the
amount of behavioural experimentation () (Figure 3.9). By increasing , I see an in-
crease in the number of farmers. However, this increase converges to around 50% farmers,
because when  is large, agents are changing regularly between both strategies and there
is little structuring in the group. It is only when the number of groups is large (i.e.,
the groups are small) that there starts to be more simulations that have a majority of
farmers. Because the simulations all started with a civic forager population, it could be
that a single farmer in a large group would be more at a disadvantage than it would in
a smaller group, and hence farming would be less likely to emerge as a majority. In fact,
it is increasingly unlikely that a bourgeois will win a civic-bourgeois contest in a civic
majority group when groups are large (see Figure 3.11). When groups are smaller, I
also see that there are more majority farmer simulations as the behavioural experimen-
tation decreases; possibly because high values for  disrupt any structuring, resulting in
property rights and farming failing to coevolve. Hence, I predict that farming should
emerge when there is low behavioural experimentation and groups are as small as pos-
sible (groups smaller than around four or six members are ethnographically improbable
anyway). Interestingly, this prediction is consistent with some models of the emergence
of prosocial behaviour, whereby cooperation (of which farming property rights are an
example) is unlikely to emerge in large groups (Barcelo and Capraro, 2015; Boyd et al.,
2014; Nosenzo et al., 2015; Powers and Watson, 2011).
3.4.2 Conservatism
Another finding of this work is that to generate large numbers of farmers or foragers,
behavioural experimentation () should be low (Figure 3.5). Because the model starts
with all foragers, to generate farming,  must not equal 0. However, as behavioural
experimentation approaches 1, there will be equal numbers of foragers and farmers,
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Figure 3.11: The probability of a civic winning a bourgeois-civic interaction, f , when
group size and frequency of civics are varied.
because people will be constantly switching from one to the other as explained above.
Hence, I predict that conservatism (defined as a low rate of switching between strategies)
helps the emergence of farming, and so long as farming is introduced into the population,
it will be selected for.
3.4.3 Property Rights
This analysis lends further support to the conclusion by Bowles and Choi (2013) that
farming and farming-friendly property rights can coevolve. One illustration of this sup-
port is that although there could be no property rights (which was when farming property
is always contested, µa = 1), I still saw a greater proportion of farmers as the contesta-
bility of a farmed product (µa) approached 0 (Figure 3.5). Conversely, I also found
that varying degrees of property rights for foraged products, µh, had little influence on
the number of foragers (as seen by the absence of any trend in the µh panels of Figure
3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, and by the low correlation coefficients in Table 3.5. Furthermore, the
relationship between µa and the number of farmers appears similar to one of exponential
decay as the size of the top slice is decreased (Figure 3.5). This trend would be expected
if farming-friendly property rights were a main cause of farming in the model.
3.4.4 Ratio of the Productivity of Farming to Foraging
The results also showed that the productivity-of-farming to productivity-of-foraging ra-
tio (Va/Vh) has an important effect on farming, where Va > Vh almost always holds in
the top 1% of simulations. However, there are some simulations with a majority of farm-
123
3.4. DISCUSSION
ers where Va < Vh (Figure 3.10). Thus, there are cases where farming emerges despite
the productivity of foraging being greater than the productivity of farming. This obser-
vation lends some support to the result of Bowles’ study (Bowles, 2011), where it was
found that the productivity of farming did not need to be greater than the productivity
of foraging for early farmers.
3.4.5 Cost of Conflict and the Level of Conformity
The proportion of farmers at 9,000 yBP was moderately sensitive to parameters C and
η, the cost of conflict and the level of conformity, respectively. The frequency decrease
as the cost of conflict is increased (Figure 3.5) may be because this change has the
most impact on bourgeois agents, as civic foragers share the cost. Because I saw that
the amount of farming is increased by farming-friendly property rights, fewer bourgeois
agents would mean fewer farmer agents. Thus, costly conflicts result in less farming
in this model. For η, the level of conformity, the highest frequency value in the top
simulations approaches around η = 1 as the top slice gets smaller (Figure 3.5). This result
may be because as η increases, if a strategy’s frequency is below 0.5 in the group, it is
increasingly unlikely that this strategy will be a cultural model for another agent (Figure
3.1); thus, this strategy may have little chance of propagating in the population. Hence,
for a farming strategy (which starts from a frequency of 0) to become the main strategy
in a population, η cannot be too large. On the other hand, at η = 0 (no conformity),
the probability that a farmer or a forager agent will be selected as a cultural model is
always 0.5 independent of frequencies in the group; therefore, I see most simulations
leading to a near 1:1 farmer/forager ratio (Figure 3.7). Thus, for farming to do well in
this model, there should be low (but nonzero) levels of conformity.
3.4.6 Insensitive Parameters
There were a number of parameters whose values were relatively unimportant for the
emergence of farming in the model. These parameters were the migration rate (m), the
contestability of a foraged product (µh; discussed earlier), the resource transfer amount
(τ), and the probability of a between-group conflict (κ). Because varying κ and τ will
affect agents’ payoffs and the spread of farming or foraging equally, it might be expected
that these parameters would not make a difference to the amount of farming. Thus, the
likelihood and intensity (in terms of potential payoff losses and gains) of between-group
conflicts are not driving forces in the emergence of farming in this model. If there was
any intergroup violence associated with the Neolithic transition (although there is little
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evidence for it; Ferguson, 2013), this analysis suggests it was caused by the transition,
rather than causal of the transition.
The probability of migration between groups also makes little difference to the emer-
gence of farming. Perhaps in this model, intergroup cultural updating drives the mixing
of different strategies in the population, and so migration among well-mixed groups will
not introduce new strategies into groups.
3.4.7 Assumptions and Caveats
As with all models, there are many assumptions and simplifications in the Bowles and
Choi model (2013). For example, would cultural updating be likely to occur for every
agent at each iteration, would an individual’s technology be as binary as ‘farmer’ or
‘forager’, and is it likely that foraging and farming productivity are independent of one
another?
Whereas the Bowles and Choi model (2013) and the analyses here are primarily
concerned with the initial establishment of farming groups, other factors are likely to
have influenced farming’s growth, sustainability, geographical spread, and archaeological
visibility. These factors include the availability of suitable plant and animal species for
domestication, other local climate and ecological factors, and technological innovations,
all of which are likely to affect the relative productivity of farming to foraging (Va/Vh).
In addition, it is likely that farming activity itself changes Va/Vh, to varying extents in
different regions, as a niche construction process (O’Brien and Laland, 2012).
An issue with this approach is making sure that enough simulations were collected,
because insufficient simulations can result in poor assessment of model behaviour. How-
ever, because the relative frequency plots in Figure 3.5 do not change greatly with
more narrow top slices, I am confident that running more simulations would have only
smoothed these plots, rather than supporting different interpretations. Because this ap-
proach does not fit to empirical data, there could be another issue in finding what the
‘idealized outcome’ should be. If there are multiple possibilities, as many as possible
should be tested. In the case of this work, I found that using various other possible
idealized outcomes (number of bourgeois farmers at 9,000 yBP, number of farmers at
0 yBP, and minimum and average number of farmers between 0 and 9,000 yBP) made
very little difference to the overall results (shown in Figure E1 of Appendix E). Further-
more, it is important to pick parameters from a sensible range of values. If the range
covers unrealistic values, there will be unnecessary simulations; on the other hand, if
the range does not cover all of the realistic values, there could be unseen trends. This
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work erred on the side of caution; most of the parameter ranges cover all plausible values
(parameter ranges are justified in Section 3.2.2 and Appendix D).
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have replicated the results of the Bowles and Choi model (2013) and
implemented the FIO method to explore the parameter space and parameter interactions
of this model. To my knowledge, this is the first use of this approach in archaeological
modelling.
This analysis also allowed me to hypothesise that a number of elements are key
for the emergence of farming. These elements are as follows: a population structured
into groups, small (but not too small) group sizes, a very low amount of behavioural
experimentation, and the presence of farming-friendly property rights. I also found that
although it is beneficial for farming when its productivity is greater than the productivity
of foraging, it is not essential for its emergence; this result is consistent with previous
findings (Bowles, 2011). Additionally, the results indicate that costly conflicts within
the groups, and high levels of conformity when groups are culturally updating, result in
less farming. Furthermore, I found that migration rate and the likelihood and intensity
of between-group conflicts are unimportant for the emergence of farming in this model.
To an extent, these analyses contradict the robustness checks reported by Bowles and
Choi (2013) and reveal parameter complexities and interactions previously unrecognized.
They have also allowed me to examine the effects of simultaneously varying parameters,
which was not possible using the fix-all-but-one parameter approach. In comparison
to Bowles and Choi’s robustness checks (summarized in Table 3.3), the small range of
variations in m led to an increase in farming using 1,000 simulations in Bowles and
Choi’s study (2013), but I saw no overall effect when looking at the full range of m in
over 103 times as many simulations. Similarly, when Bowles and Choi (2013) increased
the contestability of a foraged product (µh), the resource transfer amount (τ), and the
probability of a between-group conflict (κ), they found a decrease in the amount of
farming, whereas I found no significant differences. Furthermore, they found an increase
in the amount of farming when increasing either the cost of conflict (C) or behavioural
experimentation (), whereas I found a decrease in both cases. However, for an increase
in the contestability of a farmed product (µa), we both predicted that there will be a
decrease in the amount of farming.
The findings from this analysis highlight key conditions for the origins of agriculture,
which could be investigated in more detail in future studies (e.g., asking whether groups
were small during the transition to agriculture). This work also highlights the problems
of the fix-all-but-one parameter approach, and serves as an example of this type of
parameter analysis in the field of computational modelling in archaeology as a means of
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exploring past processes.
Bowles and Choi’s model was developed to look at the role of property rights in
the evolution of farming. Their main finding was that farming-friendly property rights
and farming co-evolved when they did. Bowles and Choi’s predictions of the increase
in Bourgeois farmers almost exactly mirrors climate stabilisation (as measured by the
NGRIP data). Teamed with the fact that little reasoning is given to how the NGRIP
data is transformed to calibrate farming productivity in the paper, I am not sure how
much the model should be praised for replicating the timings of the origins of agriculture.
I do think the results hold theoretically though, and the role of climate amelioration can
be said to encourage farming.
In the Bowles and Choi model there is a fixed population size and migration is
concerned with strategy mixing, rather than having any effect on productivity. Bowles
and Choi take as given the ‘sedentary nature’ of farming, and imply that only after
farming was established would population increases be seen. Having seen in Section 1
that there is some evidence that sedentism could come before farming and that it is
unclear whether population pressure may have been a contributing factor in the switch
to farming, I think Bowles and Choi’s assumptions are perhaps too generalised.
In the next three chapters I will develop my own models for mobility decisions and
the origins of agriculture. In the further work section of Chapter 7 I will discuss how I
could include elements of Bowles and Choi’s model into my own.
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Summary
In Chapter 1 I discussed the multitude of factors and influences surrounding the origins
of agriculture, and how the impacts and dynamics of some of these are still not fully
understood. I showed how the transition to farming involved several other behavioural
changes, and in Chapter 2 showed how evolutionary theory and mathematical modelling
can be used to understand these behaviour changes. The work reviewed in these chapters
has provided the motivation to create a new agent-based evolutionary model to specif-
ically look at how mobility, population density and human-environmental interactions
are interlinked with the origins of agriculture. This cultural evolutionary model will be
influenced by the existing models reviewed in Section 2.3.
In this chapter I will introduce the first stage of my model’s development which only
considers a foraging population. I will refer to this model as the Forager Model. The
Forager Model is analysed and discussed in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 6 the addition of
allowing agents to forage and/or farm is added. The purpose of considering the model
with and without the possibility of farming is both because it is easier to understand
the workings of the model before adding more complexity, and also since it is still worth
exploring the relationship between mobility, population size and environmental impacts
in hunter-gatherers (which was looked at Section 1.4).
This chapter will thoroughly explain the specifics of the Forager Model. Details
about the sites are given in Section 4.1, agent qualities are discussed in Section 4.2, agent
fission is explained in Section 4.3, strategy mutation in Section 4.4, agent movement in
Section 4.5, and details of model initialisation and iterations are given in Section 4.6. A
diagrammatic overview of the Forager Model is given on page 144.
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The Forager Model simulates families moving around a region over many years. The
model is iterative and each iteration is one year. The region is split up into sites of the
same size, and each of these sites has a dynamic foraging quality. Foraging quality
can be thought of as the potential for foraging or, equally, the quality of the natural
resources. Foraging resources stay within each site, and in this way do not include
migrating animals. Family units (or ‘agents’) occupy one site each iteration (although
many families can co-occupy a single site), and forage at this site. The family’s foraging
creates a feedback between the foraging quality of the site and the family’s fitness.
Families can die, fission, mutate, and move from site to site, according to different
probabilities. A visualisation of two iterations of the model can be seen in Figure 4.1
and the stages of the model are shown in the flow diagram on page 131.
These dynamics will be explained in more detail in the sections to come. For good
practice, I also explain the model using the ODD protocol (Grimm et al., 2010) in
Appendix F.
Itera&on	1		 Itera&on	2		
The	region	
A	site	
A	family/agent	
Figure 4.1: Visualisation of the model. Agents (white numbers) move from site to site
(green hexagonals). The shade of the hexagonal reflects the foraging quality of the site
– where the best quality is shown in bright green, and worst quality in dark green. The
foraging qualities change from year to year according to natural growth and depletion.
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4.1 Sites
The region modelled is made up of a hexagonal grid of sites with sx sites in the horizontal
direction and sy in the vertical direction. The hexagons are regular and so each of their
sides has the same length. The sites have coordinates found by using a 3D coordinate
system – illustrated in Figure 4.2.
At each iteration sites have a foraging quality value and can be occupied by agents
or left unoccupied.
4.1.1 Foraging Quality
I assume there are two forces which act on the dynamics of a site’s foraging quality, qf ;
natural growth, and depletion when agents forage at the site.
Similarly to Marceau and Myers (2006) and Freeman and Anderies (2012) I assume
foraging quality grows according to logistic growth with a carrying capacity of 1 and a
growth rate of r. I also assume that the amount of depletion is density dependent. Thus
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Figure 4.2: Coordinate system used for sites (above) and the indexes used (below).
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at iteration t+ 1 the foraging quality at a site is
qf,t+1 = qf,t + rqf,t(1− qf,t
1
)− λ(1− 1
n+ 1
)qf,t, (4.1)
where n is the number of agents which occupy this site and λ is the depletion scalar.
Thus when the site is unoccupied there is no depletion effect (1 − 1n+1 = 0) and when
the site is occupied the depletion impact is logarithmically increasing with the number
of agents – shown in Figure 4.3. The dynamics of how the foraging quality varies over
time for different values of r and λ, but when the number of agents stays at 1, are shown
in Figure 4.4.
In this model qf ∈ [ qf,min, 1] , where qf,min > 0. I do not allow the foraging quality
to reach 0 since if it did it could never grow back (see Equation 4.1).
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Figure 4.3: The effect the number of agents has on the depletion term, 1− 1n+1 .
4.2 Agent Movement and Fitness
Agents have a mobility strategy which determines how likely they are to move site every
iteration, m. Thus every iteration an agent moves site with a probability of m. An
agent’s mobility strategy can mutate and I set m ∈ [ 0.01, 0.99] – explained in Section
4.4. I refer to agents being sedentary if their mobility strategy is close to 0, and highly
mobile if their strategy is close to 1.
Agents also have a fitness1 measure, f ∈ [ fmin, 1] , which changes within the lifetime
of the agent. If f < fmin then the agent dies. An agent’s fitness at iteration t is
calculated as
f = qf,t−1/n, (4.2)
1 Although related, I use the term ‘fitness’ to refer to well-being rather than fecundity.
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Figure 4.4: How the foraging quality changes over time when the site is always occupied
by one agent. I vary the value of r and set λ to 3 different values (top row) and I vary
λ and set r to 3 different values on the bottom row.
where qf,t−1 is the foraging quality (in the previous iteration) of the site the agent
occupies, and n is the number of agents which occupy this site. Hence, there is no
accumulation of fitness as the agent’s fitness in the last iteration does not affect its
current fitness.
Using Equation 4.2 the maximum number of agents that can survive at a site, nmax,
is :
nmax = max(n) = max(
qf,t−1
f
) =
max(qf,t−1)
min(f)
=
1
fmin
, (4.3)
and therefore fmin = 1/nmax.
4.3 Family Fission
The agents in my model are families, and as long as their fitness is never below fmin they
have the potential to exist indefinitely in the model. The model assumes new generations
replace the older generations, and incest is avoided by mixing amongst different families
(for example the young female members of two families swapping). I have chosen not
to model these or other population dynamics (for example birth and death of individual
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people within the family) since these are individual dynamics and add an unnecessary
level of detail.
A successful family could be interpreted as one which is able to support a large
number of members, and hence a high fitness could mean that a family has a higher
chance of being able to split into another family. Therefore, new families occur not
because of birth, but because the ‘parent’ family was fit enough to fission into a new
one.
When fission happens the new family occupies the same site as the parent family,
but it is free to move site in the next iteration. The new family will have the same
strategies as its parent and a randomly chosen initial fitness value.
4.3.1 Probability of Fission
Thus, there is a need for a function which describes the relationship between a family’s
fitness and its probability of fissioning, p. I set it so that if an agent has the minimum
agent fitness (fmin) then there is a 0 chance of fissioning. Finding the upper probability
of fitness is slightly tricky, since it is not realistic that full fitness would mean there was
100% chance of fissioning every iteration.
Based on the work by Mace (1996) (discussed in Section 2.5.1) the relationship
between wealth and fertility can be modelled as
fertility = c+ d log(wealth), (4.4)
where the c and d are constants. This is shown in Figure 4.5a. I will use this relationship
between my agent fitness (which can be thought of as a measure of wealth) and fission
probability (which should be proportional to fertility). Hence I take,
p = c+ d log(f). (4.5)
The upper limit for the probability of fission, pmax, will be reached when agent fitness
is 1. Hence pmax = c+ d log(1), and thus
c = pmax. (4.6)
Since the probability of fission is 0 when fitness is at its minimum, fmin, then using
Equations 4.5 and 4.6 I can find d,
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0 = pmax + d log(fmin)⇒ d = −pmax
log(fmin)
. (4.7)
Thus substituting equations (4.7) and (4.6) into (4.5) I have
p = pmax − pmax
log(fmin)
log(f) (4.8)
where pmax ∈ [0, 1].
I can find a estimated value for pmax by using the data on hunter-gather fertility
and mortality from Kelly (2013) which was summarised in Table 2.6 in Section 2.5.1.
Using this the average fertility rate of the sample of hunter-gatherer groups is 5.7, with
a minimum of 2.6 and a maximum of 8.5, and the average mortality for children < 15
years old was 35.3%.
Assuming that children under 15 are not reproductive, then using the average child-
hood mortality, the proportion of children who survive to reproductive age is
1− 35.3
100
= 0.647. (4.9)
And thus the number of children a woman will have that survive to a reproductive
age is the proportion who survive to reproductive age multiplied by the total fertility
rate. From the ethnographic data this is a minimum of 0.647× 2.6 = 1.68 children and
a maximum of 0.647 × 8.5 = 5.50 children (using the minimum and maximum total
fertility rates respectively).
For the family units in my model (the agents), I assume that two children need to
stay in the family to replace the previous generation, but any other children can form
new families. Therefore I find the family fission probability every year should be
Number that survive to a reproductive age− 2
Generation time
. (4.10)
If we set the generation time, G, to 25, then the lower fission probability is 1.68−225 =
−0.0128 (in effect this is 0), and the upper fission probability, pmax, is 5.5−225 = 0.14.
The modelled relationship between fitness and fission probability using pmax = 0.14
can be seen in Figure 4.5b. The number of years until there is a new family based on
these fission probabilities is simply 1/p.
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Figure 4.5: The relationship between wealth and fertility. (a) The best fit regression
curves of data on the number of camels in the household (a measure of wealth) and the
residual fertility of ever-married male head of household (solid line) and ever-married
females (dashed line), from a study by Mace (1996) on 848 Gabbra households. Repro-
duced from Mace (1996). (b) My modelled relationship between fitness and probability
of fission (Equation 4.8) using fmin = 1/6 and pmax = 0.14 based on Mace (1996) and
ethnographic data from Kelly (2013).
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4.4 Mutation
With a probability of µ ∈ [ 0, 1] each iteration and for all agents, an agent will mutate
its mobility strategy. This mutation could be thought of as random experimentation or
cultural learning. I will assume that approximately every generation, which I take as 25
years, a family changes the way it moves, and thus µ = 1/25 = 0.04.
I use a Binomial distribution to pick the new mutated strategy value from, where
the distribution is influenced by the agent’s original strategy value, m0, and fitness, f :
B(n∗, p∗) = B(κmf,m0) (4.11)
where the parameter κm is a measure of mobility strategy conservatism. This distri-
bution means that the strategy value will not change much if the agent is successful,
and conversely if the agent is not very fit then the agent will be less conservative. Val-
ues chosen from this distribution then need to be divided by κmf so that the agent’s
new mobility strategy is between 0 and 1. Figure 4.6 shows the distributions the new
strategies would be picked from under a few different circumstances.
Using a Binomial distribution also makes sense as a model for cultural transmission,
since the value for the number of components in the distribution can be thought of as
the number of components that make up mobility. However, there is the problem that
when the agent’s strategy is 0 or 1 then the variance is 0 (variance = n∗p∗(1 − p∗)).
Thus there could be fixation to only either mobility strategies of 0 or 1 if these values
ever occur. Hence, to avoid this issue I pick the strategies from between [ 0.01, 0.99] . If
a strategy value of < 0.01 or > 0.99 is selected then it is set to 0.01 or 0.99 respectively.
4.4.1 Selection and the Null Strategy
The model allows for the evolution of the mobility strategy. For example, if high mobility
results in higher agent fitness than low mobility does, then agents with low values for
m will be more likely to die, and agents with high values for m will be more likely to
live and fission (where they pass on their high m value). This means that high m values
will persist in the population. Furthermore, I introduce variation into the population
via the mutation step, so new, possibly more advantageous, strategy values enter the
population.
Thus I can see whether there are any circumstances which cause a selection pressure
for certain mobility strategies. This could be seen by a change in the frequencies of
strategy values in the population over time. However, such changes could also occur
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Figure 4.6: Examples of the distributions new mobility strategies would be selected
from in strategy mutation. The agent’s fitness, f , original mobility strategy, m0, and
the value of κm are varied. Dashed lines at 0.01 and 0.99 are shown.
randomly, and so to distinguish between the effects of selection and random drift, I
introduce a ‘null strategy’.
All agents have a null strategy, and is initialised, passed on, and mutated in exactly
the same way as the mobility strategy. However, this is the extent of the null strategy
– it has no effect in the model. Thus I can compare how the null strategy changes in
comparison with the mobility strategy to see what is likely to be a real selection effect,
and what is random drift in values.
4.5 Movement
As mentioned previously, an agent will move site with a probability equal to its mobility
strategy, m. If an agent does move site they are more likely to move to more ‘attractive’
sites. Site ‘attractiveness’ values are calculated based on proximity and the potential
fitness for the agent, and are values between 0 and 1.
4.5.1 Distance Between Two Sites
The distance between two sites, here denoted as d, is the number of site steps between
them. If (xa, ya, za) and (xb, yb, zb) are the hexagonal coordinates of sites ‘a’ and ‘b’
respectively, then the distance between them is calculated as
da,b =
|xa − xb|+ |ya − yb|+ |za − zb|
2
. (4.12)
An example of distances from a site can be seen in Figure 4.7a.
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(a) Distance (b) Potential fitness (c) Attractiveness
Figure 4.7: An example of the distances (a) from the original site (black circle), the
potential fitnesses (b) and the attractiveness score calculated from these (c). Bolder
colours represent the distance being closer (blue), or a higher fitness (red) or attractive-
ness (yellow).
4.5.2 Potential Fitness
The other factor that influences site attractiveness is the potential fitness, f∗, an agent
could have there. For an agent considering moving to site b, this is
f∗b =
qbf
nb + 1
, (4.13)
where qbf is the foraging quality of site b, and nb is the number of agents at site b.
4.5.3 Attractiveness
Thus, taking proximity and potential fitness into account, the attractiveness of site b to
an agent which was previously at site a is calculated as
Ab = (1− da,b
dmax
)× f∗b , (4.14)
where dmax is the maximum distance possible in this region – calculated as the distance
from the bottom left site to the top right. Thus when da,b = dmax then Ab = 0, and
thus attractiveness is relative to the region size. By inventing values for site potential
fitnesses (Figure 4.7b), an example of the calculated site attractivenesses can be seen in
Figure 4.7c.
The site the agent moves to is then picked weighted by these values (the algorithm
used is shown in Appendix G).
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4.5.4 Cost of Movement
Moving sites costs the agent an amount of fitness scaled by the distance it moves. If a
family moves from site a to site b its new fitness is
f = f − ηda,b (4.15)
where η is the cost of movement parameter.
4.5.5 Site Size and the Maximum Number of Agents
I can estimate the size of the region I am modelling from the ethnographic data sum-
marised in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2.
I found that the maximum total distance moved each year by the hunter-gatherer
groups in the dataset given in Kelly (2013) is 1600 km. Therefore in my model I want
the maximum possible distance moved in an iteration of the model to be less than or
equal to 1600 km. The maximum number of moves possible in this model is given by the
distance from opposite corners of the region, an illustration of this movement is given
in Figure 4.8. The distance from the bottom left site (the first site) to the top right site
(the final) site is
d1,f =
|x1 − xf |+ |y1 − yf |+ |z1 − zf |
2
, (4.16)
where (x1, y1, z1) and (xf , yf , zf ) denote the coordinates for the first and final site re-
spectively. Using basic trigonometry the distance from the centre of one hexagonal to
the centre of a neighbouring hexagonal is
√
3a, where a is the length of a side of the
hexagon.
Therefore in my model the following inequality should hold
(d1,f − 1)
√
3a ≤ 1600km. (4.17)
The maximum population density of the hunter-gatherer data from Kelly (2013) is
2.665 persons/km2 and the minimum is 0.004 persons/km2. Thus I want my model to
have a similar range in densities.
The maximum population density will occur when there are nmax agents at every
site and the minimum will occur when there is one agent in the entire region. I will
assume a family has four members, and therefore the number of people is 4 multiplied
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by the number of agents. Thus for the maximum population density
4nmax
H
= 2.665 persons/km2 (4.18)
and for the minimum population density
4
sxsyH
= 0.004 persons/km2, (4.19)
where H is the area of a hexagonal,
H =
3
√
3
2
a2. (4.20)
Having many agents and lots of sites in the model is computationally expensive, thus
for most of my analysis I use a region of size 10×10. Thus, by rearranging Equation 4.19
this means that H = 10 km2, and thus from Equation 4.18 I find nmax = 6.66 agents.
Since we must have a discrete value for nmax and I want the population density to fall in
the observed range of [ 0.004, 2.665] persons/km2 I will use nmax = 6 as a default value.
Using these values I can rearrange Equation 4.20 to find a = 1.96km. In a 10×10
region d1,f = 15, and therefore the inequality 4.17 is satisfied ((d1,f − 1)
√
3a = 48).
Thus using a 10×10 region I am modelling a region of 1000 km2 which can theo-
retically support a maximum of 600 agents (although practically this will be limited by
other parameters).
l
l
Figure 4.8: The furthest distance an agent can go in one iteration of the model.
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4.6 Initialisation and Iterations
There are ρinitnmaxsxsy agents in the initial iteration of the model, where ρinit is the
initial population density, and nmaxsxsy are the maximum number of agents possible in
the region. These initial agents are all randomly assigned a site to occupy, their fitness
is randomly assigned in [ fmin, 1] , and their mobility strategy is randomly assigned in
[ 0.01, 0.99] . The foraging qualities of sites are also randomly assigned in [ qf,min, 1] .
The 4 main steps to every iteration of the model are:
1. Foraging quality and fitness updates
2. Fissioning
3. Mutation
4. Movement
However after steps 1 and 4 there can also be the death of unfit agents.
At the beginning of each iteration the number of families, and all the information
about the agents (their location, strategy and fitness) and the sites (who occupies it,
the foraging quality) are saved. And after all the iterations have run I save the mean
mobility strategy and fitness of all the agents left alive, or if the agents all die before
the last iteration I save the iteration number at which the last agents died.
All the constants, variables and parameters in the Forager Model are given in Table
4.1, and the steps of the model are summarised in the flow diagram on page 144. In
the next chapter I will discuss the results of running the Forager Model, and in Chapter
6 I will add the ability for agents to farm and discuss the results (the Forager-Farmer
Model).
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Foraging quality and fitness
1. Calculate family fitness, f =
qf,t−1/n
2. Calculate site foraging quality,
qf,t+1 = qf,t + rqf,t(1 − qf,t1 ) −
λ(1− 1n+1)qf,t
If the site is unoccupied then only
the second step occurs and n = 0.
Initialisation
1. Initial Ninit agents assigned to
live at random sites
2. Agent fitness ∈ [ fmin, 1]
3. Agent mobility strategy
∈ [ 0.01, 0.99]
4. Site foraging qualities
∈ [ qf,min, 1]
Death A family dies if f < fmin
Fissioning
1. With a probability of p = pmax −
pmax
log(fmin)
log(f) a family fissions
2. The new agent lives at its parent’s
site and has a fitness ∈ [ fmin, 1]
3. The new agent’s mobility strategy is
the same as its parent’s
Mutation
1. With a probability of µ a family
mutates its strategy
2. The new mobility strategy is calcu-
lated by picking a value from the
Binomial distribution: B(κmf,m0)
and then dividing by κmf
Movement
1. Each agent moves site with a proba-
bility of its mobility strategy
2. The site it moves to (includes its
original site) is chosen weighted by
site attractiveness (a function of
distance and potential fitness)
3. A cost of movement is incurred, f =
f − η × distance moved
Death A family dies if f < fmin
Repeat
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Table 4.1: Constants, variables and parameters in the model.
Constants Range
sx Number of sites in x axis -
sy Number of sites in y axis -
dmax Maximum distance of the region Distance between bottom
left and top right site
qf,min Minimum foraging quality -
Nmax Maximum number of families possible
in the region
nmaxsxsy
Ninit Total number of agents initially ρinitnmaxsxsy
fmin Death fitness 1/nmax
Variables Range
qf Site foraging quality [ qf,min, 1]
m Agent mobility strategy [ 0.01, 0.99]
f Agent fitness [ fmin, 1]
p Probability of fission [ 0, pmax]
da,b Distance between site a and b [ 0, dmax]
f∗ Potential fitness at a site (0, 1]
A Attractiveness of a site [ 0, 1]
n Number of agents at a site -
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism -
pmax Maximum probability of fission [ 0, 1]
η Fitness cost of movement per site [ 0, 1]
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
≥ 1
µ Probability of mutation [ 0, 1]
ρinit Initial population density (0, 1]
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5Mobility Changes in a Forager
Population
Summary
Ethnographic data shows that there are many factors correlated with changes in hunter-
gatherer mobility – including resource abundance and reliability, population density,
dependence on fish, effective temperature, and dependence on farmed resources (see
Sections 1.4 and 2.5.1). Since there are considerable energy costs to mobility (Hamil-
ton et al., 2016) it is reasonable to assume there is some cost-to-benefit assessment of
movement decisions. Therefore I can ask what are the circumstances for high and low
mobility?
In this chapter I will explore the link between foraging and degrees of mobility using
the Forager Model described in Chapter 4, with a particular focus on the transition from
high to low mobility. To do this I perform various experiments using the model; each of
which requires running the model with different parameters, variables and/or constants.
A list of all my experiments is given in Table 5.1; this table can be cross-referenced to
tables in the Appendix where all the model details are given. Methods and results are
given in tandem in this chapter. Appendix C gives details of coding and running this
model.
To illustrate the model dynamics and outcomes analysed in this chapter, I begin
by giving an example of how I summarise outcomes from the model. In Section 5.2 I
give the details of some preliminary checks I performed to confirm decisions made in the
main analysis.
Section 5.3 gives details of running the Forager Model and the parameter sensitivity
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analysis performed. In this analysis I find that large carrying capacities, large initial
population densities, and low movement costs promote the evolution of low mobility
in the model. I also find experimentation in mobility strategies and the potential for
high amounts of fissioning make little difference to outcomes, suggesting that stable
strategies have evolved in the duration of my simulation experiments. Furthermore, the
ratio between the two parameters which directly effect foraging quality – the growth rate
and depletion rate, have a strong impact on model outcomes, where in general the best
environmental conditions (highest growth rate and lowest depletion rate) give rise to
decreased mobility. I also show that simulations roughly fall into a continuum between
having low numbers of agents, high fitnesses and high mobility strategies, and having
high numbers of agents, low fitnesses and low mobility strategies.
I look at the effect of spatial and temporal environmental variability in Section 5.4;
for this I find that temporal variability discourages low mobility in my model, but spatial
variability allows both high and low mobility strategies to co-occur in the simulation.
In Section 5.5 I look at the how simulations change over time – I find that when a
population changes from having initially high mobility strategies to having low mobility
strategies in the final iteration, mean mobility will usually start to decrease before the
number of agents start to increase. I discuss the results of this chapter in Section 5.6.
Table 5.1: A brief description of experiments using the foraging only model. The table
numbers refer to tables in Appendix H.
Experiment
number
Description Table
1 The effects of initial conditions H1
2 The effects of number of iterations H2
3 The effects of the number of sites H3
4 Using the average as a summary H4
5 Varying all 8 parameters H5
6 Varying 4 parameters H6
7 Varying 2 parameters H7
8 Looking at temporal variability H8
9 Looking at spatial variability H9
10 Simulations over time H10
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5.1 An Example of Model Outcomes
When I run a simulation of the Forager Model I input how many iterations it should run
for and how many simulations I want to run (as well as the values for parameters and
constants). I refer to a ‘simulation’ as an independent run of the model. There is unique
data for every iteration of each simulation – the location, fitness, and strategies of every
agent, and the foraging quality of every site. I refer to this data as the model outcomes.
Figures 5.1a and 5.1b show the distributions of mobility strategies and fitnesses in the
agents at each iteration for one simulation of the model. I can summarise the model
outcomes by finding the mean values for agents and sites, i.e. the mean fitness of all
agents at each iteration in a single simulation of the model. Figure 5.1c shows an example
of this. With this data I can see how population averages change over time.
Since there is stochasticity in the model, every simulation will have different dynamics
even if the conditions are the same. Therefore, I run many simulations of the model
to understand the model behaviour in general. Figures 5.1d and 5.1e show the mean
mobility strategies and fitnesses over time for 100 simulations of the model, with the
final mean values for all the simulations also shown in a box plot. I am mostly (but not
always) interested in seeing the final iteration conditions (e.g. what conditions lead to
low mobility after some time) rather than the dynamics over time. Hence, for much of
the analysis presented here I compare the final mean mobility strategy (or other final
outcomes) for different conditions.
Note that outcomes of the model are saved at the end of every iteration, and so the
data recorded for iteration ‘0’ is not the same as the initial conditions of the model.
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Figure 5.1: Box plots of the mobility strategies (a) and fitnesses (b) of all agents at
each iteration using one simulation, the means of these are given in (c). The mean
mobility strategies and fitnesses for 100 simulations are plotted in (d) and (e), with the
final mean outcomes also given in a box plot. For box plots the interquartile range is
shown in blue or yellow (for mobility strategy and fitness respectively), the median is
shown in slightly darker blue or yellow, the whiskers are in grey and outliers in black.
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5.2 Preliminary Checks
My main interest is to investigate the effect of the parameters (given in Table 4.1) on the
outcomes of the model after a number of iterations. However, the model outcomes may
also be dependent on the values I have chosen for the constants of the model. Therefore
in this section I will investigate the effect of (and attempt to justify default values for)
the initial conditions of the model, the number of iterations the model is run for, the
region size, and the minimum foraging quality. The constants and parameters used and
varied for these experiments are given in Tables H1, H2 and H3 of Appendix H.
For the region size and the number of iterations in the model, there is a trade off
between making sure that the values selected for these are large enough to give accurate
and reproducible results, but not so large that the memory and time these simulations
will need is impractical.
5.2.1 Initial Conditions – Experiment 1
I ran the model 1000 times each with 100 random sets of initial conditions (thus the
model was run 100, 000 times in total) for 1000 iterations. Initial conditions in the model
are the fitness, mobility and null strategies of the agents, the sites the agents live at,
and the site qualities at iteration 0. For these runs I randomly varied r ∈ [ 0, 1] and
λ ∈ [ 0, 1] . I set κm = 100, pmax = 0.14, η = 0.05, nmax = 6, µ = 0.04, and ρinit = 0.1.
In Figure 5.2 I show the ranges of five different model outcomes for each of the 100
sets of simulations. Table 5.2 gives the correlation coefficients between initial and final
conditions. From these it can be seen that the difference the initial conditions make
to the end results are generally quite small (with the exception of the initial and final
mean null strategy) – the interquartile ranges are mostly overlapping, and the correlation
coefficients are small. Hence I will not consider the initial conditions in further analysis
of the model and generate them randomly for each run of the model.
5.2.2 Number of Iterations – Experiment 2
The number of iterations (where one iteration models one year) to run the model for
is also something to consider. If there is a stable state for the system then I need to
run the model for enough iterations for this stable state to be reached. To investigate
the number of iterations needed I ran the model 1000 times over 2000 iterations and
recorded the mean agent and site properties every 100 iterations. For these I randomly
varied r ∈ [ 0, 1] , λ ∈ [ 0, 1] , and set κm = 100, pmax = 0.14, η = 0.05, nmax = 6,
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Figure 5.2: A comparison of the spread of model outcomes of 1000 simulations with
the same initial conditions, for each of the 100 initial condition sets (each box plot).
Medians are given in dark blue, and the inter-quartile range in a lighter blue.
Table 5.2: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between initial and final
iteration conditions. Using all 100,000 simulations. ns – the tests which were not
significant (p-value ≥ 0.05).
Initial mean
fitness
Initial mean
mobility
strategy
Initial
mean null
strategy
Initial mean
foraging
quality
Final number of agents 0.005ns -0.009 -0.001ns -0.001ns
Final mean mobility strategy -0.011 0.049 0.016 -0.005ns
Final mean fitness 0.108 0.01 0.011 0.046
Final mean null strategy 0.007 -0.07 0.213 0.039
Final mean foraging quality -0.01 0ns -0.004ns -0.005ns
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µ = 0.04, and ρinit = 0.1.
Figure 5.3 shows how the distribution of simulation outcomes converge over time.
Although the range is always large, the median value converges as the number of itera-
tions increases. Using the method described in Section 2.4.3 I compared the outcomes of
simulations at consecutive pairs of iterations (e.g. comparing the distributions of mean
mobility strategies at iteration 200 and 300) to see if these distributions become more
similar. As I compare later iterations the p-values become larger, and therefore the
distribution means are likely to be converging; these values are shown in Figure 5.4.
From this analysis it appears that running the model for 1000 iterations would be
enough time for stable behaviour of the system to appear.
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Figure 5.3: Violin plots of model outcomes at various iterations of 2000 simulations.
5.2.3 Number of Sites – Experiment 3
I was not sure what effect the number of sites would have on the model outcomes, so I
compared the outcomes from six different region sizes. The region sizes compared were
8×8, 9×9, 10×10, 11×11, 12×12 and 20×20. I randomly varied r ∈ [ 0, 1] , λ ∈ [ 0, 1]
and set κm = 100, pmax = 0.14, η = 0.05, nmax = 6, µ = 0.04, and ρinit = 0.1 . I varied
the model 1000 times each for 1000 iterations for each of these region sizes.
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Figure 5.4: The p-values from a two-tailed Student’s t-test on 5 simulation outcomes
at two consecutive iterations. e.g. I perform a t-test on the mean mobility strategies in
1000 simulations at iteration 200 and 300 and plot the p-values.
Figure 5.5 shows the range of some of the final properties of the model for each of the
different region sizes. I note that as the region size increases the final number of agents
increases, which makes sense as there is more space for agents. I also find that the final
mean foraging quality increases with region size – possibly because of less depletion since
there is more space for agents. Generally however, the range of values become tighter
(due to the law of large numbers), but median values do not change much. Hence I will
use a region size of 10×10.
5.2.4 Minimum Foraging Quality
The reason I have a minimum foraging quality in the model is to make sure that it never
reaches 0 (since if it reaches 0 it would never be able to recover due to the nature of the
equation for foraging quality). Therefore the only real criterion for this value is that it
should be > 0 and ≤ 1.
It makes sense that there will be a natural value for qf,min which occurs simply from
the dynamic that there will be no depletion from foraging if the foraging quality has
become so low that all the agents die. However specifying this natural minimum value
is difficult since there are many options for how the simulations play out. As long as my
inputted value for qf,min is lower than the natural minimum then I should not have to
worry that the value for qf,min is biasing my results.
In all the simulations run in this section I chose qf,min = 0.1 and I found that the
minimum final mean foraging quality that ever occurred was 0.238. This does not mean
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Figure 5.5: Violin plots of the final properties of simulations for different region sizes.
that there was not a point during the simulations when the foraging quality became less
than 0.1 (and then had to be reset to 0.1), but 0.238 is encouragingly greater than 0.1
to suggest that the use of qf,min = 0.1 is adequate.
5.2.5 Averaging – Experiment 4
In the analysis in this chapter I use the final mean mobility strategy as the measure of
how mobile the population is. To double check whether it is reasonable to summarise the
final population using the mean, I look at the final distributions of all mobility strategies
in the final population. I ran the model 1000 times over 1000 iterations with random
values for r and λ.
Figure 5.6 shows the relative frequencies of mobility strategies of the final agent
population coloured by the mean mobility strategy of the population, for each of the
1000 simulations. The absence of a yellow peak around 0.5 in this plot indicates that
when the mean mobility strategy is at a mid value, it is the case that the agents have a
wide range of strategies, as opposed to every agent having a strategy of around 0.5.
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Figure 5.6: Relative frequencies of mobility strategies in the final agent populations of
1000 simulations, coloured by the mean value.
5.2.6 Outcomes of Preliminary Checks
The analysis performed in this section leaves me confident that I am not biasing my
interpretation of the results by picking random initial conditions for every run of the
model, by using a region size of 10×10, by setting qf,min = 0.1, or by running the model
for 1000 iterations. This means that I can focus on analysing the other parts of the model
exclusively. The analysis also shows that caution must be applied when interpreting final
mean mobility strategies of around 0.5, as rather than this meaning that most agents
have mobility strategies of around 0.5, it is likely to mean their strategies are distributed
widely in the range of 0 to 1.
5.3 Parameter Sensitivity and Simulation Outcomes
To thoroughly explore the parameter space of the model I ran it many times with
randomly chosen parameter values and recorded certain outcomes of the simulations.
The simulation outcomes I record are the final number of agents, the mean of the mobility
and null strategy, fitness, and foraging quality in the final iteration. I only consider
simulations in my analysis which have ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration (which
happens more than 97% of the time anyway), since otherwise taking the mean of such
a small sample can include too much noise. Thus, unless otherwise stated these are the
subset of simulations analysed in this chapter.
With the data of parameter values and the five outcomes for many independent simu-
lations, I can then investigate which parameter values influence certain model outcomes.
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To look at how parameters affect certain outcomes in my model I can use two ap-
proaches: the FIO method (proposed in Section 2.4.1 and used in my analysis of the
Bowles and Choi model in Chapter 3); or the OC method which searches for unspecified
outcome types discussed in Section 2.4.4. If I use the FIO method I can use either low or
high mobility as my idealised outcome, and then investigate the simulations which have
the highest and lowest mobility, to see what the environmental conditions are most likely
to be in either case. However, since there are simulation outcomes other than final mean
mobility, which are possibly correlated and still worth investigating (e.g. the number of
agents, mean fitness, etc.), using the OC method allows a less forced and more broad
analysis of combined parameter value effects on simulation outcomes. With this method
I look at all the outcomes of the simulations and see if there are any simulation outcome
groupings. This allows me to look more thoroughly at model complexity without being
biased by looking for a particular outcome.
In this section I will discuss the experiments and results when running many simu-
lations and varying all eight, four and two of the parameters.
5.3.1 The Effects of All 8 Parameters – Experiment 5
I ran the model 100,000 times whilst varying the values of all 8 parameters; the details of
this experiment are given in Table H5. Of these, 3112 simulations had no agents in the
final iteration (they had all died) and 62,089 simulations had ≥ 15 agents alive in the
final iteration. Figure 5.7 shows that the simulations in which all agents died before the
final iteration were those with the lowest initial population density, the lowest maximum
number of agents which can be supported at a site, and high movement costs.
Figure 5.8 shows the outcomes of the simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final
iteration. I note that the distribution of final mobility strategies is not Gaussian, and
therefore there does appear to be some differences in the simulations (whether from the
parameter combinations or to do with the stochasticity of the simulation) which lead
to different outcomes. I examine the relationship between parameter values and final
mean mobility strategy with scatter plots (Figure 5.9, correlation coefficients are given
in Table 5.3). From these plots I note that the final mean mobility strategies are often
correlated with parameter values. For example, the cost of movement (η) is never high
in the simulations with a high mean mobility, and the depletion rate is never high in the
simulations with a low mean mobility.
I performed a principal components analysis on four outcomes (I ignored the final null
strategy). Principal component 1 (PC1) accounts for 41.3% of variation, PC2 accounts
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for 35.5%, PC3 accounts for 15.8%, and PC4 accounts for the remaining 7.4%. Each
pair of principal components is visualised in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.7: Histograms of parameter values in the 3112 simulations with no agents
alive in the final iteration. When all parameters are varied.
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agents alive in the final iteration. When all parameters are varied.
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Figure 5.9: Scatter plots of the parameters values and final mean mobility strategies in
the 62,089 simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration. When all parameters
are varied.
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Figure 5.10: Each pair of principal components from the four main outcomes of 62,089
simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration.
Outcome Clusters
Since some of the simulation outcomes were highly correlated (final number of agents,
final mean mobility, fitness and foraging quality) I looked for clusters in these outcomes,
rather than just separating the simulations by whether they have a high or low mobility.
This Outcome Clustering (OC) method is described in Section 2.4.4.
First, I looked at whether clusters in the outcomes were noticeable by eye. I plotted
scatters of each pair of outcomes and coloured each point by a third outcome; this is
shown in Figure 5.11. These plots show that although there are no obvious clusters, there
is some structure to the types of simulation (seen by some gradient to the colours).
Due to processing taking a long time, I found outcome clusters based only on the first
10,000 simulations and then used these to predict the rest of the cluster classifications
using the function ‘predict.Mclust’, also in the ‘mclust’ library.
I have plotted the relative densities of outcomes for each of these clusters (9 were
found) in Figure 5.12a, and in Figure 5.12b I have plotted pairs of outcomes coloured by
cluster. From these figures it can be seen that the clusters are roughly a continuation of
two extreme types, which I will henceforth refer to as States ‘A’ and ‘B’: one extreme
state has low numbers of agents, high mobility strategies, high fitnesses and low foraging
qualities (the red cluster, State A); and the other has the opposite, high numbers of
agents, low mobility strategies, low fitnesses and high foraging qualities (the blue cluster,
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State B).
I also plotted relative densities of the parameter values in each of the clusters in
Figure 5.13. I found that certain parameter values make little or no difference to which
cluster the simulation is assigned to – which can be seen by the same relative density
pattern in all clusters. This is the case for the parameters concerning the mutation
of strategies; κm and µ. I discuss how mutation has little effect on outcomes in my
model by setting µ = 0 in Appendix I. I can also see when parameter values do make a
difference to which cluster a simulation is assigned to – which is seen by different relative
density patterns for clusters. For example, this is the case for the maximum number of
agents, nmax, where State A outcomes have lower values (but not too low) and State B
outcomes have high values.
Figure 5.11: 3D representations of 3 outcomes (x and y axis, and colour) in the 62,089
simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration.
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Figure 5.12: The outcomes in the different clusters, using all the 62,089 simulations
with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration when all parameters are varied. (a) Outcomes
in different clusters. The most and least mobile clusters are highlighted with a thicker
line. (b) Outcome pairs coloured by cluster.
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Figure 5.13: The parameters in the different clusters, using all the 62,089 simulations
with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration when all parameters are varied. The most
and least mobile clusters are highlighted with a thicker line.
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5.3.2 Fixing Certain Parameters – Experiments 6 and 7
Varying all the parameters can make the analysis less clear – since there are more
interdependencies and effects to consider – and introduces more noise into the model.
Since some of the parameters are of greater interest than others, and some have values
backed up from observed data (namely pmax, nmax and µ – discussed in Chapter 4), I
chose to run the simulations again but this time fixing some of the parameter values.
I varied the four parameters r, λ, pmax and η in one experiment since these both had
a strong impact on simulation outcomes and I wanted to investigate their effect further.
I also ran an experiment whilst only varying the parameters to do with foraging quality
growth and depletion (r and λ) to more clearly understand the effect of the environment.
When I only varied r and λ I set pmax to its default value of 0.14 (as explained in Section
4.3.1), and the cost of movement η to 0.05.
I chose to no longer vary nmax and ρinit, since I suspect they mostly directly affect the
numbers of agents (which may then indirectly effect the other outcomes), and I would
rather investigate parameters with indirect effects on the evolution of certain outcomes.
I set nmax to its default value (of 6, shown in Section 4.5.5) and ρinit to 0.1.
In Section 5.3.1 I showed that the value for κm makes little difference to simulation
outcomes, therefore varying it is unnecessary, and thus I fix it to a mid value of κm = 100.
This is also the case for µ, and thus I chose the default value of µ = 0.04 as explained
in Section 4.4.
Simulation Outcomes
Of the 100,000 simulations run 95,835 had ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration when
varying four parameters and 98,657 when varying two parameters. I compared the
outcomes of these simulations, along with those when 8 parameters were varied, in Figure
5.14. I note from this that varying fewer parameters gives more of the simulations with
lower mobilities, although there is not a large difference between varying 8 and 4. There
is however a stark difference in the final mean mobility strategies density when only 2
parameters are varied – for this a clear bimodal distribution can be seen.
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients between parameters and outcomes
when four and two parameters are varied are given in Table 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.
Correlations are of the same sign, but become stronger when fewer parameters are varied.
As in Figure 5.11 I can look at each triplet of the highly correlated outcomes to see if
there are any obvious clusters, these are shown in Figures 5.15a and 5.15b – for these
the clusters are clearer than when all eight parameters are varied.
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Figure 5.14: Relative densities of the outcomes of simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive
in the final iteration, when eight (62,089 simulations), four (95,835 simulations) and two
(98,657 simulations) of the parameters are varied.
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Outcome Clusters
As when I varied all the parameters, I also used the Outcome Clustering (OC) method
(discussed in Section 2.4.4) to find groupings of simulation outcomes in both the simu-
lations where four parameters were varied and when two were varied. For each of the 9
clusters found I plotted the relative density of outcomes and parameters; these are shown
in Figure 5.16 and 5.17 for when four and two parameters are varied, respectively. Fig-
ures 5.16b and 5.17b show the relationship between outcomes coloured by the cluster the
simulation was assigned to, when four and two parameters are varied, respectively. As
with when I varied all the parameters, the continuation of outcome types from between
State A and State B clusters can still be seen, but when I vary fewer parameters the
separation of the clusters become much more defined.
I plotted each parameter pair coloured by the cluster the simulation was assigned
to in Figure 5.18. Here it can be seen that the ratio between the growth rate and the
depletion rate (r and λ) is strongly correlated with which cluster the simulation belongs
to, however, the relationship is not linear – the highest values for r/λ (high r, low λ)
give the State B outcomes (the blue cluster), but the lowest values for r/λ (low r, high
λ) give the cluster somewhere between State A and State B (a yellow cluster).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.15: 3D representations of 3 outcomes (x and y axis, and colour) in the
simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration, using simulations where 4
parameters were varied (a) and 2 parameters were varied (b).
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(a) Outcomes in different clusters.
●
Most mobile (n = 13271)
 (n = 13396)
 (n = 5871)
 (n = 5813)
 (n = 25962)
 (n = 2055)
 (n = 17678)
 (n = 4571)
Least mobile (n = 7218)
(b) Outcome pairs coloured by cluster.
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(c) Parameters in different clusters.
Figure 5.16: The outcomes and parameters in the different clusters, using the 95,835
simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration when four parameters are varied.
In the relative density plots the most and least mobile clusters are highlighted with a
thicker line.
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(a) Outcomes in different clusters.
●
Most mobile (n = 29293)
 (n = 17739)
 (n = 16283)
 (n = 5814)
 (n = 1358)
 (n = 7278)
 (n = 6936)
 (n = 3739)
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(b) Outcome pairs coloured by cluster.
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(c) Parameters in different clusters.
Figure 5.17: The outcomes and parameters in the different clusters, using the 98,657
simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration when two parameters are varied.
In the relative density plots the most and least mobile clusters are highlighted with a
thicker line.
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(a) Parameter pair relationships coloured by cluster, when varying four parameters.
(b) The relationship between r and λ coloured by cluster, when varying two parameters.
Figure 5.18: The pairwise relationships between parameters coloured by cluster. For
when four parameters are varied (a) and when two parameters are varied (b). Cluster
colours are the same as in Figure 5.16 and 5.17.
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5.4 Temporal and Spatial Variability
In the previous section I have shown how different parameter combinations can affect
the outcomes of my model, but within a simulation the parameter values were constant
for each iteration and for every site. In this section I look at both the effects of tempo-
ral (changing every iteration) and spatial (changing every site) variability in parameter
values. To investigate specifically the effect of temporal and spatial environmental vari-
ability I only varied the parameters which directly relate to the sites – the growth and
depletion rates, r and λ.
5.4.1 Temporal Variability – Experiment 8
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Figure 5.19: How a parameter value changes over time when there is temporal vari-
ability in r and λ. The dynamics with three random starting points and a walk distance
of 0.1 are shown. The blue line shows the mean parameter value from iteration 300 to
1000.
I ran the model 10,000 times with random values for the growth and depletion rates,
r and λ (for details of this run see Table H8). After a run-in period of 300 iterations
I then randomly varied r and λ every iteration. This was done according to a random
walk, where new values for the parameters were picked randomly in [ previous value −
WD, previous value+WD] , whereWD is the walk distance. Three randomly generated
examples of how a parameter value can change over time using this method can be seen
in Figure 5.19.
The average values of r and λ from the iterations in which they were varied (iterations
301 to 1000) were then used in 10,000 simulations without variability (referred to as the
‘paired no variability’ run). Thus I have 10,000 pairs of simulations, with one simulation
with temporal variation in r and λ, and one simulation with the means of these value
used throughout the iterations. I also ran 10,000 simulations with a random r and a
random λ value chosen for each simulation (as in Experiment 7; the ‘no variability’ run),
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for further comparison. I compared the relative frequencies of the simulation outcomes
for each of the types of run in Figure 5.20a. This figure shows when there is random
variability there are fewer simulations with low mean mobility values. This could be
because for low mean mobility strategies to evolve a persistent state is needed. It could
also be because to promote low mobility simulations quite specific parameter values are
needed (in particular a low λ from what I have shown previously), and when there is
random variability these values are unlikely to come up – as shown by the lack of low
mobility simulations in the paired no variability run of the model. Hence, it is possible
that low mobility is not necessarily directly promoted from no variability, but rather
there are more chances of the conditions being good enough for low mobility. It is
interesting to note that the modal value (where the peak is) for the higher mobility
strategy is the same in all three runs of the model.
I also performed this experiment the opposite way around, where from iterations 1
to 500 there was random variability in r and λ, and from iterations 501 to 1000 the
values for r and λ were kept the same. The results from this were almost identical to
when there is no temporal variability – see Appendix J.
I ran a further experiment where r and λ randomly changed every iteration according
to the random walk described above, but in this case there was no run-in period and I
also chose different values for WD (between 0 and 1) in each of the 100,000 simulations
(otherwise this experiment is the same as Experiment 8). Varying WD means I can
see the entire range from no variability (WD = 0) to extreme variability (WD = 1).
I found that it is only for the simulations with the lowest values of WD (i.e. where
there is little variability) that there are the low mobility, high numbers of agents and
low fitness (State B) simulations – this is shown in Figure 5.21.
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(b)
Figure 5.20: Relative densities of simulation outcomes when testing the effect of tem-
poral (a) and spatial variability (b) in r and λ.
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Figure 5.21: Scatter plots of the value randomly chosen for the random walk distance
(WD) and outcomes in each of the 9904 simulations with ≤ 15 agents alive in the final
iteration. Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient, ρ, is given in red.
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5.4.2 Spatial Variability – Experiment 9
I also considered the effect of spatial variability in the environmental conditions. I do
this by varying r and λ continuously in the x and y direction of the region (i.e. each
site has a different combination of values for these two parameters) – this is referred to
as ‘structured spatial variability’. I compare this to a run where r and λ are randomly
picked for each site each simulation (the ‘non-structured spatial variability’ run), and
also a run where only one value for r and λ is chosen each simulation and therefore there
is no spatial variability (this is the usual type of condition). An illustration comparing
these types of run is shown in Figure 5.22. I run the model 10,000 times over 1000
iterations for all three of these conditions.
I look at the relative frequencies of the parameters and outcomes in the structured
and non-structured variability and the no variability environment conditions (as before
I only consider the simulations with ≥ 15 agents in the final iteration) in Figure 5.20b.
As with temporal variability it seems that it is only when there is no variability that
the distribution of mobility strategies is bimodal, with one mode at a particularly low
value. However, the modal values are lower in both the structured and non-structured
runs of the model as compared to the higher mode in the run with no variability.
I also found the final mean conditions at each site in all 10,000 simulations of the
model. For example, for site 1 I look at all the agents at this site in the final iteration of
each of the 10,000 simulations, and then take an average of all their mobility strategies.
Figures 5.23a and 5.23b show the final mean mobility strategy and the final number of
agents at each site for each of the structured and non-structured spatial variability and
no variability environment conditions. I found that for the structured spatial variability
run the sites are occupied by agents with quite different mobilities and numbers – i.e.
there is spatially structuring of the population. The range of mobilities for these sites
does not include the highest values, and hence it makes sense that the mean final mobility
value was around 0.4 (as seen in Figure 5.20b). When there is non-structured spatial
variation I find that all the sites have a mid value for their mean mobility strategy.
When there is no spatial variability the values for r and λ will be uniform for the whole
region, but these values change every simulation. Hence the final site mean mobilities
are all quite similar, but this value will change every simulation. The outer sites are less
densely populated than the inner sites when there is no spatial variability, which is an
artefact of movement to inner sites being more likely.
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Figure 5.22: Values for r and λ at each site in the structured (left) and non-structured
(middle) spatial variability, and no variability (right, where each simulation will have a
different value) runs of the model. For the non-structured and non variability runs of
the model these values are picked randomly each simulation.
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Figure 5.23: Final mean mobility strategies (a) and number of agents (b) in each of
the structured (left) and non-structured (middle) variability and no variability (right)
models runs.
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5.5 Model Events Over Time
In Section 5.3 I considered how the parameter values in the model affected the final
state of agents and sites. I showed that certain parameter combinations could cause
simulations to fall into two states: State A with low numbers of agents, high mobil-
ity strategies, high fitnesses and low foraging quality, and State B with the opposite
qualities. In this section I will consider the model dynamics over time, and also try to
understand the processes which could lead foragers to switch from State A to State B.
In particular I want to find if there is an order in which the simulation qualities change,
e.g. does the number agents start to increase before the mean mobility decreases or vice
versa?
Previously the initial agents of the model had mobility strategies between 0.01 and
0.99, but the simulations discussed in this section started with all the agents being highly
mobile – I chose the initial mobilities to be between 0.8 and 0.99. I also did this for the
null strategy. I ran 1000 simulations of the model with different values for r and λ, and
the other parameters were at their default values, see Table H10 in the Appendix.
5.5.1 Dynamics Over Time – Experiment 10
The number of agents and the mean mobility strategies, fitness, null strategies and
foraging quality are shown over all iterations for each of the 1000 simulations in Figure
5.24 (coloured by final mean mobility) and in Figure 5.25 (coloured by the the ratio
r/λ). These dynamics can be seen in closer detail for the first 20 iterations in Figure
5.26. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, model outcomes are recorded at
the end of each iteration, and hence even though initially there are always 60 agents,
the plots show at iteration 0 the number of agents is roughly between 40 and 60.
As can be seen from Figure 5.24, the simulations which change most over time (for
all outcomes) are those with the lowest final mean mobilities. By comparing the mean
null strategies over time to the mean mobility, I find that random drift will somewhat
lower the strategies over time, but there are distinct simulations for which the mean
mobility strategy becomes significantly lower.
In general, regardless of the ratio of r and λ, the mean foraging quality will almost
immediately increase to a steady value (see the mean foraging quality plot of Figure
5.25). For simulations where r > λ this steady value will be higher than when λ > r,
which is intuitive since the foraging quality is growing faster and there is less depletion.
The value for r/λ seems to predict, as in Section 5.3, whether the simulation is going to
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Figure 5.24: Simulation properties at each iteration coloured by the final mean mobility
strategy.
have a low final mean mobility (and high number of agents and lower final mean fitness);
however, there does seem to be a discrepancy in the highest values for r/λ where the
simulations do not have the lowest final mean mobilities or have the least final mean
fitness.
When there is no effect from depletion (λ = 0) the simulations are quite different
to the others – they have the highest number of agents, and the lowest mean mobility
and fitness, but take more iterations before they start to change (the three simulations
for which λ = 0 are shown in black in Figure 5.25). This could be because selection to
become sedentary is slower, since fewer agents will be dying due to the foraging quality
being good even if the site is occupied by many agents. In three of the simulations for
which r = 0 all the agents died in the first 21 iterations.
It is apparent that the simulations have ‘settling in’ dynamics – where in the first few
iterations the short-term behaviour is slightly different until it has chance to stabilise
into the long term behaviour (seen in Figure 5.26). In these first few iterations there is
a decrease in the number of agents followed by an increase in fitness.
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Figure 5.25: Simulation properties at each iteration coloured by the ratio of the pa-
rameters r and λ. Black represents when r = 0 or λ = 0. Colours are log scaled.
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Figure 5.26: Simulation properties in the first 20 iterations coloured by the final mean
mobility strategy. The three simulations where λ = 0 are shown in black.
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5.5.2 Ordering Model Events
Out of the 1000 simulations 234 had a final mean mobility strategy of < 0.5. 30 of these
simulations are shown in Figure 5.27, where the mean mobility, fitness, and number of
agents are plotted. By using the algorithm in Section 2.4.2 I was able to predict the point
at which there is a significant change in the number of agents, the mean mobility and
mean fitness. This algorithm fits linear models to the outcomes in consecutive blocks
of iterations (e.g. the mean effort strategy from the first 100 iterations), and finds the
point at which the gradient significantly changes. Applying this algorithm allows me
to quantify whether the decrease in mean mobility strategy started to happen before or
after the increase in the number of agents. By looking at the points of change predictions
using different block sizes by eye, I found that a block size of 140 is suitable. Since the
number of agents always slightly increases in the first iterations of the model, I decided
to not include the transition between iterations 1 to 140 and iterations 141 to 280 as the
point of change when considering the number of agents.
I estimated that of the 234 simulations where the mean mobility decreased to < 0.5,
212 had a decrease in mobility before an increase in the number of agents, 1 had the
opposite, and 21 had them happen at the same time. Due to how the algorithm works
I can only predict the time of change to the nearest 140 iterations. The time these
changes occurred is shown in Figure 5.28. Table 5.6 gives the number of times each
of the different orders for simulation changes occurred when the mean fitness is also
considered, in the 212 simulations where significant changes in mobility occurred before
significant changes in the number of agents. The most common order of events is when
the mean mobility decreases first, and then the number of agents increases and the mean
fitness decreases. It is rarely the case that the mean fitness decreases before the mean
mobility decreases.
183
5.5. MODEL EVENTS OVER TIME
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
l
0 400 800
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8 l
l
0
20
0
40
0
M
ea
n 
m
ob
ilit
y 
st
ra
te
gy
M
ea
n 
fit
ne
ss
Iterations
N
um
be
r o
f a
ge
nt
s
Figure 5.27: The dynamics of 15 simulations from the 234 simulations where the final
mean mobility strategy was < 0.5. Red shows the mean mobility strategy over time (left
y-axis), yellow shows the mean fitness over time (also left y-axis), and blue shows the
number of agents over time (right y-axis). Circles show where my algorithm identifies a
significant change in gradient to occur.
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Figure 5.28: The number of iterations until there was a change in the number of
agents as compared to when there was a change in the mean mobility strategy, in the
234 simulations where the final mean mobility strategy was < 0.5. The dashed line
shows where these are equal. Coloured by r/λ (log scaled).
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Table 5.6: How many times each of the different orders for simulation changes occurred.
Only using the 212 simulations where a change in mobility happened before a change
in the number of agents, and when the final mean mobility was < 0.5. I abbreviate the
mean mobility as m¯, the number of agents as N , and the mean fitness as f¯ . E.g. m¯
then N then f¯ – how many times mean mobility decreases then the number of agents
increases and then the mean fitness decreases.
Order Number of simulations
m¯ then N and f¯ 79
m¯ and f¯ , then N 63
m¯ then N then f¯ 50
m¯ then f¯ then N 17
f¯ then m¯ then N 3
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5.6 Discussion
In this chapter I have explored the model described in Chapter 4. This has involved
running many simulations to understand model behaviours and outcomes, thoroughly
exploring parameter sensitivity, and running various experiments to test the effect of
environmental variability. The work has allowed me to make predictions about the
reasons for variability in hunter-gatherer mobility as well as allowing me to understand
the workings of the model before adding more complexity (which I will do in the next
chapter).
In this section I will discuss and suggest limitations of the results presented in this
chapter.
5.6.1 Parameter Sensitivity and Simulation Outcomes
My analysis from Section 5.3 involved running the model many times using different pa-
rameter value combinations. This allowed me to properly consider the interdependencies
of the model, and find which parameters influenced certain outcomes.
Outcomes Interdependencies
Using the correlation coefficients given in Table 5.3 I find that there are correlations
with |ρ| > 0.15 between the final number of agents, the final mean fitness, and the final
mean foraging quality. These make intuitive sense: a higher foraging quality means
there is more to eat and so fitness will be higher; higher fitness means the probability
of birth is higher so there can be more agents, but on the other hand more agents mean
there are more people to share the foraging quality with, resulting in lower fitness; and
higher numbers of agents mean there will be more impact from depletion, so the foraging
quality will be smaller (these relationships can be further understood using Equations
4.1, 4.2 and 4.8).
There are also some moderate correlations (ρ ≈ 0.4) between the final mean mobility
strategy and both the final mean fitness and the final mean foraging quality. The impli-
cations of these observations are not so intuitive since there is no implicit relationship
between mobility and other aspects of the model (i.e. there are no equations involving an
agent’s mobility strategy), and hence the effects are indirect and multi-factored. Since
there is a fitness cost to movement, one may expect mobility to be negatively correlated
with fitness; however it is positively correlated. Furthermore, since staying at one site
for number of iteration incurs a depletion cost to the site, it may also be expected that
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mobility would be positively correlated with foraging quality, but I find it is negatively
correlated. Hence, there are obviously some indirect mechanisms which influence the
final mean mobility strategy. Since the number of agents is highly correlated with these
outcomes, it is likely that this plays a part in these apparent contradictions.
As I increase the number of parameters I fix (from fixing none, to 4 to 6) I find that
these relationships still hold, but the correlations become stronger, probably because
reducing parameter variability reduces noise. I also find a correlation between the final
number of agents and the final mean mobility strategy.
Simulation Types
My clustering analysis revealed different outcome groupings. In general these were a
continuum between having high mean mobility strategies, high mean fitness, low num-
bers of agents and low mean foraging qualities; and having low mean mobility strategies,
low mean fitness, high numbers of agents and high mean foraging qualities. I referred
to these outcomes types as State A and State B respectively. As I decreased the num-
ber of parameters varied the values for these two types of outcomes overlapped much
less. As I showed from my review of Kelly’s (2013) hunter-gatherer mobility data in
Section 2.5.1, the exponentially decreasing relationship between reduced mobility and
larger population density (seen in Figure 5.16b) is also seen in real populations.
There were other clusters found with qualities in between the State A and B clusters,
but there were some clusters where the mean mobility strategies were around 0.5 but the
number of agents was much lower than those in the State A clusters. These simulations
are also those with the lowest growth rates, and I suspect that if given more time all the
agents in these simulations may have died.
Parameter Sensitivity
When I varied all of the parameters I found 3.1% of the simulations had no agents alive in
the final iteration. These simulations had low values for the maximum number of agents
that could live at site, and initially had low population density – which can be seen from
Figure 5.7. These conditions mean that there will be fewer agents in the population –
which can be good because foraging quality is shared between fewer agents (so fitnesses
are higher), and there will be less of a depletion impact (so the foraging quality will be
better). However, fewer agents can also mean there is less of a buffer if agents do die,
so the population’s survival is more fragile. Hence, even though foraging quality and
fitnesses will be higher, low numbers of agents will still pay the cost of movement, and
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if this is not too low (which is also seen in Figure 5.7) it could mean that some of the
already small numbers of agents die and the population never recovers.
In the simulations where there were ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration there
were many strong correlations between various pairs of parameters and outcomes (given
in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). Since there are also correlations between pairs of outcomes
it is difficult to ascertain which parameter values directly affected simulation outcomes.
However from my clustering analysis I can see which parameter values are in the different
types of simulation clusters, which are shown in Figures 5.13, 5.16c and 5.17c.
In none of the clusters was there a preferred value for κm or µ and thus mutation
of strategies seems to play little part in whether a simulation evolves into a particular
cluster type (which was confirmed in Appendix I when I set µ = 0). Hence when fre-
quencies of strategies change in the population it is because agents with certain strategy
values are more likely to die, and/or agents with other strategy values are more likely to
fission. Strategy frequencies do not change because of the random nature of mutation,
and thus the final mean strategy value is resistant to the introduction of new strategies
– in other words the final strategies are evolutionary stable strategies (as defined in
Maynard Smith, 1972).
The maximum number of agents, nmax, that a site can support was influential on
which cluster a simulation was in. I found that State A clusters had low values, but
not too low (although when nmax is too low all the agents can die, and therefore the
simulation would not have been included in the cluster analysis), and State B clusters
had high values for nmax. If nmax is high, then there is the potential for a large number
of agents (as long as the foraging quality is not too low), and if this occurs decreased
mobility may be selected for since there would be little benefit in paying the cost of
movement only to go to a site occupied by many agents. Thus, I predict that when
there is decreased mobility there is more homogeneity of sites (in terms of numbers of
agents and foraging quality).
The initial density of agents, ρinit, also has an impact on which cluster the simulation
is categorised into. I find that State A clusters have lower initial densities, and State
B clusters have higher initial densities. A high initial density will promote a large
number of agents, and as with my argument for nmax this could mean selection for
reduced mobility. On the other hand, I find that the values for the upper probability for
fissioning, pmax, are generally higher in State A outcomes, so although these simulations
have the potential to have large numbers of agents (depending on the fitness of agents,
see Equation 4.8) they actually have high mobility.
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Since the probability of fissioning is a function of both pmax and agent fitness, having
a high value for pmax does not necessarily mean that there is more fissioning. The
discrepancy between the preferred value for pmax in State A and B outcomes may be to
do with how the mobility strategy evolves – in State A outcomes where the values for
pmax and fitness are generally high, evolution may be facilitated by the birth of more
agents with high mobilities; whereas in State B outcomes where the values for pmax and
fitness can be low, evolution might be also caused by the death of those agents with high
mobilities.
In both State A and B outcomes the value for the cost of movement, η, is small. In
some ways this will be because even for State B outcomes there is still some mobility,
and thus if the cost of movement is too high then all the agents may die, and hence
not be included in the analysis. Obviously when the cost is as low as possible then the
benefits to being highly mobile are greater, and thus the values for η are lowest in the
highly mobile simulations.
State B outcomes generally have the highest values for r and the lowest for λ. Hence
for the evolution of reduced mobility it is important for the environmental quality to be
high, a result which is also seen from Kelly’s hunter-gatherer data (2013) (as discussed
in Section 2.5.1) where there is less mobility in areas where there is more to eat. The
opposite is not quite true in my model – for State A outcomes r is never too low and λ is
never too high; this is because if the values chosen make the the environmental quality
too low then all the agents will die. It also appears that it is less important for the value
for r to be not high, than it is important for the value for λ do be not low for State A
outcomes (seen by a more spread distribution of values for r). Hence when depletion is
a factor and environmental quality is low, mobility is beneficial.
5.6.2 Variability
In my analysis I also investigated the effects of both temporal and spatial variability
in the growth and depletion rates. Since these parameters directly affect the foraging
quality, I think of their ratio being a measure of environmental quality.
I found that when there is little temporal variability (measured by the walk distance
in the random walk, see Figure 5.21) there is more of a spread in the final mean mo-
bility strategies of the simulations, including low mobility strategies. When the amount
of temporal variability increased I saw less of these low final mean mobility strategy
simulations. Hence, my analysis shows that variability of the environment over time is
unfavourable for reduced mobility.
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For structured spatial variability I found that there were fewer simulations with
either a high or low final mean mobility strategy, and more with a value in between.
I also found that the strategies in the population became spatial structured. Hence,
rather than simulations either having a majority of agents with high mobility strategies
or having low strategies, when there is spatial variability highly mobile and less mobile
agents cohabit the region. In comparison, the simulations in the unstructured spatial
variability run have higher final mean mobility strategies, even though these have the
same sites (just in a random order). Hence, it seems that spatial variability gives mixed
final strategies in the population, and if the variability is structured there can be more
agents with lower mobility strategies. This could be explained by Kelly’s domino effect
to switching to sedentism (2013, p. 107) (mentioned in Section 1.4). In this, if clusters
of sites are occupied by lots of less mobile agents, then the mobile agents near these sites
have less options of sites to go to and are therefore at a disadvantage. And so, there may
be some selection pressure for the surrounding sites to be occupied by less mobile agents.
When the spatial variability is unstructured, there will be more movement options, since
mobile agents only need to avoid single sites isolated around the region, rather than a
whole corner of the region.
5.6.3 Events Over Time and Their Order
In Section 5.5 I specifically looked at the processes involved in the evolution of simula-
tions with high mobility strategies to State B outcomes. I showed that simulations have
four main stages in their changes over time. The first is a settling-in period of around 20
iterations where the mean foraging quality, which is initially random, is recalibrated to
a value predominately determined by the values of r and λ. This change is accompanied
in general by a small decrease and then an increase in both the number of agents and the
mean fitness. The values are then steady for a period of time after this (approximately
for an additional 100 iterations), and then in the simulations with high values for r/λ
the number of agents start to increase, and the mean mobility strategy and mean fitness
start to decrease. The values then become steady again.
Of the approximately 25% of simulations which had a final mean mobility strategy
of < 0.5 I found that it is almost always the mean mobility strategy which starts to
decrease significantly before increases in the numbers of agents and reduction in fitness
occur. Therefore, there is perhaps a case that lower mobility causes the number of agents
to increase and the fitness to decrease. This could be explained by lower mobility (or
the conditions which lead to lower mobility) meaning that more agents can survive with
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low fitness – and thus the average is lowered. In comparison to areas of high mobility,
agents may have less of a buffer against bad conditions and thus only those with the
highest fitnesses can survive.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the behaviours, outcomes and parameter sensitivities of
the Forager Model. I have seen the interdependencies of parameter values which cause
certain outcomes, and how simulation outcomes are clustered into two main groupings.
I have also seen how variability affects the results, and how the model changes over time.
In Section 5.3 I showed how simulations generally fall into two categories; one with
high mean mobility strategies, high mean fitness, low numbers of agents and low mean
foraging qualities; and one with low mean mobility strategies, low mean fitness, high
numbers of agents and high mean foraging qualities. I showed how certain parameter
values can influence which of these outcomes types the simulations fall in to.
I found that the effects of mutation are insignificant in the model’s behaviour over
time. I also found that higher values for the maximum number of agents at a site and the
initial population density promoted reduced mobility. I hypothesised that these values
promote larger numbers of agents, meaning that the probability of moving to a relatively
undepleted site is low, and hence there is little point to being highly mobile and paying
the cost of mobility. I found that the values for the upper probability of fission are
higher in the highly mobile simulations, but in the reduced mobility simulations the
values cover a larger range of values. Since lower mobility simulations also have lower
fitnesses, I hypothesised that the evolution of low mean mobilities is facilitated more by
the death of mobile agents, rather than the fissioning of less mobile agents. I also found
that the ratio between the growth and depletion rates is a large factor in which outcome
type a simulation has, where for reduced mobility to occur the growth rate should be
high and the depletion rate should be small.
In Section 5.4 I showed how temporal variability of the environment was unfavourable
for reduced mobility. Spatial variability on the other hand, did not discourage reduced
mobility, but rather allowed a region to be cohabited by both highly mobile and less
mobile agents. I also found that structured spatial variability allowed for more reduced
mobility than non-structured spatial variability.
Finally in Section 5.5 I showed how when there is reduced mobility over time, it is
often the reduction in mobility which occurs first, and then the increase in the number
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of agents and the decrease in the mean fitness.
My model has replicated the known relationships between reduced mobility and high
population density, between reduced mobility and higher environmental quality, and
between reduced mobility and reduced fitness, seen in hunter-gatherer groups (Kelly,
2013). And although I cannot provide an intuitive explanation for all of the model
behaviours, this chapter provides a thorough exploration of the model – a useful basis for
the results of the next chapter where the ability for agents to have different subsistence
strategies is added.
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6Mobility and Subsistence Strategy
Changes in a Mixed Population
Summary
The model described in Chapter 4 looked at the movement of foragers around a region,
where environmental conditions were varied. I found that high mobility was linked
with low population size and high fitness, whereas reduced mobility was associated with
high population sizes and low fitness. In Section 1.1 I discussed how the switch from a
foraging to a farming subsistence strategy was linked with reduced mobility, increased
population size and environmental changes. Thus, in this chapter I will expand on the
Forager Model by allowing agents to have different subsistence strategies.
In the first section of this chapter I will discuss all the changes made to the model
to incorporate subsistence strategies. These changes include a new agent strategy and
a new site quality measure.
Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 of this chapter contain both the methods and results of
various experiments in running the model. In Section 6.2 I use the FIO method to
look at the types of outcomes and the relationships between parameters and outcomes
when running the model when all parameters are varied, and also when just the four
environmental parameters are varied. The results from this analysis show that the
model replicates the relationship between increased population size, sedentism and low
fitness in farming populations. I find that sedentary farming occurs in good foraging
and farming environments, sedentary foraging occurs in the best foraging but worst
farming environments, mobile farming occurs in the worst foraging but best farming
conditions, and mobile foraging occurs in bad foraging and farming conditions. Strategy
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conservatism makes little difference to the evolution of various strategies, and mutation
rate should not be extremely low, but otherwise its value does not have an effect. For
the evolution of sedentary farming there should be the potential for high numbers of
farmers.
After this, in Section 6.3 I investigate the effect of temporal and spatial environmental
variability, and show that these discourage the evolution of sedentary farming, although
it can still occur. In Section 6.4 I looked at how the simulations change over time, and
find that sedentary farming evolves via either mobile foragers becoming sedentary first
or becoming farmers first; farming and sedentism do not occur at the same time. The
results from these three sections are discussed in Section 6.5.
6.1 The Forager-Farmer Model
Allowing the ability for agents to farm introduces major changes to the model. These
include adding a new agent strategy – the effort strategy, e; a new site quality – the
quality of farming, qa; and various changes to the site quality and agent fitness equations.
In this section I will discuss the changes made to the model described in Chapter 4.
All the model constants, variables and parameters are summarised in Table 6.2 and an
overview of the model is given in the flow diagram on page 201.
6.1.1 Effort Strategy
Agents will now have an ‘effort’ strategy, e, which is how their effort (which can be
thought of as labour and or time) is divided between farming and foraging when procur-
ing subsistence. This is similar as in the models of Baker (2008) and Dow et al. (2009),
discussed in Section 2.3. In contrast to the model of Bowles and Choi (2013) the sub-
sistence strategies of agents are continuous. Thus, an agent may have an effort strategy
of 0.3, which would mean 30% of its subsistence effort is spent foraging and 70% is
spent farming. In a model with only foragers (as in the Forager Model) all agents would
therefore have e = 1.
This strategy can change over time with the same mechanisms as the mobility strat-
egy. Namely, when an agent fissions it passes on its effort (and mobility and null)
strategy to the new family. Also, with a probability of µ the agent will mutate its effort
(and mobility and null) strategy. If this happens the mutated strategy value will be
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picked from the Binomial distribution
B(n∗, p∗) = B(κef, e0) (6.1)
and then divided by κef , where e0 is the agent’s original effort strategy value, f is the
agent’s fitness, and κe is the degree of effort strategy conservatism (equivalent to κm).
As with the mobility strategy, the effort strategy needs to be not equal to 0 or 1, hence
I take e ∈ [ 0.01, 0.99] .
6.1.2 Foraging and Farming Fitness Effects
In the right environment, farming can support more people than foraging can (as seen in
evidence of the NDT, Bocquet-Appel, 2011b). I include this in my model by assuming
that the fitness possible from the best foraging quality is less than or equal to that for
the best farming quality. Thus farmers have the potential to fission more than foragers
since their fitnesses can be higher. I introduce the parameter, φ, to scale the quality of
farming with relation to foraging.
In the previous model, where agent fitness is qf/n, only one forager (e = 1) can have
maximum fitness (f = 1) when qf = 1. When farming is added to the model I assume
that ≤ φ farmers (e = 0) can have maximum fitness when qa = 1. Hence, φ times more
farmers can be supported than foragers.
Using the data from Bocquet-Appel (2011b) I showed in Section 2.5.2 that a maxi-
mum of around 4.2 times more people could be supported after farming began in com-
parison to before farming began. Since this needs to be an integer value, I will take
φ = 5 as an estimated default value.
6.1.3 Agent Yield and Fitness
Since the fitness of agents can now be influenced by both farming and foraging, I include
the concept of ‘yield’ to distinguish between these contributions. The fitness of the agent
is simply the sum of the yields from both of these activities, Yf + Ya, where Yf is the
foraging yield and Ya is the farming yield.
In the Forager Model the fitness of an agent at a particular site was simply the
foraging quality divided by the number of agents at the site. Since the occupants of a
site may now all have different strategies, I want an agent’s share of the foraging and
farming qualities of the site to be scaled by its effort strategy. Hence, the qualities of
the site are shared between the agents living at the site proportionally to every agent’s
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effort strategies – this is illustrated in Figure 6.1. For example an agent with e = 0.3
will take less of a share of the foraging quality, but a higher share of the farming quality,
than an agent with e = 0.9.
The foraging and farming yields for an agent with an effort strategy of ek are
Yf =

ek∑n
i=1 ei
qf , if
∑n
i=1 ei > 1
ekqf , otherwise
(6.2)
and
Ya =

(1−ek)∑n
i=1(1−ei)qaφ, if
∑n
i=1(1− ei) > φ
(1− ek)qa, otherwise
(6.3)
where
∑n
i=1 ei is the sum of all the effort strategies of the n agents occupying this site.
Note that these equations are consistent with the previous model. In this every agent
was a forager (i.e. all the effort strategies would be 1), and hence
∑n
i=1 ei = n at every
occupied site. Thus the foraging yield would be
Yf =

qf
n , if n > 1
qf , if n ≤ 1.
(6.4)
At an occupied site n ≥ 1 holds, thus for both cases we have it that Yf = qf/n.
Since there is no farming in the previous model the farming yield is 0, and hence agent
fitness is indeed qf/n.
e = 0.9
e = 0.7
e = 0.4
e = 0.3
e = 0.4
e = 0.2
e = 0.1
e = 0.1
Figure 6.1: Examples of foraging yield. How the foraging quality, qf = 1, is shared
between four agents with different effort strategies. On the left
∑
e > 1 and on the right∑
e < 1.
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6.1.4 Site Quality
Farming requires land clearance, and therefore will impact on the natural resources of
an environment. Therefore in my model the quality of foraging will be impacted by the
amount of farming, and thus Equation 4.1 becomes
qf,t+1 = qf,t + rqf,t(1− qf,t
1
)− λ(1− 1
n+ 1
)
∑
Yf − β
∑
Ya, (6.5)
where β (the farming interference parameter) scales the negative impact from the amount
of farming. Note that this is the same as the equation for qf (Equation 4.1) in the
previous model, since when there are only foragers
∑
Yf = qf and
∑
Ya = 0.
The quality of farming grows logistically with a growth rate equal to the amount of
farming at the site. I also assume farmed crops require maintenance, and if neglected
the crops will eventually die. Thus, there is also a natural exponential decay term which
is uninfluenced by the number or type of agents at the site. Therefore I have
qa,t+1 = qa,t +
∑
Yaqa,t(1− qa,t
1
)− δqa,t, (6.6)
where δ is the farming decay rate. Hence, if there is no farming at the site the growth
rate is zero,
∑
Ya = 0, and the site will eventually decay to qa = qa,min.
As in the previous model qa ∈ [ qa,min, 1] where qa,min > 0. I will make the as-
sumption that the minimum values for the foraging and farming qualities are the same
(qa,min = qf,min).
6.1.5 The Maximum Number of Agents at a Site
In the previous model I had a parameter which defined the maximum number of agents
that could survive at a site, nmax. This informed the fitness threshold for the death of
an agent (fmin = 1/nmax), the carrying capacity of the system (Nmax = nmaxsxsy), and
the initial population size (Ninit = ρinitNmax).
In this model nmax is the maximum number of foragers which can be supported at
a site. φ more farmers can be supported than foragers, so the maximum number of
farmers which can be supported at a site is
na,max = nmaxφ. (6.7)
Since farming can support more agents than foragers, the maximum number of any
agents that can survive at a site is also nmaxφ. Hence the carrying capacity of the whole
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region is Nmax = sxsynmaxφ, and the initial population size is ρinitsxsynmax.
In a foraging only region with n foragers (
∑
e = n), the maximum number of foragers
can occur when qf is at its maximum and fitness is at its lowest, thus from Equation 6.2
the minimum fitness for this scenario will be
fmin = Yf = 1/nmax. (6.8)
For a farming only region with n farmers (
∑
(1 − e) = n) the maximum number of
farmers (where by definition n ≥ φ) will be when qa is at its maximum and fitness is at
its lowest. From Equation 6.3 the minimum fitness for this scenario will be
fmin = Ya = φ/na,max. (6.9)
Substituting Equation 6.7 into Equation 6.9 I find
fmin = φ/nmaxφ, (6.10)
and thus in either case I have
fmin =
1
nmax
. (6.11)
6.1.6 Initialisation
In the analysis of the Forager Model in Chapter 5, I considered the circumstances leading
to the evolution of both high and low mobility in foragers. Thus, I began simulations
with a random mobility strategy between 0.01 and 0.99. In this model however, I am
specifically looking for the circumstances and pathways which lead to the evolution of
farming from foraging, i.e. the transition to agriculture. Thus, I start all simulations
with mobility and effort strategies of 0.99 – reflecting the Pleistocene state of mobile
foragers. To introduce some variability there is one seed agent in the initial population
which has an effort and mobility strategy of 0.8, this means that farming and reduced
mobility have a chance to develop. Thus the initial mean strategies are high – which is
especially the case when the initial density is high.
With these exceptions, the initial conditions are the same as for the Forager Model,
i.e. initial agents occupy randomly chosen sites and have a fitness randomly selected
between fmin to 1. The sites in the region have randomly chosen initial foraging qualities
between qf,min and 1, and initial farming qualities between qa,min and 1. As before, the
initial number of agents is ρinitnmaxsxsy, where ρinit is the initial population density.
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Thus ρinit is a proportion of the maximum possible foragers, rather than maximum
possible farmers.
6.1.7 Running the Model
Using the model described in this section I perform 5 experiments, these are summarised
in Table 6.1. I perform some preliminary checks on the model to justify keeping the
number of sites at 100, and the number of iterations at 1000. I describe and discuss
these tests in Appendix K, and details of the coding of this model are given in Appendix
C.
From some additional testing of the model I observed that for the evolution of farming
to occur the farming decay rate, δ, needs to be small. Thus, I will only use low values
for δ to make sure I have enough simulations to understand how farming can evolve.
As in the Forager Model, I only analyse the simulations in which ≥ 15 agents were
alive in the final iteration.
Table 6.1: A brief description of experiments using the subsistence strategy model.
The table numbers refer to tables in Appendix M where all the details can be found.
Experiment
number
Description Table
1 Varying all 12 parameters M4
2 Varying 4 parameters M5
3 Looking at temporal variability M6
4 Looking at spatial variability M7
5 Simulations over time M8
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Table 6.2: Constants, variables and parameters in the model. Default values and
whether they are found from data (D), predicted from the Forager Model (P), or assumed
(A), are also given. Details about the data used are given in Table 2.4.
Constants Range Default
value
sx Number of sites in x axis - -
sy Number of sites in y axis - -
dmax Maximum distance of the region Distance between
bottom left and top
right site
-
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1 (P)
qa,min Minimum farming quality = qf,min -
na,max Maximum number of farmers which
can be supported at a site
φnmax -
Nmax Maximum number of families possi-
ble in the region
nmaxφsxsy -
Ninit Total number of agents initially ρinitnmaxsxsy -
fmin Death fitness 1/nmax -
Variables Range Default
value
qf Site foraging quality [ qf,min, 1] -
qa Site farming quality [ qa,min, 1] -
m Agent mobility strategy [ 0.01, 0.99] -
e Agent effort strategy [ 0.01, 0.99] -
f Agent fitness [ fmin, 1] -
p Probability of fission [ 0, pmax] -
da,b Distance between site a and b [ 0, dmax] -
f∗ Potential fitness at a site (0, 1] -
A Attractiveness of a site [ 0, 1] -
n Number of agents at a site [ 0, Nmax] -
Parameters Range Default
value
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1] -
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1] -
φ How many times more farmers can
be supported than foragers
≥ 1 5 (D)
β Farming interference parameter [ 0, 1] -
δ Farming decay rate [ 0, 1] -
κm Mobility strategy conservatism - 100 (P)
κe Effort strategy conservatism - = κm (A)
pmax Maximum probability of fission [ 0, 1] 0.14 (D)
η Fitness cost of movement per site [ 0, 1] 0.05 (P)
nmax Maximum number of foragers which
can be supported at a site
≥ 1 6 (D)
µ Probability of mutation [ 0, 1] 0.04 (A)
ρinit Initial population density (0, 1] 0.1 (P)
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Foraging quality and fitness
1. Calculate foraging and farm-
ing yields, Yf and Ya
2. Calculate family fitness, f =
Yf + Ya
3. Calculate site foraging and
farming qualities, qf and qa
If the site is unoccupied
then only the site qualities
are calculated and n = 0.
Initialisation
1. Initial Ninit agents assigned to live
at a random site
2. Agent fitness ∈ [ fmin, 1]
3. Agent mobility strategy = 0.99
4. Agent effort strategy = 0.99
5. Site foraging qualities ∈ [ qf,min, 1]
6. Site farming qualities ∈ [ qa,min, 1]
7. One seed agent has both strategies
at 0.8
Death A family dies if f < fmin
Fissioning
1. With a probability of p = pmax −
pmax
log(fmin)
∗ log(f) a family fissions
2. The new agent lives at its parent’s
site and has a fitness ∈ [ fmin, 1]
3. The new agent’s mobility and ef-
fort strategies are the same as its
parent’s
Mutation
1. With a probability of µ a family
mutates its mobility and effort
strategies
2. The new mobility strategy is calcu-
lated by picking a value from the
Binomial distribution: B(κmf,m0)
and then dividing by κmf
3. The new effort strategy is calculated
by picking a value from the Bino-
mial distribution: B(κef, e0) and
then dividing by κef
Movement
1. Each agent moves site with a proba-
bility of its mobility strategy
2. The site it moves to (includes its
original site) is chosen weighted by
their attractiveness (a function of
distance and potential fitness)
3. A cost of movement is incurred, f =
f − η × distance moved
Death A family dies if f < fmin
Repeat
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6.2 Parameters Sensitivity and Simulation Outcomes
To separate simulations by type of outcomes I use both the Outcome Clustering method
(as described in Section 2.4.4) and the FIO method. In the Forager Model I had four
model outcomes to predict simulation cluster (final number of agents, final mean mobility
strategy, final mean fitness and final mean foraging quality). In this analysis I have two
additional outcomes – the final mean effort strategy and the final mean farming quality. I
use the FIO method to specifically find the circumstances under which certain strategies
develop (including sedentary farming).
In this section I will present the methods and results of the experiment in which I
vary all 12 parameters, and the experiment where I fix certain parameter values and
only vary four parameters.
6.2.1 The Effect of All 12 Parameters – Experiment 1
I ran the model 10,000 times whilst varying all 12 of the parameters (see Table M4 in
the Appendix for the full details of this run). Out of these simulations 6390 had ≥ 15
agents alive in the final iteration.
The frequencies for each of the outcomes are shown in Figure 6.2, and the relation-
ship between final mean effort and mobility strategies are shown in Figure 6.3. I give the
correlation coefficients between all parameters and outcomes in Table 6.3. I find that
most simulations either have high effort and mobility strategies, or low effort and mo-
bility strategies, and those that fall outside of these extremes lie somewhere in between
(the correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.864). Apart from the null strategy, most outcomes
are highly correlated.
There are several strong correlations between the parameters and outcomes; for
example the maximum number of agents (nmax) and fitness (f), ρ = −0.665; and the
farming decay rate (δ) and the farming quality (qa), ρ = −0.525. These could be
explained by direct effects, such as large populations meaning the site qualities have to
be shared between more people, and thus reducing fitness. Of the four parameters which
directly effect the foraging and farming qualities (r, λ, β and δ), it is only δ which has
any strong linear correlations with outcomes.
The results presented in the rest of this chapter often use colour coding to represent
both the final mean mobility and final mean effort strategies of the simulations. This
colour coding can be seen in Figure 6.4. Unless otherwise stated, please refer to this
figure for colour coding.
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Figure 6.2: Histograms of the outcomes of simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the
final iteration, when varying all the parameters.
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Figure 6.3: Final mean effort strategy by final mean mobility strategy for all simula-
tions with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration, when varying all the parameters. 2%
(128) of the simulations from each of the extreme strategies are coloured according to
the key.
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6.2. PARAMETERS SENSITIVITY AND SIMULATION OUTCOMES
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Figure 6.4: Colour coding used to represent final mean strategies.
Extreme Strategies
I used the Outcome Clustering method described in Section 2.4.4 to find clusters of
simulations using the six outcomes (final number of agents, mean effort and mobility
strategies, mean fitness, foraging quality and farming quality). This analysis revealed a
cluster with high numbers of agents, low final mean effort and mobility strategies, low
final mean fitness, low final mean foraging quality, and high final mean farming qualities.
However, the algorithm did not highlight a cluster with the opposite qualities, and thus
I could not make predictions about how mobile foraging could remain the dominant
strategy. More results from this analysis are discussed in Appendix L.
Alternatively to the clustering approach, I used the FIO method to separate simu-
lation types. Although my key question concerns the evolution of sedentary farming, I
look at four types of idealised outcomes in this analysis:
1. MF simulations – high mobility and high effort strategies (mobile foragers)
2. MA simulations – high mobility and low effort strategies (mobile agriculturalists1)
3. SF simulations – low mobility and high effort strategies (sedentary foragers)
4. SA simulations – low mobility and low effort strategies (sedentary agriculturalists)
1 I interchange the word ‘farmer’ with ‘agriculturalist’ for the purpose of making the acronym distinct
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I took the most extreme (‘top’) 2% (128) of simulations from each of these four
simulation types and compared their outcome and parameter values. When I refer to
the ‘SA set’ I specifically mean the 2% of simulations with the lowest of these values
(measured by Euclidean distance from strategies of 0.99).
I show the relative frequencies for the outcomes and parameters of these sets in
Figure 6.5. A clear distinction in the outcomes of these sets is that when there is a high
mean effort strategy (mostly foraging) the final mean foraging quality is high and the
final mean farming quality is low, and when there is a low mean effort strategy (mostly
farming) the final mean foraging quality is low and the final mean farming quality is
high.
Parameter distributions can be different for the simulation sets – this is shown in
Figure 6.5b. Some parameters strongly influence the outcomes (e.g. the foraging deple-
tion rate, λ, is very low in SF simulations; the farming decay rate, δ, is very low in low
effort simulations; and the mutation rate, µ, is very low in MF simulations), and others
do not make much difference (e.g. the conservatism parameters, κm and κe; and the
farming interference parameter β).
The fact that the mutation rate, µ, is low in MF simulations suggests that perhaps
one of the main reasons these are MF simulations is that they were not able to mutate
much from the initial state (where every agent is a mobile forager). Thus, it is worth
remembering these MF simulations may have not evolved to optimal strategies, but
rather not changed at all. I fix µ in the next section and thus these effects are eradicated.
I examined the relationships between each pair of outcomes for all of the simulations,
this can be seen in Figure 6.6. I find that the largest numbers of agents co-occur with low
strategies, fitness and foraging quality, but high farming quality. Foragers tend to have
higher fitnesses than farmers, and highly mobile agents tend to have higher fitnesses
than sedentary agents. Also I find that farming and foraging quality are negatively
correlated.
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(a) Outcomes in different extremes.
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(b) Parameters in different extremes. Grey dashed lines show default values.
Figure 6.5: The outcomes (a) and parameters (b) in the top 2% (128) of each of the
extreme simulation types, using all the 6390 simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the
final iteration when all parameters are varied. Grey dashed lines show default parameter
values (if given).
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Figure 6.6: Outcome pairs in all simulations, using all the 6390 simulations with ≥ 15
agents alive in the final iteration when all parameters are varied. Points from the top
2% (128) of each of the extreme simulation types are slightly larger. Coloured by the
final mean strategies for the simulation (see Figure 6.4).
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6.2.2 Fixing Parameters – Experiment 2
I decided to normalise the effects from population size, mutation of strategies and move-
ment costs, in order to see the influences of the environmental parameters more clearly.
Thus in Experiment 2 I fixed the parameters, φ, κm, κe, pmax, η, nmax, µ, and ρinit
to their default values of 5, 100, 100, 0.14, 0.05, 6, 0.04 and 0.1 respectively. I varied
r, λ, β and δ randomly in 100,000 simulations (Table M5 in the Appendix gives exact
inputs for this experiment). Of these simulations 98,927 had ≥ 15 agents alive in the
final iteration.
The outcome frequencies for these simulations are shown in Figure 6.7, and the
relationship between the effort and mobility strategies are shown in Figure 6.8. The
correlation coefficients between the parameters and outcomes in these simulations are
given in Table 6.4.
I find that fixing the parameters to these values mean that more of the simulations
have mean strategies in the extremes, i.e. there are less simulations with mid values
for their final mean strategy values. I also find that the final mean strategies are less
strongly linearly correlated. In particular I find many more simulations in the SF set,
which may be explained by setting pmax = 0.14 or nmax = 6 (since I showed these
values were common in SF simulations from Figure 6.5b). Again, I find that many of
the outcomes are highly correlated.
Since the mutation rate is relatively low I find that the mean null strategy is often
higher in this experiment compared to Experiment 1, where the mean null strategy was
more frequently at a mid value. This result is reassuring as it means that when the effort
or mobility strategies are low or at a mid value, it is a product of selection rather than
drift. It could also explain the large number of simulations with mid strategy values in
Experiment 1 – these may have occurred by drift.
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Figure 6.7: Output histograms of all simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final
iteration, when 4 parameters are varied.
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Figure 6.8: Final mean effort strategy by final mean mobility strategy for all simula-
tions with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration, when 4 parameters are varied. 0.2%
(198) of the simulations from each of the extreme strategies are coloured according to
the key.
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I looked at the relationships between pairs of simulation outcomes in Figure 6.9.
Many of these relationships are generally the same as when I varied all 12 of the pa-
rameters, but also reveal intricacies unseen before. It can also be seen that when the
effort strategy is high (i.e. only looking at the yellow to light blue points) the plots are
comparable to Figure 5.16b from the Forager Model.
Generally these plots show a continuum of properties between SF and SA simulations
(light blue to dark blue), and another continuum between MA to SA simulations (red
to dark blue). The biggest difference between these two is that MA to SA simulations
have higher numbers of agents. There is also quite a strong cluster of SF simulations
(yellow).
In Figure 6.10 I plot the relationships between pairs of parameters and colour by
the final mean strategy values. It can be seen that the relationship between r and λ is
similar to as in the Forager Model (see Figure 5.18) – the least mobile simulations have
the highest r and λ ratio (i.e. the growth rate is higher than the depletion rate). I also
find that β makes little difference to the end strategies, and SA simulations have the
lowest values of δ.
In Figure 6.11 I plotted the relationships between parameter values and the Euclidean
distance between the beginning strategies (taken as 0.99 for both) and the final strategies.
This plot further highlights the effect of high r and low λ causing the most changes in
strategy value, and the biggest changes (SA simulations) have the lowest values for δ.
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Figure 6.9: Pairwise relationships between all outcomes using all simulations with ≥ 15
agents alive in the final iteration, when 4 parameters are varied. Coloured by the final
mean strategies for the simulation (see Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.10: Pairwise relationships between all parameters using all simulations with
≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration, when 4 parameters are varied. Coloured by the
final mean strategies for the simulation (see Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.11: Relationships between parameters and the Euclidean distances from the
starting effort and mobility strategies and the final mean values in all simulations with
≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration. Coloured by the final mean strategies for the
simulation (see Figure 6.4).
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Extreme Strategies
The clustering analysis for this experiment managed to pick out high and low effort
strategies, but as in Experiment 1, was not so successful in picking out high and low
mobility strategies. Because of this I will focus my discussion on the results from using
the FIO approach, where my four idealised outcomes are the simulations with the most
extreme strategies – highly mobile foragers, highly mobile farmers, highly sedentary
foragers and highly sedentary farmers.
I look at the top 0.2% of simulations (198 simulations) from each of the four extreme
strategies. Figures 6.12a and 6.12b show the relative densities of outcomes and parameter
values respectively for each of these.
The lowest values for the farming decay rate, δ, are seen in the farming extremes –
the MA and SA sets. And the lowest values for the foraging depletion rate, λ, are seen
in the SF set. By looking at the pairwise relationships between parameters in these sets,
in Figure 6.13, I can see that although the SA set has slightly higher values for r and
slightly lower values for λ than in the MA set, the relationships are very similar. Thus,
farming evolves in the best environments for farming and sedentism evolves in the best
environments for foraging. I also find that low numbers of agents are found when there
is more foraging, and high number are found when there is more farming. Additionally,
when there is high mobility then these numbers are even lower.
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Figure 6.12: The outcomes (a) and parameters (b) in the top 0.2% (198) of each of
the extreme simulation types, using all the 98,927 simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in
the final iteration when four parameters are varied.
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Figure 6.13: Parameter pairs in the top 0.2% (198) of each of the extreme simulation
types, using all the 98,927 simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration when
four parameters are varied.
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6.3 Temporal and Spatial Variability
In this section I investigate the effects from temporal and spatial environmental vari-
ability on the outcomes of my model.
6.3.1 Temporal Variability – Experiment 3
I ran the model 10,000 times over 1000 iterations, this left 9899 simulations with ≥ 15
agents alive in the final iteration. Other details of this run of the model are given in
Table M6. In this model I implemented temporal variation slightly differently to in the
Forager Model. As before I picked new parameter values randomly in [ previous value−
WD, previous value + WD] , where WD is the random walk distance. I varied all the
environmental conditions, r, λ, β and δ like this. Rather than allowing there to be
a run in time where there was no variation in the environmental conditions, I set it
so variability began in the first iteration. Also, rather than the binary ‘variation’ or
‘no variation’ and setting the walk distance to 0.1, I varied the walk distance every
simulation between 0 and 1. In this way I was able to investigate the different extremes
of variation – since if WD = 0 there is no variation, and if WD = 1 there is a lot of
variation from iteration to iteration. The results from this can be seen in Figure 6.14.
I found that little temporal variation means that there are more SA and SF simula-
tions. This is strongest for the SF simulations, where there are none of these simulations
when there is a high amount of temporal variation. In this experiment there were not any
MA simulations, so perhaps temporal variation also negatively impacts the emergence
of these too. Thus, temporal variation disrupts the evolution of sedentary foraging, and
to a lesser extent, sedentary farming.
6.3.2 Spatial Variability – Experiment 4
Including spatial variability in this model is slightly different than in the Forager Model
since in the Forager-Farmer Model there are more environmental variables to vary. In the
previous sections I found that β had limited effect on the outcomes, so I only considered
r, λ and δ when looking at spatial variability. To look at each pair of these required
three runs of the model – varying r and λ, varying r and δ, and varying λ and δ –
these are the ‘structured spatial variability’ simulations. I varied β between 0 and 1
every time. I also ran the model with ‘non-structured spatial variability’ (each site has
randomly chosen values for r, λ and δ) and ‘no variability’ (the usual type of run where
every simulation has the same randomly chosen parameter values for every site), these
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Figure 6.14: Simulation outcomes when varying the walk distance (WD) in the ran-
dom walk. Using all simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration, when 4
parameters are varied. Coloured by the final mean strategies for the simulation (see
Figure 6.4).
are illustrated in Figure 6.15 and all details of the experiment are given in Table M7.
Each of these five model conditions were run 10,000 times over 1000 iterations.
I found that no spatial variability led to the highest percentage (10.3%) of low strat-
egy simulations (which I define here as having both final mean strategies < 0.5), r and
λ spatially structured variability had 6.5% low strategy simulations, r and δ spatially
structured had 4.5%, non-structured simulations had 2.1%, and lastly λ and δ spatially
structured had 1.7%.
In Figure 6.16 I plotted the final mean strategies for each of these five simulation
types. I found that non-structured spatial variability gives simulations in a continuum
between being a mobile forager and a sedentary farmer, and there are little to no MA
or SF simulations. SF simulations do not occur very often when there is structured
spatial variability in λ; and SA and MA simulations do not occur as often when there
is variability in δ.
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0 15000 30000Number of agents
0 0.5 1Mobility strategy
0 0.5 1Effort strategy
0 15000 30000Number of agents
0 0.5 1Mobility strategy
0 0.5 1Effort strategy
0 15000 30000Number of agents
r
		
		
1	
0	
λ 			
0	 1	 r
		
		
1	
0	
δ	
0	 1	 λ
		
		
1	
0	
δ	
0	 1	
Figure 6.15: Values for r, λ and δ at each site in the structured (first, second and third
grids), non-structured (fourth grid) spatial variability, and no variability (last grid, where
each simulation will have a different value) runs of the model. For the non-structured
and no variability runs of the model these values are picked randomly for each each
simulation.
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Figure 6.16: The final mean effort and mobility strategies in each of the three struc-
tured spatial variability (where r and λ change, where r and δ change, and where λ
and δ change), the non-structured spatial variability and the non-variability runs of the
model. Each point represents a simulation.
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6.4 Model Events Over Time
So far I have investigated the parameter values in four types of simulation; MF, SF, MA
and SA simulations. In this section I will investigate the processes which lead to these
simulation outcomes.
6.4.1 Dynamics Over Time – Experiment 5
I ran the model 1000 times over 1000 iterations and looked at how outcomes change over
time (rather than focusing on the final iteration). Details of this experiment are given
in Table M8. Figure 6.17 shows the mean outcomes of 1000 simulations over time for
all 1000 iterations and for just the first 20 iterations. There is a short settling in period
where the number of agents decreases slightly, the fitness increases and site qualities
also change. After this there are big changes in the simulations that become sedentary
farmers – these increase in numbers, and decrease in effort and mobility strategies,
fitness, and foraging quality. There is then a second increase in the number of agents.
The farming quality for these decreases and then increases.
SA simulations have two levels in their number of agents, and the SF simulations
never have as high population numbers as the first plateau of the SA simulations. The
MF to SF simulations (yellow to light blue) follow similar patterns as those of the Forager
Model (Figure 5.24). I estimate the SF simulations get to as many as around 300 agents,
and SA simulations have plateaus of around 800 agents and 2500 agents.
I looked at how the mean mobility and effort strategies changed over time for all of
the simulations. This is shown in Figure 6.18a where I plot the mean strategies every 100
iterations, and in Figure 6.18b where the mean strategies for every iteration are plotted.
By finding the mean ratio of the strategies over all iterations for each simulation, I can
find how many usually have higher effort strategies than mobilities and vice versa. Figure
6.19a shows the average ratio over time for each simulation. There were a majority (722
to 278) of simulations which had a mean ratio of less than 1, which suggests for most of
the time their effort strategy was higher than their mobility strategy. However, when I
only looked at low strategy simulations (defined here by both the final mobility strategy
and the final effort strategy being < 0.5) the number with a mean ratio of less than 1
was 50 whilst the number greater than 1 was 45. Figure 6.19b shows how it is only for
the MF simulations for which the mean ratio is around 1. Hence, when SA simulations
evolve they do so according to one of two pathways – becoming sedentary first and
then farmers, or farming first then sedentary. From Figure 6.18a I can see that the
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evolution of SA simulations via farming first generally happens before the evolution of
SA simulations via becoming sedentary first.
I also looked at the parameters which were in each of the simulations in Figures
6.19c and 6.20. From these the distinctions between the SA simulations which became
sedentary first and the SA simulations which became farmers first can be seen. The
main difference is that when farming occurs first it is when the value for δ is particularly
low. Also when SA simulations evolve by becoming sedentary first they tend to have
lower λ values and higher r values than those that remain sedentary foragers.
In Figure 6.21 I looked at the number of agents over time in both the SA simulations,
where the mean mobility to effort ratio is less than 1, and when it is greater than 1. This
plot shows that when farming occurs before sedentism (when the ratio is greater than 1)
there are two steps to the population size increase – once for when farming occurs, and
once for when sedentism occurs. When sedentism occurs before farming there is only
one population size increase.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.17: Outcomes at all 1000 iterations (a), and at the first 20 iterations (b), for
each of the 1000 simulations. Coloured by the final mean strategies for the simulation
(see Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.18: Pathways of evolution. Mean strategies for each simulation at various
iterations (a) and all the iterations (b). Points are coloured by the final mean strategies
for the simulation (see Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.19: The average mobility to effort strategy ratios over all iterations, for each
of the 1000 simulations. (a) A histogram of this ratio. (b) The relationship between the
Euclidean distance between start and end strategies and the ratio, coloured by the final
mean strategies for the simulation (see Figure 6.4). 722 simulations have an average
ratio of less than 1, and 278 have a ratio greater than 1. (c) The parameter densities
in the SA simulations (strategies < 0.5, 95 simulations) where the average mobility to
effort strategy ratio is < 1 (50 simulations) and > 1 (dashed, 45 simulations).
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Figure 6.20: The trajectories of strategy values for each simulation coloured by the
parameter values.
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Figure 6.21: The number of agents over time in the simulations with final mean
strategies are < 0.5, for both those when the average mobility to effort strategy ratio is
less than 1 (left, 50 simulations) and greater than 1 (right, 45 simulations)
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Table 6.5: The percentage of times different simulation outcome orders occurred. Given
for all 1000 simulations, only the 95 SA simulations (defined as when the final mean
mobility and effort are both ≤ 0.5), and only the 110 SF simulations (defined as when
the final mean mobility is ≤ 0.5 and final mean effort is > 0.5).
Order Percentage of all sim-
ulations
Percentage of SA
simulations
Percentage of SF
simulations
e¯ then N 89% 92% 85%
m¯ then N 92% 93% 91%
f¯ then N 45% 57% 40%
f¯ and N 25% 29% 26%
e¯ and m¯ 80% 78% 70%
e¯ then f¯ 53% 46% 62%
e¯ and f¯ 38% 49% 32%
6.4.2 Ordering Model Events
I applied the same algorithm as I did for the Forager Model (explained in Section 2.4.2)
to predict which order the model events occurred in. I found that in general the mean
strategies change at the same time, then the mean fitness changes and then (or at
the same time) the number of agents changes. The percentage of simulations found in
various orders are shown in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.22 gives a pair-wise comparison of
when outcome changes occurred.
The fact that this algorithm has picked out the effort and mobility strategy as chang-
ing at the same time may actually be an artefact of the low resolution (if anything
changes within 100 iterations of each other this algorithm can group them as occurring
at the same time). Thus the main message from this analysis is that despite the low
resolution, the number of agents and the fitness change after the mobility and effort
strategies do.
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Figure 6.22: Pairwise scatter plots of the number of iterations until there was a sig-
nificant change in four outcomes – number of agents, mean effort, mean mobility and
mean fitness. Using the data from all 1000 simulations. The dashed line shows where
these are equal.
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6.5 Discussion
By running the model many times with different parameter values I am able to assess
how environmental (and other) variables can affect the evolution of mobile foragers. I
can also find how certain outcomes of the model evolved over time and how they are
impacted by environmental variability.
6.5.1 Simulation Outcomes
When I varied all 12 parameters most of the simulations had either low final mean
strategies or high final mean strategies. When I fixed 8 of these parameters and only
varied 4, there was the additional frequent simulation type of low mobility and high
effort. This was because the default parameters chosen based on the data promoted
more low mobility and high effort simulations – which (with the exception of φ) can be
seen in Figure 6.5b.
If a simulation has low final mean strategies (SA simulations), it will also tend to have
the highest numbers of agents, the lowest fitness, low foraging quality and high farming
quality. Conversely, if a simulation has high final mean strategies (MF simulations), it
will have the lowest numbers of agents, the highest fitness, high foraging quality and
low farming quality. Compared to MF simulations, for the low mobility and high effort
simulations (SF), the number of agents is slightly higher, fitness is lower, and foraging
quality is higher.
The relationships between effort strategy and foraging and farming qualities are
intuitive. If there is a lot of foraging then there will be little farming, so qa will be low.
qf is high because the number of agents able to be supported at a site is low (since
too many agents would deplete the foraging resource and die due to low fitness). Hence
a natural carrying capacity is found in the model. Since foraging quality depletion
is greater if the agents are sedentary foragers (and thus there is less chance for site
regrowth), the SF set only occurs when the decay rate, λ, is particularly low. Farming
increases the farming quality, and it also has a negative impact on the foraging quality
(the farming interference aspect).
In this model it seems that sedentary farming is also associated with low mean fitness
and high numbers of agents. These two outcomes are dependent in that more agents
mean that resources need to be shared more widely, but also counter-intuitive since low
fitness means the probability of fissioning is lower.
As in Chapter 5, the exponentially decreasing relationship between mobility and
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population density (in Figures 6.6 and 6.9) replicates what is seen in Kelly’s (2013)
hunter-gatherer mobility data (see Section 2.5.1). Furthermore, the relationship be-
tween sedentary farmers, high population densities and decreased fitness also fits with
the archaeological record (namely the Neolithic demographic transition Bocquet-Appel
(2011a) and evidence for a health decline Lambert (2009) – see Section 1.1.3).
6.5.2 Parameter Sensitivity
Some of the parameters were significantly correlated with various outcomes of the model.
Many of these correlations were obvious, and others will have been because of indirect
effects. For example the farming decay rate, δ, was negatively correlated with the
farming quality (more decay, worse quality); the cost of movement, η, was negatively
correlated with the final mean mobility strategy (more movement cost, less movement);
the maximum number of foragers, nmax, was negatively correlated with fitness (more
agents, more people to share resources between).
I used the FIO method to look at parameter distributions in the four extreme strate-
gies (Figures 6.5b and 6.12b). This analysis allowed me to find which parameters were
insensitive to outcomes, and for those which were sensitive I could see their effect.
When varying 12 parameters in Experiment 1, the strategy conservatism parameters,
κm and κe, did not have much effect on the outcomes. I take this result as an indication
that when strategies evolve they do so via selection rather than random drift. Since all
agents start with high mobility and effort strategies it is necessary that some variation
is introduced into the population in order for low strategies to evolve – hence when the
mutation rate, µ, is very low the simulations do not change much from their initial state
(i.e. MF simulations). I disregard the result for the lowest effort and highest mobility
simulations from this discussion since they were actually very spread in the values for
their strategies.
The number of farmers which can be supported in the model (which is positively
affected by both φ and nmax) promotes low strategy (SA) simulations. However, I
also find that parameters which would increase the numbers of agents, pmax and ρinit
are relatively low in SA simulations. These findings might suggest that large numbers
of agents do not encourage sedentary farming, but rather the potential to have large
numbers is a prerequisite and an outcome of sedentary farming. This could be because
in the process of evolving from a mobile forager the first step (whether it be becoming
a farmer or becoming sedentary) discourages large numbers of agents.
Since all simulations started from having a high mobility value it makes sense that
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the value for η is quite low for all the simulation types – otherwise the agents may
have all died due to movement costs. The initial population density, ρinit, also tends to
be low in all the simulation types. This could be because high initial population sizes
could cause strains on the resources. It is also the case that since there is only one seed
agent, having a low initial density makes the impact of this one seed agent stronger.
Contradictory to this, the lowest initial densities are seen in the simulations with the
highest strategies.
When I varied only the four environmental parameters in Experiment 2 I found
stronger, but similar, correlations between parameters and outcomes. The relationship
between λ and the final mobility strategy was particularly strong. For the sedentary
farming (SA) simulations I find good environmental conditions – high foraging growth
rates, low foraging depletion and farming decay rates, and relatively low farming inter-
ference effects. For sedentary foraging (SF) simulations I find the best foraging environ-
mental conditions – high foraging growth rates and the lowest foraging depletion rates,
I also find that the farming interference effect is high and the farming decay rate is high.
These last two findings are unusual; since there is little to no farming it should not
matter what the farming decay rate or the farming interference effects are. My inter-
pretation of this result is that the SF simulations are simply the simulations which had
very good conditions for reduced mobility, but lacked the right conditions for farming to
occur. For high strategy (MF) simulations, the foraging environmental conditions are
quite poor, but there are also some farming decay effects (δ is never very small). For
these simulations agents can get by by moving often and keeping low numbers of agents,
but there is no drive to switch to farming.
High mobility and low effort strategy (MA) simulations have the worst conditions for
foraging – low foraging growth rates, high foraging depletion and high farming interfer-
ence effects – they also have the lowest farming decay rates. Hence, for these simulations
agents can grow food quickly via farming, and keep moving from site to site.
When the farming decay rate, δ, is low then farming will evolve in the model (seen
in Figures 6.5b and 6.12b). The other parameters differ in their distributions for MA
and SA simulations, suggesting that the values for these affect whether high or low
mobility evolves. It seems that the evolution of high mobility and farming (MA) will
be in response to the worst foraging conditions and the best farming conditions, and for
low mobility and farming (SA) to evolve the environmental conditions are good (but not
the best) for foraging and farming.
When farming does not evolve, the foraging growth rate (r) is not very low. For MF
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simulations the values for the farming interference parameter and the farming decay rate
are quite spread – which makes sense since if there is no farming these effects do not do
much. However, for the evolution of SF simulations there does seem to be an association
with high farming interference effects and high farming decay rates. It is also the case
that SF simulations have the lowest values for the foraging depletion rate (λ), but MF
simulations have higher values. Thus, for the evolution of MF simulations the foraging
conditions will not be very good for both the foraging and farming environments. For
the evolution of SF simulations foraging conditions are the best, and farming conditions
are the worst.
6.5.3 Variability
In Experiments 3 and 4 I looked at the effect of temporal and spatial environmental
variability on the emergence of different strategy values.
Even though temporal variation was random, and thus the environment had the po-
tential to be in various states, Figure 6.14 shows that the number of simulations with
low mobility (SA or SF) decreased when there was temporal variation (there are no MA
simulations in these runs of the model, so I will not comment on these.). This may be
because MF simulations can occur in a range of different environmental conditions (see
Figure 6.12b), but SA or SF simulations tend to need more particular environmental
conditions to evolve. Therefore, variation means that although these particular condi-
tions may be met more often (in the random walk), they may still change year on year.
It is also the case that SF simulations are only seen when the temporal variation is low
(WD is small). When temporal variation is higher SA simulations can still evolve, but
most are MF simulations. It may be the case that temporal variability means that it is
too risky for foragers to evolve reduced mobility (since foraging quality depends upon
3 parameters), but it is less risky for farmers to evolve reduced mobility (since farming
quality depends on one parameter and benefits from staying at one site).
When I introduced spatial variability (see Figure 6.16) I found different distributions
of final mean strategy values. When there was non-structured spatial variability (spatial
heterogeneity) there were no MA or SF simulations – perhaps suggesting that spatial
homogeneity (even if the environment is of a poor quality) seems to promote mobile
foragers becoming either sedentary or farmers, but not both at the same time. When
there is structured variability in λ I find less SF simulations. This might be because
there are not enough sites with low values of λ to promote SF simulations (in Figure
6.12b I showed that it was the lowest values for λ which gave rise to SF simulations).
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Similarly when there is structured variability in δ there are less SA and MA simulations
– perhaps because it is only the lowest values for δ which allow farming to evolve. Thus
structured and non-structured spatial variability can mean that there are not enough
sites with the ideal environmental conditions for certain strategies to evolve – there needs
to be the same environmental conditions everywhere for some of the extreme strategies
to evolve.
6.5.4 Events Over Time
In Experiment 5 I looked at how simulations evolve over time to allow me to find the
order in which events occur. Although the sample size is small, the MA simulations (in
red in Figure 6.17) follow similar trajectories over time to the SA simulations, and I
hypothesise if given more iterations these simulations may have become sedentary. The
MA state thus seems to be a necessary transitional state in some circumstances. Thus,
I suggest there are three stable states in my model – MF, SF and SA.
I looked more specifically at how SA simulations evolve. I found that SA simulations
become either sedentary before farming (53% of the time), or farm before becoming
sedentary (47% of the time) – they do not co-occur. I also found that the SA simulations
evolving via becoming sedentary first have the lowest values for the foraging depletion
rate, λ, and higher values for r (i.e. when the foraging environment is good); whereas
those which become farmers first tend to have the lowest values for the farming decay
rate, δ (i.e. when the farming environment is good) (see Figure 6.19c). Hence, the
foraging environment is particularly good for SF simulations, bad for MF simulations
and moderate for SA simulations. For SA simulations to develop via becoming farmers
first the farming conditions will be very good, and for SA simulations to develop via
becoming sedentary first the farming conditions will be moderate.
I found that when SA simulations became sedentary before farmers there is one pop-
ulation size increase (see Figure 6.21). When SA simulations became farmers before
becoming sedentary there was one increase in population size associated with becom-
ing farmers, and then another increase when they became sedentary. Both of these
trajectories still lead to the same carrying capacity for numbers of agents.
When applying my algorithm to look at the order of events (see Figure 6.22 and
Table 6.5) I found that in the evolution of SA simulations (with final mean strategies
of < 0.5) both strategies become lower and then the number of agents increased. This
was true for both pathways of evolution (via sedentism first or farming first). Although
this seems to contradict the previous result, it must be remembered that the algorithm
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detects the first instances of changes. Thus it would not necessarily be the case that
sedentism and farming had fully occurred before the number of agents increased; rather
that the strategies had first started to change before the number of agents did.
In summary, I think the two pathways of evolution of SA simulations are as follows.
First if the conditions are particularly good for farming (δ is low) the agents start to farm
more, this also makes foraging quality worse (because of the farming interference effect),
so quite quickly agents become farmers. At this point their population increases since
farming can support more agents than foragers. There is little benefit to moving since
there is no need to seek out non-depleted foraging environments, and thus sedentism
evolves. After this another population increase can happen since the lack of movement
costs mean agents have higher fitnesses and thus less death and higher fission rates.
Alternatively, if the conditions are good for foraging (λ is low) and not too bad for
farming, the cost-to-benefit of movement is reduced and thus mobile foragers become
less mobile. Since population sizes are low and farming quality is increased with more
farming investment, it is only after sedentism occurs that there is selection for agents to
farm more.
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6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at the effect of adding the ability for agents to choose their
subsistence strategy. This model replicates the link between increased population size,
sedentism and low fitness in farming populations seen in the archaeology evidence (see
Section 1.1.3).
In Section 6.2 I showed how there are three main outcome types: ones with relatively
low numbers of agents, high effort and mobility strategies, high foraging quality and low
farming quality (MF simulations); ones with slightly higher numbers of agents, high
effort and low mobility strategies, lower fitness, high foraging quality and low farming
quality (SF simulations); and ones with very high numbers of agents, low effort and low
mobility strategies, very low fitness, low foraging quality and high farming quality (SA
simulations). The differences between MF and SF simulations are comparable to Type
A and Type B simulations from the Forager Model. I also found some high mobility, low
effort simulations (MA simulations), but these were much rarer than the other three.
I also showed how some parameters are correlated with outcomes of the model.
The potential for large numbers of agents at a site was predicted to be a prerequisite to
agents becoming sedentary farmers, but actually having large numbers did not encourage
sedentary farming. Strategy conservatism made little difference to the model outcomes.
I found that changes in mobility and effort strategies were affected by the environ-
mental conditions. Mobile foragers would become less mobile if the foraging environmen-
tal conditions were very good (quite high foraging growth rates and very low foraging
depletion rates), the farming environmental conditions were bad (farming decay rates
were high) and any farming would negatively impact the foraging quality. Sedentary
farming could evolve if both the foraging and farming environmental conditions were
good, although the conditions were not the best they could be. I showed that SF simu-
lations are the ones where the foraging conditions are particularly good, allowing reduced
mobility to occur, but the farming conditions are not good enough for farming to be a
more beneficial strategy.
In Section 6.3 I introduced environmental variability into the model. I found tempo-
ral variability discouraged changes in strategies and thus most agents remained mobile
foragers. When I introduced spatial variability I found less sedentary farming evolved
than when there was no spatial variability, but there were still some changes in the
strategies. For non-structured spatial variability (random conditions over the region) I
showed that farming and sedentism will evolve at the same time (rather than one at a
time as in the no-variability model).
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When I looked at how the model changes over time in Section 6.4 I found that
sedentary farming simulations evolved from mobile foragers by either first becoming
sedentary and then a farmer, or first becoming a farmer and then sedentary – they
do not co-occur. When farming comes first there is a two-step population increase –
one associated with the switch to farming, and the second associated with becoming
sedentary.
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Summary
In Chapter 1 I gave a summary of what is known about the origins of agriculture –
when and where it happened, the consequences it had, and how it may have spread.
I also discussed how despite many theories, there is no consensus on how and why it
occurred. Since sedentism is linked with the origins of agriculture, I also reviewed some
of the theories for why there might be changes in forager mobility. In this chapter I also
considered how human behavioural ecology can be used as a framework to understand
mobility and subsistence changes.
In Chapter 2 I discussed how evolutionary theory, game theory and agent-based mod-
elling can be used to understand human behaviour in general. I then went on to review
some existing models for forager mobility and also those for the origins of agriculture.
Some of these models provided me with inspiration for the development of a new model,
which I felt was lacking from the literature. Next, I discussed the methodological con-
tributions I have made – a method for parameter sensitivity analysis in mathematical
modelling (fitting to idealised outcomes, FIO), an algorithm for predicting when model
outcomes change, a method to measure convergence in simulation outcome distributions,
and a method to infer parameter-outcome associations and simulation outcome types
(the Outcome Clustering method). I then discussed and analysed the ethnographic,
archaeological and climate data I have used to help me inform and test my model.
These first two chapters provided the motivation, relevant background literature,
tools, and a discussion of data, for Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, where I went on to develop
and analyse evolutionary models for the origins of agriculture.
In Chapter 3 I replicated an existing game-theoretical model which looks at property
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rights and subsistence strategies – the model published by Bowles and Choi (2013). I
applied the fitting to idealised outcomes method to this model to reveal new insights
into its behaviour, and the origins of agriculture.
The behavioural decisions people make will be partially in response to their envi-
ronment, and also the environment will change in accordance with the behaviour of
the people living there. Furthermore, the relationship between population size, mobil-
ity decisions and subsistence decisions are all crucial in understanding why and how
agriculture first began. Thus, in a human behavioural ecology and niche construction
framework, I built an evolutionary model to study the relationships between population
growth, farming and reduced mobility. The first stage in this model’s development (the
Forager Model) which considers mobility decisions of foragers, is explained in Chapter
4. Section 6.1 gives the details of how subsistence strategies were added to the Forager
Model to develop the final model; the Forager-Farmer Model model. Hence this final
model concerned the evolution of two types of behaviour – mobility and subsistence
decisions.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the results from the Forager Model and the Forager-Farmer
Model. Along with the results from Chapter 3, I will give key findings from these models
in the next section. I will specifically discuss if my findings can be validated by data,
if they match the results of the models reviewed in Section 2.3, or if they simply make
new predictions. In Section 7.2 I will discuss the limitations of this work and in Section
7.3 I will discuss how the Forager-Farmer Model could be used in further work.
7.1 Thesis Conclusions
7.1.1 Property Rights and Subsistence Strategy Changes
Key findings from my replication and analysis of the Bowles and Choi model in Chapter
3 were that for the emergence of farming in the model certain conditions were preferred,
these were; group structuring (lots of small groups which do not change much), small
(but not too small) group sizes, conservatism (low behavioural experimentation), and
farming-friendly property rights. I also found that the productivity of farming does not
necessarily have to be less than that of foraging for farming to emerge. Furthermore,
the migration rate was unimportant for the emergence of farming.
The work in this chapter also provided an example of how parameter interactions,
sensitivities, and complexities, can be missed when using a fix-all-but-one parameter
sensitivity analysis. By using the FIO approach I was able to explore many more of
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these model behaviours.
7.1.2 Mobility Changes in a Forager Population
After running experiments with my own evolutionary model in Chapter 5 I predicted
that a reduction in hunter-gatherer mobility was more likely to occur when there were
large carrying capacities, large initial population densities and low movement costs. The
amount of strategy experimentation was unimportant, as was having a high maximum
probability of fissioning.
Temporal variability discouraged the evolution of low mobility, and spatial vari-
ability allowed the co-occurrence of both high and low mobility in the same simulated
world. The former result matches the archaeological record in SW Asia, where there is
a correlation between the climate becoming more stable (at the end of the Late Glacial
Maximum, and at the start of the Holocene) and the appearance of sedentism. It is also
similar to the model prediction of Dow and Reed (2015) where in bad weather with high
variance there is increased mobility and vice versa.
For the evolution of low mobility in my model I found that the foraging growth rate
should be high and the depletion rate should be low (i.e. the foraging quality is good).
This reflects what is found in Kelly’s (2013) ethnographic data (see Section 2.5.1), where
in areas of low primary biomass (i.e. where there is more to eat) there are less residential
moves. There was no explicit relationship between the foraging quality parameters and
mobility behaviour, and thus this result is emergent. This result is also similar to one
of the findings from the model by Hamilton et al. (2016); where changes in subsistence
ecology (specifically increases in biodiversity) would cause switches to sedentism.
In this chapter I also used the Outcome Clustering method (described in Section
2.4.4) to group the types of outcome that can occur. Using this I found that there was a
continuum of outcome types; from those with high mean mobility strategies, high mean
fitness, low numbers of agents and low mean foraging qualities, to those with low mean
mobility strategies, low mean fitness, high numbers of agents and high mean foraging
qualities. Furthermore, I used the algorithm described in Section 2.4.2 to predict the
point at which outcomes begin to change significantly in time; I found that if mobility
decreases it will do so before there is an increase in the numbers of agents.
It is worth noting that whilst the simulations using the Forager Model started with
all agents having random strategies, agents in the Forager-Farmer Model start being
mobile foragers. Thus, in the Forager-Farmer Model there is almost no variation in
strategies initially, so there needs to be some mutation in order to introduce this. In the
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Forager Model having a high initial population density was important for the evolution
of reduced mobility. However, in the Forager-Farmer Model this parameter was preferred
to be at a low value. This will be because there was only ever one seed agent (an agent
with slightly lower mobility and effort strategies than the rest of the population) in the
Forager-Farmer Model, regardless of initial population density. Thus for any evolution
of sedentism or farming it is beneficial for this seed agent to be at a higher proportion
of the population (which will be achieved with lower population sizes).
7.1.3 Mobility and Subsistence Strategy Changes in a Mixed Popula-
tion
My results from experiments using the Forager-Farmer Model in Chapter 6 showed
that three strategy types could evolve in the model; mobile foragers, sedentary foragers
and sedentary farmers. Although I do find some mobile farmers, I predict that given
more time these simulations would have evolved decreased mobility. I find that with the
evolution of sedentary farmers the two strategies evolve in two stages, i.e. mobile foragers
becoming sedentary and then farmers, or mobile foragers become farmers and then
sedentary. These pathways occurred in roughly equal proportions. The archaeological
record does not give a consensus on whether sedentism caused a switch to farming or
vice versa (see Section 1.1), and thus in some way validates my result.
There are also relationships between the fitness and population sizes of these strategy
types. Mobile foragers have the highest fitness and lowest population size, sedentary
foragers have slightly higher numbers of agents and lower fitnesses, and sedentary farmers
have the highest population sizes and the lowest fitnesses. This result is not obvious.
On the one hand the fitness of agents is the sum of the foraging and farming yields, and
these yields decrease if there are many agents at a site. Hence, it might be expected that
population size and fitness are inversely related. But on the other hand, for population
sizes to increase there needs to be more fissioning than death, but in agents with low
fitnesses the opposite would be expected (lower probabilities of fissioning and more
death). I hypothesised that since mobile foragers live in the worst environments, only
the very fittest can survive. For less mobile agents the conditions are better and thus
more agents can be supported at lower fitnesses.
I find that the environmental variables strongly influence the evolution of agents over
time. Although the space limitation parameter (the negative effect of farming on the
foraging quality) and the foraging growth rate influence the outcomes, the most predic-
tive are the foraging depletion rate and the farming decay rate (λ and δ respectively).
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I find that mobile foragers will stay as mobile foragers (even when there is a non-zero
mutation rate) when both the foraging conditions are bad (low growth rates and high
depletion rates) and the farming conditions are not particularly good either. When there
is evolution to sedentary foraging, the conditions are the best for foraging (the lowest
foraging depletion rate) and the worst for farming (the highest farming depletion rates).
Conversely, when evolution to mobile farming occurs the conditions are the worst for
foraging and the best for farming. I have shown that from mobile farming sedentism
can then evolve. When sedentary farming evolves from mobile foraging via becoming
sedentary first, the foraging conditions are good (but not the best) and farming is good
(but not the best). Hence, if the foraging environmental conditions are particularly
good, farming may never evolve. There will be a switch to sedentary foraging, but there
is no driver for agents to evolve farming. This could be the case in Japan where per-
haps the good foraging conditions and not particularly good farming conditions led to
semi-sedentary and large forager populations (Bleed and Matsui, 2010).
My analysis showed that if there is an increase in the number of agents and decrease in
fitness then these generally happens after decreases in the mobility and effort strategies.
I also found that if sedentary farming evolves via agents becoming farmers first then there
is a clear two-step increase in the numbers of agents, whereas if it evolves via becoming
sedentary first, there is a slight increase in the numbers and then a large increase after
the agents become sedentary farmers. Thus, my model predicts that pressures from
high population sizes are unlikely to be a driving factor in the evolution of farming;
rather high population sizes are something that occur after farming evolves. However, if
mobile foragers become farmers and population sizes increase, there could then be less
benefits for mobility and thus sedentism could be selected for. In comparison to the
models discussed in Section 2.3, Locay (1989) and Dow and Reed (2015) both propose
that population pressure could cause sedentism, Locay (1989) and Dow et al. (2009)
propose population pressure could lead to agriculture, and Wirtz and Lemmen (2003)
predicts population pressure was not a driver for agriculture.
The outcomes of this model replicate to some extent the exponentially decreasing re-
lationship between mobility and population density seen in the ethnographic data (Kelly
(2013), see Section 2.5.1). Also, the link between farming, sedentism, high population
sizes, and reduced fitness seen in this model replicates what is seen in the archaeological
data (reviewed in Section 1.1.3).
In my discussion of the origins of agriculture in Sections 1.1.1 and 1.3.1 I showed
that climate change during the Pleistocene-Holocene transition had impacts on how
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mobile foragers lived. One of these impacts was becoming less mobile and another was
starting to cultivate. My analysis of temporal and spatial environmental variability
models key components of these climate changes: my temporal variation is equivalent
to the more rapid climate fluctuations seen in the Pleistocene (seen in the NGRIP data,
Section 2.5.3), and my spatial variation is equivalent to regional variation in which some
areas could be refugia. My results indeed show that less temporal variation leads to
more sedentism and farming. This refutes the result by Dow and Reed (2011), where
climate shocks (which could be seen as similar to temporal variation) were found to
induce technological experimentation, which could then lead to agriculture. In terms
of spatial variation, I find regional homogeneity leads to the most sedentary farming,
but heterogeneity in both the foraging parameters does still lead to some (more so than
when there is only variation in one foraging parameter). In the Forager Model I found
that structured spatial variability led to the co-occupation of a region by both sedentary
and mobile agents, where sedentary agents would stay in the best environments.
7.2 Limitations
In this section I will discuss limitations with the Forager-Farmer Model, and by extension
the Forager Model. Limitations of the Bowles and Choi model replication are discussed
in Section 3.4.7; and thus I will not repeat them here.
One of the major limitations of this work is in the assumptions of the model. I have
tried to base these on informative data, but this was not always available. Assumptions
both affected what I chose to include in the model and how I set certain parameter values.
I included the factors I believed were most important and interesting in understanding
the origins of agriculture, but I am sure there are other factors which are also important.
However, with more aspects of human behaviour and the environment added to the
model, the more assumptions that need to be made. As the mathematician George Box
(1976) put it,
... following William of Occam he should seek an economical description of natural
phenomena. Just as the ability to devise simple but evocative models is the signa-
ture of the great scientist so overelaboration and overparameterization is often the
mark of mediocrity.
Therefore, the very nature of modelling means processes will be not included, and
caution must be taken when interpreting the model. The assumptions I made in estimat-
ing certain parameter values (pmax, µ, nmax and φ) should also be borne in mind. For
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example, I modelled the relationship between fitness and fissioning probability according
to how wealth and reproductive rates are related in the study of Gabbra households by
Mace (1996), but perhaps I should have also considered the idea that in wealthy families
it may be more adaptive to have fewer children and invest more in them (e.g. Kaplan
(1996)). Also, perhaps the assumption that farming quality decreases as soon as a site
is unoccupied needs reviewing. This is not the case for the Mikea forager-farmers of
Madagascar, who plant crops and then leave the area, returning when the crops are
ready for cultivation (Kelly et al., 2005).
A limitation of the FIO method is that there is the risk that I did not run enough
simulations to get results which were stable to the effects of stochastic variation in
outcomes. In my replication of the Bowles and Choi model I ran the model 1.2 × 108
times, in the Forager Model I ran it 100,000 times for each of Experiments 5, 6 and 7,
and I ran the Forager-Farmer Model 10,000 times for Experiment 1 and 100,000 times for
Experiment 2. Furthermore, my analysis of the events over time in the Forager-Farmer
Model was only based on 1000 simulations. There is no exact way to test how many runs
of the model are needed, but generally the more there are the more robust the results
are. I am confident that the overall pattern of my results would not change very much
if I ran more simulations, but I could possibly give more robust predictions about what
the environmental parameter values may be for certain strategies to evolve.
As mentioned in Chapter 2 a lack of detailed data is one of the reasons for creating
models, and using the FIO method to analysis parameter sensitivity is one way to not
bias results by poorly defined parameter values (if data is lacking). Data is important for
testing the validity of the model, and the absence of this is an inadequacy of this work.
Ideally, I would have a yearly record of the proportion of farmers to foragers, and how
mobile they were, throughout the Pleistocene-to-Holocene transition. With this data I
could test how accurate my model predictions were, and thus make strong inferences
on what the environmental conditions would have to be for sedentary agriculture to
develop when it did. Unfortunately this data does not exist. I do, however, replicate a
number of correlations observed in the archaeological and ethnographic literature, and
have refrained from making any grandiose statements on the predictive power of my
model. Thus, I treat my model results as a means of sharpening intuitions on how
generalised environmental states may be in order for certain strategies to evolve.
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7.3 Further Work
There are many additional tests and extensions I would like to make to the Forager-
Farmer Model. I will describe the main ones in this section.
My model looks at families in a 1000 km2 region over a 1000 year period. Under
particular environmental conditions I found that sedentary farming can evolve during
this time. However, in reality (see Table 1.1) the evolution from mobile foragers to
sedentary farmers may have taken much longer than this. One of the reasons for this
discrepancy is that some of the parameters values I have used are not fixed to real data.
However, the results presented in this thesis still have merit – they still give predictions
for how the conditions might have been in order for sedentism and farming to evolve,
and also the processes in which they occurred. An extension to this work would be to
run the model over more iterations, and then analyse the simulations which gave rise
to sedentary farming after the number of years it might be expected for the transition
from mobile foraging to sedentary farming to occur (this was around 3500 years in SW
Asia). This model could then be directly compared to the proxies for agricultural uptake
rates and sedentism in the archaeological datasets discussed in Section 2.5.2 (see Figures
2.18b and 2.19b).
In my spatial variability experiments I varied the environmental parameters (the
growth rate, depletion rates and space limitation scalar); these parameters directly affect
the foraging and farming qualities, which in turn affect the agents living there. The
purpose of this was to model differences in the region. Additionally, there could have
been other interesting ways to look at spatial variability. One could be to look at the
effect of mobility barriers in the region (e.g. mountains and rivers), which could be
quite simply modelled by making the cost of movement change at different sites. I
could have also looked at more stark differences in the environmental conditions when
there is structured spatial variability (rather than the gradual changes I modelled) – this
might be similar to the model of the Mimbres region by Anderies and Hegmon (2011).
Furthermore, as in the model by Hamilton et al. (2016) it would be interesting to also
consider changes in the distance moved (rather than just whether agents move or not)
in different region types.
In the Forager and Farmer-Forager Models agents affect each other because of changes
they make to the environment and by sharing resources with other agents which occupy
the same site. There are no direct interactions between agents. Rather than assuming
that people would happily allow others to come and forage at the site they occupy, it
would be of interest to include a game-theoretical element of interaction when a new
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agent tries to migrate to a site. This could be whether the agents fight for the occupa-
tion of the site, or perhaps cooperate in defending the site from other migrating agents
(similarly to the models of Freeman and Anderies, 2012; Marceau and Myers, 2006). If
agents cooperated this could result in the formation of groups of agents – which might
be more realistic since nuclear families are not typically alone in their movements or
agricultural networks (they would be in foraging bands or farming communities).
I discussed in Section 1.1.3 that storage, property rights and social inequality are all
consequences of agriculture. Hence, I could also include the ability for agents to store
a certain amount of their resources and, as in Bowles and Choi (2013), allow agents to
have a property-rights behavioural strategy whereby stored items might be respected
or stolen by agents co-occupying the same site. Since the Forager-Farmer Model takes
into account mobility strategies too (and Bowles and Choi’s model does not) it would
be interesting to look at the relationship between mobility, storage and property rights.
All these factors would mean I could then examine social inequality in my model, and
investigate the circumstances in which there are consistent differences in the amount of
accumulated wealth (from storage of resources, or the regular ownership of a site).
The goal of this thesis was to examine why people switched from foraging to farming
during the transition to agriculture. The work in this thesis has tested hypotheses
for this, developed a new evolutionary model which could be used to test many more
hypotheses surrounding mobility and subsistence behaviour, made explicit predictions
that can be tested against archaeological and ethnographic data, and also made several
methodological contributions, including a new method for parameter sensitivity analysis
in archaeological models.
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A Data from Robert Kelly
In obtaining the hunter-gatherer data in The Lifeways of Hunter-Gatherers: The For-
aging Spectrum (Kelly, 2013) I contacted Robert Kelly. Kelly sent me two data tables;
the first contains the mobility variables in Table 4-1 of Kelly (2013, pg. 80–84), and the
second dataset given to me contains the data in Table 7-3 of Kelly (2013, pg. 178–184).
In the first dataset there were nine discrepancies between the data given to me and
the book, for example for the Berens River Ojibwa peoples a figure of 320 was given as
the total distance (km) in the book, but in the data given to me this figure was given as
the total area (km2). There were also data entries with vague values given, for example
the number of residential moves per year for the Chilkat Tlingit is given as ‘> 2’ and the
total area given for the Maidu is given as ‘455 - 3,255’. I excluded any of the discrepancy
data points in my analysis, if a range of values was given I took the mid point, and for
data enteries of ‘> 2’ or ‘2?’ I used a value of 2. I copied the Primary Biomass (kg/m2)
values by hand from the book.
The second dataset (Table 7-3 of Kelly (2013, pg. 178–184)) gives the country/area
the hunter-gatherer group lives in (e.g. ‘Greenland’), the area category (e.g. ‘Arctic’),
and the population density. There are several discrepancies between the data given to
me and the book values, for example for the Anbarra the book gives values of 2 and 43
for population density, and in the database it just gives 43. I use the book value in my
analysis, and if there are multiple or a range of values then a mid point is taken.
I also used the data from Table 4-3 in Kelly (2013, pg. 92) on the annual residual
moves and the dependence on fish. If an inexact data value was given for residential
moves (e.g. ‘>4’ or ‘0-2’) the highest value mentioned in the table is given (in the
example these would be 4 and 2), and a value of 75 is set when ‘High’ is given for
dependence on fish. Values from tables 7-2 (pg. 171), 7-5 (pg. 195–196) and 7-7 (pg.
201) in Kelly (2013) are used to look at group size, fertility and mortality respectively.
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If values in the book are recorded as a range of values I used the mid point value in my
calculations.
Table A1 shows the collated mobility and population density data for 87 groups.
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B Corrections to Bowles and Choi’s Model
Whilst translating the published description of Bowles and Choi’s (2013) algorithm into
code I spotted several mistakes and misleading or unclear explanations. Bowles and
Choi clarified these over email and the corrections/explanations are as follows:
1. In a Bourgeois - Bourgeois interaction one will win with probability of 0.5.
2. θ = −(0.45− w)/5
3. Payoffs are reset to zero after each iteration.
4. One iteration = one generation = 20 years.
5. The benchmark parameters for v and γ are 8 and 5 respectively.
6. ‘piS be there average payoff of the group" on page 11 of the supplementary material
should be a pi.
7. pii is the average payoff of group i.
8. If the cultural model is chosen to be a sharer (for example), then one sharer will
be chosen at random from the cultural model group.
9. An agent could pick itself as its own cultural model.
10. The reward or cost when a civic attempts to punish another individual is shared
between all the civics in the group.
11. In the equation for f , n is the size of the group, hence (1−α− β)n is the number
of civics in the group.
12. A farmer is picked as a cultural model with probability (frequency of farmers)η/(freq.
of farmersη+freq. of foragersη), and similarly for foragers.
13. The number of agents which immigrate into a group is equal to the number that
migrate from the group.
14. All the groups are paired for between-group interactions.
15. Any value of θ greater than 1.5 is set to 1.5 (although this has no effect when the
benchmark parameters are used).
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16. It is not the case that updating will definitely occur if the model’s fitness is greater
than the updating individual’s. What actually happens is the following:
if (the model’s fitness > the updating individual’s)
x = model’s fitness − updating individual’s fitness
if (x < a random number between 0 and 1)
the individual with update its strategy to the model’s strategy
else
the individual will not update its strategy
end
end
17. The same set of random numbers are used for each run of 1000 simulations, each
of the 1000 simulations have different results though.
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C Model Coding and Running Information
All the models presented in this dissertation – my replication of the Bowles and Choi
model, and experiments with the Forager model and the Forager-Farmer model – were
coded in C++.
Using my laptop (a late 2013 MacBook Pro, with a 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 processor
and 8GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory) one simulation of the Bowles and Choi model took
on average 2.91 seconds, one simulation of the Forager Model experiment 5 took on
average 0.084 seconds, and one simulation of the Forager-Farmer model experiment 1
took on average 0.22 seconds.
D Justifying Limit Assumptions in the Bowles and Choi
Model
Finding the maximum value for the payoff parameters (C, Vh, τ and z) involved as-
sumptions that were not grounded in observed data. However, in the main analysis (see
Section 3.3) it was found that the model outcomes are not very sensitive to the values
for C and τ , so there is little evidence to suggest that changing the upper limit of their
ranges would make much of a difference.
The parameters Vh and z do have an effect on the model outcome, but I suspected it
was their ratio that made the difference, rather than their values individually. If this is
true it means the upper limit to these parameter values should not change interpretations
in this analysis.
To test this I compared the relative frequencies of parameters in the top 1% of
simulations using both the original ranges for Vh and z, and also using half these original
ranges (i.e. the top 1% of simulations where Vh ≤ 5 and z ≤ 9.605). Figure D1
shows this comparison – I see that the distributions (other than for Vh and Va, where
Va = (r − θ)z − z) are very similar. Hence, it is really only the value of this ratio that
has an effect on the number of farmers in this model, so increasing the upper limit for
this should make no difference to our interpretation.
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Figure D1: Relative frequency plots of each parameter for the top 1% of simulations
(green) and the top 1% of simulations which had both Vh ≤ 5 and z ≤ 9.605 (black).
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E FIO Ranking Criteria in the Bowles and Choi Model
In my FIO analysis of the Bowles and Choi model, I could have looked at how much
farming existed over the period of agricultural establishment to present day, as perhaps
simulations which have many farmers at 9000 yBP, but then decrease in number should
not be classified as simulations reflecting reality. However, I find a mostly equal trend
between the number of farmers at 9000 yBP and the number at 0 yBP, between the
number of farmers at 9000 yBP and the minimum number of farmers between 0 and
9000 yBP, and also between the number of farmers at 9000 yBP and the average number
of farmers between 0 and 9000 yBP (Figure E1). Hence, I conclude that it is realistic
to assume that a simulation will have a similar number of farmers between 0 and 9000
yBP. Thus, my results can be applied to other origins of farming in different regions of
the world (as the Near East was the earliest).
I also could have considered the number of bourgeois farmers at 9000 yBP as my
acceptance criteria in this analysis. However, I found that out of all the simulations
92.5% were in both the highest 1% number of farmers and the highest 1% number of
Bourgeois farmers. Thus the difference this makes to the results in small, which can also
be seen in Figure E2.
Figure E1: How the number of farmers at 9000 yBP in the model relates to the number
at 0 yBP (left); the minimum number between 9000 and 0 yBP (middle); and the average
number between 9000 and 0 yBP (right). The line y = x is shown in red.
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Figure E2: Relative frequency plots of each parameter for the top 1% slices of the
1.2 × 107 simulations. When the number of Bourgeois farmers is used as the success
criteria (black) and when the number of farmers is used as the success criteria (green).
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F ODD Protocol for the Forager Model
The ODD (Overview, Design concepts, Detail) protocol offers a consistent way to com-
municate agent-based models with other researchers (Grimm et al., 2010). The Forager
Model has been described without this protocol in Chapter 4, but as good practice I
will also describe the model using the seven subelements of the ODD protocol here. I
will reference parts of Chapter 4 when necessary, rather than repeat myself.
F.1 Purpose
The Forager Model is used to consider the circumstances for which foragers become less
mobile, and what consequences and associations this transition might have.
F.2 Entities and State Variables
Entities in the model are families and sites. State variables for families are their fitness,
mobility strategy and which site the family occupies. State variables for sites include
spatial coordinates and foraging quality.
F.3 Process Overview and Scheduling
Time is modelled as discrete iterations where one iteration represents one year. State
variables can be updated each iteration. The flow diagram on page 144 gives an overview
of the model.
F.4 Design Concepts
1. Adaptation: Agents in the model can change their mobility strategy via random
mutation, and the strategy will change more in this step if the agent is less fit.
Fitter agents are also more likely to fission and thus pass on their mobility strategy
to the new agent. Thus natural selection acts on the mobility strategy.
2. Emergence: The mobility strategies, fitnesses and number of agents, and the for-
aging quality of sites over time can all change sometimes unpredictably.
3. Objectives: Agents want to have a high enough fitness not to die.
4. Prediction and Learning: If agents have a high fitness they will not mutate their
mobility strategy by much (if mutation occurs). This could be thought of learning
or predicting from past experience what mobility strategy might be beneficial.
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When agents move site they predict, based on the current conditions, which site
will be most beneficial (in terms of fitness) to move to.
5. Sensing: Agents can sense the current environmental conditions of sites in the
calculation of which site to move to.
6. Interaction: Agents and the sites they occupy interact with one another via the
process of foraging. Agents do not interact with one another.
7. Stochasticity: Initial conditions, fissioning, mutation and movement all have ran-
dom elements.
8. Observation: At the beginning of each iteration, and at the end of the entire
simulation, all state variables can be recorded.
F.5 Initialization
Section 4.6 gives details of the initial state of the model.
F.6 Input data
There is no input data to the Forager Model.
F.7 Submodels
The submodels of the Forager Model (changes in foraging quality and fitness, fissioning,
mutation, movement) are explained in detail in Sections 4.1.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5
respectively. All constants, variables and parameters in the Forager Model are given in
Table 4.1.
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G Weighted Selection Algorithm
I use an algorithm to select a value from a list (usually numbers between 0 and 1)
weighted on how big the value is. I use this algorithm in a few places in my code, one
of which is where I select the new site (randsite) a migrating agent will go to based on
my calculation of the attractiveness of each of the sites (siteattract). This algorithm is
as follows
// a. Sum all the site attractivenesses:
double sumattract = 0;
for (int s=0; s<NUMSITES; s++)
{
sumattract = sumattract + siteattract[s];
}
// b. Pick a random number between 0 and the sum
randnum = ((double)(rand() % 1000)/1000)*sumattract; // [0,sumattract)
// c. Go through the items one at a time, subtracting each weight
// from your random number, until you get the item where the
// random number is less than that item’s weight
for (int s = 0; s < NUMSITES; s++)
{
if (randnum < siteattract[s])
{
randsite = s;
break;
}
randnum = randnum - siteattract[s];
}
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H Details of the Forager Model Runs
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Table H1: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 1 – to check the effect of
initial conditions. Initial conditions are changed 100 times and each combination is ran
1000 times.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1,000 × 100
Number of iterations 1,000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table H2: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 2 – to check how many
iterations to run the model for.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000
Number of iterations 2000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
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Table H3: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 3 – to check the effect of
region size. The model is run 1000 times for six different region sizes.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000 × 6
Number of iterations 1000
sx Number of sites in x axis 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20
sy Number of sites in y axis 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table H4: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 4 – using an average to
summarise the final population.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1,000
Number of iterations 1,000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
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Table H5: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 5 – varying all 8 param-
eters.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 100,000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 600
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism [ 50, 150]
pmax Maximum probability of fission [ 0, 0.5]
η Fitness cost of movement per site [ 0, 0.2]
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
[ 2, 6]
µ Mutation rate [ 0, 1]
ρinit Initial population density [ 0.05, 0.2]
Table H6: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 6 – varying 4 parameters.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 100,000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 600
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission [ 0, 0.5]
η Fitness cost of movement per site [ 0, 0.2]
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
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Table H7: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 7 – varying 2 parameters.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 100,000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 600
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table H8: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 8 – looking at temporal
variability.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 10,000 × 3
Number of iterations 1000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
WD Random walk distance 0.1
Run-in time 300
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Table H9: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 9 – looking at spatial
variability.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 10,000 × 3
Number of iterations 1000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table H10: Constants and parameters in the non-FIO Experiment 10 – looking at
simulations over time.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000
Number of iterations 1000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
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I Investigating Mutation Rate
My experiments suggested that the mutation rate did not seem to effect which cluster
each simulation was assigned to. To test this further I ran the model with µ = 0 and
varied the other 7 parameters (otherwise the same as in Experiment 5), and also set
µ = 0 and varied only r and λ (otherwise the same as in Experiment 7). I found that
setting µ = 0 gave less high mean mobility strategy outcomes, which can be seen in
Figure I1. A comparison of the clustering results when varying 7 parameters were very
similar to when µ was varied from 0 to 1 (Experiment 5). Figures I2a and I2b show
the outcomes and parameter inputs in the clusters of simulations. A comparison of this
figure with Figures 5.8 and 5.12 give little differences.
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Figure I1: A comparison of the relative densities of simulation outcomes when varying
all 8 parameters, when varying 7 parameters and fixing µ = 0, when varying 2 parameters
and setting µ = 0.04, and when varying 2 parameters and setting µ = 0 (and unless
otherwise stated default parameter values are used).
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(a) Outcomes of the different clusters of simulations when seven param-
eters are varied.
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(b) Parameters of the different clusters of simulations when seven parameters are varied.
Figure I2: The outcomes (a) and parameters (b) in the different clusters of simulations
when there is no mutation (µ = 0), using all the simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in
the final iteration. The most and least mobile clusters are highlighted with a slightly
thicker line.
270
J. WHEN THE ENVIRONMENT BECOMES STABLE
J When the Environment Becomes Stable
In the main text I look at temporal variability occurring in the model after some run-in
period, here I investigate the effect of stabilising temporal variability. To do this I ran
the model 1000 times where for the first iteration a random value for r and λ were
chosen (all the other parameters were at their default value, see Table J1), and then
until iteration 500 r and λ varied according to a random walk with a walk distance of
0.1 (as described in Section 5.4.1). The value for r and λ at iteration 500 was then kept
the same until iteration 1000. I compared this to a run of the model where there was no
temporal variability, and found little difference in the outcomes – see Figure J1. In fact,
the temporal variability in the first 500 iterations appears to make no difference, and
the outcome is only determined by which values for r and λ there are at iteration 500. I
compare the relationship between parameter values at iteration 500 and the final mean
mobility strategy in both the temporal variability and no variability runs in Figure J2.
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Figure J1: Relative densities of outcomes in the simulations with stabilising random
variability (blue) and the simulations with no variability (red). Only simulations with
≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration are included.
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Figure J2: The relationship between parameter values at the 500 iteration (which is
the same as any other iteration when there is no variability) and the final mean mobility
strategy in the simulations with stabilising random variability (blue) and the simulations
with no variability (red). Only simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration
are included.
Table J1: Constants and parameters when I look at the switch from temporal variability
to stability. This involves running it once with variability on, and once with it off (to
compare).
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000 × 3
Number of iterations 1000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of agents which can
be supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
WD Random walk distance 0.1
Run-in time 0
Iteration of stability 500
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K Preliminary Checks for the Forager-Farmer Model
For comparability between adding subsistence strategies to the model and not (i.e. the
work described in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively), I set the number of sites, the number
of iterations and the minimum foraging quality, equal to their values in the Forager
Model (namely 100, 1000 and 0.1 respectively). However, I still perform some checks on
these constants to make sure that I understand their influence on the model.
K.1 Number of Iterations
I ran the model 1000 times over 1900 iterations and recorded various outcomes every
100 iterations. Table M1 shows the parameters in this experiment and Figure K1 shows
the distribution of outcomes at each of the recorded iterations. I do see changes in the
mean value between iterations 1000 and 1900, but from Figure K2 I can see the relative
densities of outcomes between iterations 1000 and 1900 are quite similar, and thus my
interpretation of the results would be similar.
K.2 Number of Sites
I ran the model 1000 times for 5 different region sizes – 8×8, 9×9, 10×10, 11×11, and
12 × 12, Table M2 shows the parameter values used in this experiment. In Figure K3
I show the distributions of the final outcomes of the simulations for each of the region
sizes. I see that increasing the region size means that there can be more agents in the
final iteration and the final foraging quality is higher, but otherwise the outcomes do
not change too much.
K.3 Averaging
I ran the model 1000 times over 1000 iterations, varying r, λ, β and δ. I saved all the
family and site information in the final iteration, to see whether using mean values is
representative of the whole population.
I looked at the relationship between the densities of final outcomes and the mean
value calculated for these outcomes. The main concern is finding out whether a mean
value of around 0.5 means that the outcomes are all around 0.5, or that they are spread
between 0 and 1 (and therefore give an average of 0.5). I find that the latter is often
the case for effort, mobility and null strategies, but for the final fitness and the foraging
quality the former is often the case. For the farming quality there are very few simula-
tions with a mean outcome of 0.5. These results can be seen in Figure K4, where the
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Figure K1: Violin plots of model outcomes at various iterations of 1000 simulations.
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Figure K2: Relative densities of model outcomes in iterations 1, 1000 and 1900.
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Figure K3: Violin plots of the final properties of simulations for different region sizes.
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yellow lines are those with final mean values of around 0.5.
Figure K4: Relative frequencies of all final outcomes coloured by the final mean value.
K.4 Outcomes of Preliminary Checks
In the Forager Model I also looked at the effect from initial conditions, however in the
Forager-Farmer Model every simulation has the same initial strategies (0.99 with one
seed agent with a strategy of 0.8), so this is somewhat unnecessary.
These preliminary checks have shown that the distribution of outcome values are still
changing at the 1000th iteration (i.e. they do not stabilise at this point). Because of
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this I cannot say whether the outcome types are stable strategies or not – i.e. will there
always be some simulations with high mobility and effort strategies, or over time do
they all become low mobility and effort simulations? However, this does not invalidate
my results, it just means that I need to consider the fact I am only looking at changes
over a 1000 year period. For example, rather than using the model to ask “what are the
conditions for the evolution of sedentary farming?”, I would instead ask “what are the
conditions for the evolution of sedentary farming over 1000 years?”.
The preliminary checks also show that using a region size of 10 × 10 does not bias
results too much, and when a final mean outcome is around 0.5, I need to remember
that this means (in most cases) that the final agents have a wide distribution of outcome
values (they are not all around 0.5).
277
L. CLUSTER ANALYSIS USING THE FORAGER-FARMER MODEL
L Cluster Analysis Using the Forager-Farmer Model
I used the Outcome Clustering method described in Section 2.4.4, namely the function
‘Mclust’ in the R library ‘mclust’ (Fraley and Raftery, 2002; Fraley et al., 2012; R Core
Team, 2013), to cluster my simulations by the 6 outcomes (final number of agents, mean
effort and mobility strategies, mean fitness, foraging quality and farming quality). For
Experiment 1, in which I varied all 12 of the parameters, the algorithm found 4 clusters.
The relative frequencies of the outcomes and parameters are plotted in Figures L1a and
L1b. Pairwise relationships between all the outcomes, coloured by cluster, are plotted
in Figure L2.
I will refer to two extreme types of simulation as Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1
simulations have low numbers of agents, high effort and mobility strategies, high final
mean fitnesses, high foraging quality and low farming quality. Type 2 have the opposite
– high numbers of agents, low final mean effort and mobility strategies, low final mean
fitness, low final mean foraging quality, and high final mean farming quality. From my
cluster analysis I find a clear Type 2 cluster (in the plots this is the blue cluster). There
is less of an obvious Type 1 cluster (red in the plots) where the final mean strategies are
generally high, but still quite spread.
Type 2 simulations have the lowest values for δ and η, and the highest values for
nmax. They also have relatively high values for r, low values for λ, high values for φ,
high values for pmax, high values for µ. The placement of a simulation into any of the
clusters is insensitive to the value of β, κe, κm or ρinit. Hence for the evolution of mostly
sedentary farmers the foraging and farming conditions should be good, the decay term
in farming should be low, the number of agents should have the potential to be quite
big, the cost of movement should be low, and there should not be too little mutation.
Interpretation of what influences the evolution (or stability) of mobile foraging is not as
clear, because there is no cluster with solely highly mobile foragers.
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0.0 0.4 0.8
0.
00
00
0.
00
20
r
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
0.0 0.4 0.8
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
λ
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
1 2 3 4 5
0.
00
00
0.
00
20
φ
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
0.0 0.4 0.8
0.
00
00
0.
00
15
β
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
0.00 0.04 0.08
0.
00
0
0.
01
0
δ
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
60 80 120
0.
00
00
0.
00
20
κm
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
60 80 120
0.
00
00
0.
00
20
κe
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
0.0 0.2 0.4
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
pmax
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
0.00 0.10 0.20
0.
00
0
0.
00
4
0.
00
8
η
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
2 3 4 5 6
0.
00
0
0.
00
3
nmax
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
0.0 0.4 0.8
0.
00
00
0.
00
20
µ
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
ρinit
R
el
at
ive
 d
en
sit
y
(b) Parameters in different clusters.
Figure L1: The outcomes (a) and parameters (b) in the different clusters, using all the
6390 simulations with ≥ 15 agents alive in the final iteration when all parameters are
varied.
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Figure L2: Outcome pairs coloured by cluster, using all the 6390 simulations with ≥ 15
agents alive in the final iteration when all parameters are varied.
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Table M1: Constants and parameters in an experiment to check how many iterations
to run the model for.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000
Number of iterations 2000
Maximum number of agents allowed 3000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
5
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
κe Effort strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
6
µ Probability of mutation 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table M2: Constants and parameters in an experiment to check the effect of region
size. The model is run 1000 times for five different region sizes.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000 × 6
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 1920,2430,3000,3630
sx Number of sites in x axis 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
sy Number of sites in y axis 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
5
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
κe Effort strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
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Table M3: Constants and parameters in an experiment to check the effect of averaging.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 3000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
5
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
κe Effort strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table M4: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 1 – varying all 12 pa-
rameters.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 10,000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 3000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
[ 1, 5]
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism [ 50, 150]
κe Effort strategy conservatism [ 50, 150]
pmax Maximum probability of fission [ 0, 0.5]
η Fitness cost of movement per site [ 0, 0.2]
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
[ 2, 6]
µ Mutation rate [ 0, 1]
ρinit Initial population density [ 0.05, 0.2]
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Table M5: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 2 – varying 4 parameters.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 100,000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 3000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
5
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
κe Effort strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table M6: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 3 – looking at temporal
variability.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 10,000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 3000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
5
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
κe Effort strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
WD Random walk distance [ 0, 1]
Run-in time 0
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Table M7: Constants and parameters in the FIO Experiment 4 – looking at spatial
variability.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 10,000 × 5
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 3000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
5
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
κe Effort strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
Table M8: Constants and parameters in the non-FIO Experiment 5 – looking at
simulations over time.
Constants Value
Number of simulations 1000
Number of iterations 1000
Maximum number of agents allowed 3000
sx Number of sites in x axis 10
sy Number of sites in y axis 10
qf,min Minimum foraging quality 0.1
Parameters Range
r Foraging quality growth rate [ 0, 1]
λ Foraging quality depletion scalar [ 0, 1]
φ How many times more farmers can be sup-
ported than foragers
5
β Space limitation scalar [ 0, 1]
δ Farming depletion parameter [ 0, 0.1]
κm Mobility strategy conservatism 100
κe Effort strategy conservatism 100
pmax Maximum probability of fission 0.14
η Fitness cost of movement per site 0.05
nmax Maximum number of foragers which can be
supported at a site
6
µ Mutation rate 0.04
ρinit Initial population density 0.1
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N. RESEARCH ARTICLE
N Research Article
This appendix contains the work from Chapter 3 published as:
Gallagher, E. M., Shennan, S. J., and Thomas, M. G. 2015. “Transition to farming
more likely for small, conservative groups with property rights, but increased productiv-
ity is not essential”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(46):14218–
14223.
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